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ABSTRACT 
The thesis begins by enquiring into the relationship between 
polit ics and public order in a world of change (Introduction: 'Politics* 
Public Order and Time'). The view is put forward that polit ical act i -
vity is crucial in maintaining an order which enables men to coordinate 
their act iv i t ies . The concept of order is then examined and the way in 
which change is significant in the establishment of individual identity 
in a shared public world is explored (Chapter 1: 'Order, Change and 
Identity') . The thesis then moves to a consideration of what i t means 
to be a member of such a public order and of a c i v i l society in partic-
ular (Chapter 2: 'Membership and Citizenship'). Being a member is seen 
as accepting certain rights and duties with regard to others. The way 
in which these rights and duties are specified in c i v i l society and the 
obligations which they impose are then examined (Chapter 3: 'Law and 
Obligation'). In the following chapter the character of authority and 
the role i t plays in establishing the rights and duties of membership 
are taken up (Chapter 4: 'Authority'). The distinctive characteristics 
of institutions and organizations in establishing and enforcing the con-
ditions of membership in c i v i l society are then considered (Chapter 5: 
'Pol i t ical Institutions and Organizations'). When these conditions are 
not readily complied with, coercion may become necessary, and i ts role 
in the maintenance of public order is- examined (Chapter 6: 'Coercion, 
Violence and Public Order'). The debate which precedes the passage of 
any law creating obligations is the concern of the following chapter 
(Chapter 7: 'Polit ical T a l k ' ) , and the thesis moves to an examination of 
how such debate is brought to a close (Chapter 8: 'Polit ical Conven-
t ions ' ) . These distinct aspects of polit ical activity taken together 
constitute over time a characteristic way of going about politics which 
has a prescriptive force (Chapter 9: 'Tradition'). Final ly , the successful 
maintenance of a relatively continuous public order is seen to l i e in 
the possibi l i t ies i t upholds for freedom (Chapter 10: 'Freedom and 
Order'). 
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PREFACE 
In recent years a great deal of time and energy has been devoted 
to the problem of social and polit ical change. Attention has been 
focused on the d i f f i cu l t i es of social and political orders which are 
facing the transition from what we may cal l tribal and/or feudal socie-
ties with modern economies. At the same time, we in the West have be-
come concerned in our own societies with the problem of change and the 
necessity of meeting new and unprecedented problems in our own social 
orders. We anxiously wonder i f we are capable of changing fast enough 
to survive or i f we are changing too fast and are losing something of 
value in the process. 
Amidst a l l this concentration on the problems and potentials of 
change, what is perhaps equally remarkable is the relative continuity 
and stabi l i ty of social orders. I f i t is less fashionable to be con-
cerned with order and continuity than with innovation and change, i t is 
nonetheless true that order i s not without interest or significance. 
This thesis originated in a reluctance to embrace the current preoccu-
pation with change and i ts concomitant disposition to regard order as 
something which is given in our experience and which need not concern us 
unduly. Here order is as problematic as change, and the concern is to 
elucidate what i t i s that characterizes a public order, the purpose i t 
serves and how i t is maintained through time. 
In a sense, this preoccupation with public order is not a rejection 
of the current debate about change, but is simply the obverse,side of 
that concern. Order and change, while distinct, are not separate and 
isolated features of human experience which can be treated apart from one 
another. The two are interdependent. Change would not make sense out-
side of order, and order could not be conceived apart from change. There 
( i i ) 
i s , therefore, no attempt here to ignore the significance of change. 
Rather the attempt is to relate change to the often overlooked other 
side of the coin; to see how change is related to order and the way in 
which both are significant in the maintenance and modification of a 
common social world shared amongst men. 
Polit ical activity is not the only way in which public order is 
established and maintained, but i t is a primary way. I t is for this 
reason that polit ical activity remains the focus of this essay. There 
are, of course, various approaches which may be taken in an examination 
of the relationship between polit ical activity and public order. It 
may be both frui t ful and interesting to undertake research into the way 
in which children are socialized into a community and come to accept 
certain polit ical procedures as right and proper. I t may be of interest 
to investigate the way in which perceptions of political events are 
moulded by an anticipation of what wi l l be an acceptable view in the 
eyes of one's peers. Or i t may be valuable to trace the development 
through time of a particular public order, narrating the events which 
may be said to have led to i ts growth or its demise. Such endeavours as 
these may well be revealing about the way in which public order is main-
tained and the role which polit ical activity plays, or has played, in 
i t s preservation, but they are not of concern here. This i s not an 
exercise in polit ical sociology, polit ical psychology or political his-
tory. I t sketches the outlines of human activity from a different per-
spective, that of polit ical philosophy. 
There are, however, various things which could be meant by pol i t i -
cal philosophy, for there are great differences in the kinds of dis-
courses which i t is claimed are polit ical philosophy. In the past, men 
have on occasion embarked upon the analysis of polit ical activity from 
a particular understanding of the nature of man or his purpose in l i f e . 
From such premises, they have proceeded to argue that polit ical order 
ought to exhibit particular characteristics. One thinks most readily 
of Bentham, Burke or Locke. Writers of this kind, in an attempt to 
come to grips with the essential character of political l i f e , have fre-
quently resorted to extended metaphors, analogies or concepts borrowed 
from other discipl ines. The confusing diversity of pol i t ical l i f e is 
c l a r i f i e d , i t has been claimed, i f we understand political society as a 
family, or l ike a market, or in terms of the efficiency of information 
c ircui ts . In these cases one thinks of Filmer, Spencer and Deutsch. 
Such men have suggested that polit ical l i f e is not merely to be under-
stood, but i s to be mastered and transformed as well , and political 
philosophy is significant to the extent that i t provides the theoretical 
basis for such a transformation. 
This essay has a different approach. I t begins not from an under-
standing of the eternal nature of man or his purpose in l i f e , but from a 
particular historical experience. I t attempts to explore the character 
of a polit ical l i f e and its relationship to public order by examining 
the way in which this activity has been carried on over a given period 
in a given place. Moreover, the categories of analysis employed are not 
analogical or metaphorical, nor are they imported from other disciplines. 
They are native to a polit ical tradition. The politics of a particular 
form of society has a vocabulary which is unique to i t s political l i f e . 
Concepts such as citizenship, law, government and freedom are the con-
cern of this essay. 
This i s , then, a characterization of a political experience at a 
particular level of abstraction. I t neither descends to a discussion of 
specific pol i t ical issues nor ascends to consideration of what the u l t i -
mate goal of a l l polit ical activity may be said to be. I t is neither a 
polit ical argument nor an ideological statement. I t seeks to c lar i fy 
and to distinguish different aspects of Western political l i f e which, 
taken together, at once modify and maintain the established, although 
f lu id , public order within which we l ive . The categories of analysis 
are drawn from modern Western pol it ical experience; from the liberal 
democratic societies which have emerged over the past two hundred 
years, and in particular France, Great Britain and the United States. 
The distinctions which are made, the relationships which are traced, 
the conclusions which are drawn serve to illuminate the character of 
pol i t ical activity only in these societies. This essay is a philosoph-
ical characterization of these pol i t ical orders in that i t seeks to 
elucidate the logical distinctions and relationships which pertain be-
tween diverse aspects of polit ical l i f e in these particular kinds of 
societies. 
I t may be concluded "that* because this thesis dir'ectslits attention 
to l iberal democratic societies, i t amounts to a defence of liberalism. 
However, i t is instead an analysis of an experience to which liberals 
have made a notable contribution. To characterize a practice is not to 
defend i t ; to explore i ts dimensions is not ito prescribe . i t . Unlike 
pol it ical and ideological argument, which urge practical activity upon 
the reader, philosophic argument urges only a way of viewing the world. 
The only thing which i t is intended to recommend in these pages is a 
manner of understanding the way in which political activity is carried 
on in modern Western societies. There is no attempt to discredit or 
defend any particular practice; to lend support to or detract from any 
pol i t ical programme; or to eulogize or condemn particular form of 
society. 
I t may be asked, what could be the significance even of the success-
ful achievement of such an endeavour? What just i f icat ion could be given 
for such an effort? The f inal effect of al l this might be dismissed as 
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merely the clearing of our conceptual decks prior to the initiation 
of action in the pol i t ical world. However, even those bent upon action 
must admit that, modest or not, such an effort is necessary i f their 
prescriptions and programmes are to be efficacious. Only when our con-
ceptual decks have been cleared, and our understanding of political 
activity c lar i f i ed , are we in a position to begin to decide i n t e l l i -
gently how and when we should act. I t must be admitted, however, that 
to such men this wil l always be seen as a rather minor enterprise; a 
necessary evil which must precede the far more significant problem of 
pol i t ical action. The claims of this sort of analysis wil l always 
appear modest to them. 
I t is to those whose concern is understanding polit ical activity 
rather than init iating pol it ical action that the achievements of this 
kind of endeavour are l ikely to seem most valuable. Its appeal wil l be 
to those who do not feel impelled to act and are not in search of j u s t i -
f ication for their programme, but who wish to understand the character 
of pol i t ical l i f e in l iberal democratic societies. I f this analysis 
can lead to a keener appreciation of the character of our public l i f e 
and a greater sensitivity to i t s subtleties and nuance^ then to such 
men i t wil l not appear quite so modest and apologetic alongside the more 
imperious and strident claims of polit ical argument or ideological pre-
scription. 
INTRODUCTION 
POLITICS, PUBLIC ORDER AND TIME 
We live in a world in which we experience time, which is to say 
that we live in a world which is always undergoing change. I f there 
were no change, there would be no time. When we talk about the passage 
of time, we are able to do so only because we are able to refer to 
changes in the world which are evidence for the passage of time. 'Now' 
is different from 'then' because in the time that has elapsed since 
'then' we can see that there have been changes in the world. I t is 
change which enables us to mark and identify time; to distinguish one 
time from another. 
Time is thus irrelevant to no man. It pervades the world in which 
a l l men act and is indeed the very condition of action i t s e l f . Time 
cal ls for action for i f time were irrelevant to men there would be no 
reason to act now instead of later, or ever to act at a l l . Action, and 
the order which results from i t , also take time to complete. When action 
is undertaken, purposive changes are initiated in the world; some plan is 
imposed upon i t ; some order i s fashioned within i t . This takes place in 
time, and the duration of the resulting order marks the difference between 
'now' and 'then', before and after. 
However, taken by i t s e l f , the duration of human order cannot provide 
an objective standard of temporal measurement. Men live in the present 
and their memories are subjective. In order to measure the lapse of time 
we rely on the phases of the moon or orbit of the earth about the sun, 
rather than human actions, to make calendars, and the rotation of the 
earth about i ts axis to mark the hours. It is against these changes, 
which do not depend upon the contingency of human action and the subject-
ivity of human memory, that we measure the changes that occur in the 
world. 
Like other ac t iv i t i e s , polit ics must cope with the problems and 
potentials of a world in which change must both be met and initiated. 
I f time were not a part of our l i v e s , political act iv i ty , l ik^ other 
kinds of act iv i ty , would cease. In a world of no change, contingency 
would vanish and there would be no need to concern ourselves with the 
practical problem of making arrangements about our common l ives . 
Most of our lives are lived in public, amongst our fellow beings, 
and our actions are undertaken with due regard for the fact that we do 
not Vive in complete i s o l a t i o n . The opinions and actions of others are 
of significance to us. Their aid may be enlisted in our projects, or 
their opposition overcome. Individual autonomy is transcended by a 
common world which binds men together. Activities are guided and coord-
inated in accordance with an appreciation of some public order. Without 
this public order, each man would pass his existence in an autonomous 
and isolated universe where relationships with other men would only be 
contingent but could never be directed or planned. Two men could neither 
agree nor plan to meet at a particular time i f either or both of them 
refused to accept the convention which divides the day into twenty-four 
hours and which designates certain moments as 'one o'clock', 'two 
o'clock', etc. Only the acceptance of'a convention makes i t possible for 
them to decide to meet at a particular moment and to plan their common 
endeavours in light of that decision. Recognition of a common word en-
ables disparate men to coordinate their efforts, and thus to reach beyond 
the limitations of any one man. 
Pol i t ical activity must presuppose such a common world shared amongst 
men. I t is an activity in which only those who recognize conventions can 
participate. Polit ics would be impossible amongst men who were in every 
sense strangers to one another. At the same time, political activity 
both manifests and maintains public order. I t manifests public order 
in that, insofar as pol it ical activity is carried on, men continue to 
act within a conventional framework. I t maintains public order in 
that the character and preservation of rules is the primary concern of 
pol i t ics . I t addresses i t s e l f to the problem of deciding how we are 
going to arrange our common lives and the manner in which our act iv i -
ties wi l l be coordinated. 
Polit ics is not the only way in which the activit ies of men are 
coordinated and public order preserved in a world characterized by 
change, but i t is perhaps the most significant way. I t is more comp-
rehensive, more self-conscious and more enduring than other human 
ac t iv i t i e s . All areas of human existence are of potential interest to 
those engaged in polit ical act ivity . I t is the character of the whole 
society which i s their concern. The prescription of rules and regula-
tions to fac i l i ta te or to inhibit any activit ies in public may be 
consciously contemplated-and "openly debated in polit ical l i f e . As a l l 
areas of human l i f e are of potential interest in pol i t ics , so, too, are 
a l l men. Whatever the character of a particular society, no one may 
claim to be completely indifferent to public affairs because a l l men 
are l iable to the restrictions and directions which result from decisions 
reached in pol i t ics . By such public-decisions men attempt to mould the 
character of their public world in accordance with their wishes. Polit-
ical activity i s , therefore, a self-conscious activity where men are 
intent upon the examination of their society and the ways in which their 
public world demands coordinated action. 
This public order which is maintained by polit ical activity is l ikely 
to endure through time beyond the l i f e of any one individual, providing 
the context within which his actions achieve significance not simply 
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beyond the immediate moment, but beyond the immediate generation as 
well. I t is no accident, therefore, that the history of man has prim-
ari ly been polit ical history; the record of the actions of men seeking 
to maintain or to modify public order through time so that they may 
coordinate their ac t iv i t i es . To the extent that such endeavours have 
been successful and public orders have endured, men have been conscious 
of themselves as a part of an on-going common world; of acting within 
a relatively continuous public order. Those who take pride in and 
value this continuity have come to see their society as a partner-
ship not only between those who are l iving, but between those who are 
l iv ing, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.'^ Percep-
tions of the past, appreciations of the present, aspirations for the 
future are a l l couched in terms of the public order within which men 
coordinate their actions to modify the world in accordance with their 
plans. 
The framework of public order within which political l i f e is 
carried on is not given to us as an inevitable part of our experience. 
Change can disrupt public order, making political activity d i f f i cu l t or 
even impossible, and thereby destroying the primary way in which con-
certed action is made possible. Because i t is the creation of human 
action, the public world is contingent and constantly in need of 
attention and maintenance in the face'of change. Therefore, change, 
which is one fact bringing forth polit ical l i f e , also presents politics 
with i t s primary task: the maintenance of the continuity of the public 
order within which men are able to coordinate their endeavours. An 
order which is here one moment and gone the next is of l i t t l e s ign i f i -
cance. There would be l i t t l e opportunity for any man to act within 
^ Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France. (London: 
Penguin Books, 1969). 194-95. 
such an order, no permanent public to observe and appreciate his 
actions, and no possibil ity of others following his inspiration. As 
with individual identity, a public order achieves significance only 
insofar as i t i s maintained in the face of change, i t s character 
revealed by i t s relative continuity in contrast to the relative 
change in the world.. 
1 
I t appears then that we have a paradox: on the one hand, change 
makes pol i t ical activity possible, even necessary, i f men are to live 
together and act in concert to make a home for themselves in the world. 
On the other hand, change threatens the continuity of the public order 
within which men are able to sustain common a c t i v i t i e s , and is the 
major preoccupation of their pol i t ical concerns. Pol it ical l i f e both 
springs from a world where change occurs in time, and seeks to control 
that change so that public order may be sustained. At the heart of 
pol i t ical act ivi ty l ies;the complex and paradoxical relationship between 
time, change, and a public order shared amongst men. 
I t is because of this relationship that politics is Oanus-faced. 
I t looks both to the past and to the future- of the public order within 
which i t occurs. I t looks to the past for two distinct but related 
reasons. F i r s t , i t i s only as the public order endures from the past to 
the present that men become aware of the world they share in common with 
those about them; that they become conscious of what i t means to be a 
member of a public order, and the possibility of acting with other men 
rather than apart from them. Such an order is not created overnight, 
nor can i t be established by the f i a t of one man. I t takes time for men 
to gain an appreciation of what they have in common with their fellows 
and this appreciation i s not susceptible to command. Second, the present 
character of a public order has been determined by the experience of the 
past. The past i s never wholly inconsequential to polit ical activity 
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because i t i s the past which has given birth, so to speak, to the 
present with which polit ics must deal. Who we are and where we stand 
in relation to one another cannot be divorced from who we have been, 
and where we have come from. I t is in this sense that 'we are backing 
into the future.' From our understanding of who we are and where we 
stand, we proceed to formulate our hopes, expectations and fears for 
the present and the future, and attempt to coordinate our activit ies 
with others to achieve some states and avoid others. The course of the 
future is contingent, and i t is from our view of the past that we 
attempt to work together with others to shape i ts character. 'No man 
can have in his mind a conception of the future, for the future is not 
yet. But of our conception of the past, we make a future.' An aware-
ness of the past, therefore, is as vital to understanding the character 
of the public order, and is as much the concern of polit ical l i f e , as 
an awareness of his biography is to appreciating the individual. The 
decisions arrived at through the political activity carried on within 
public order can never escape the influence of the past. • 
At the same time, pol i t ical activity must look forward to the 
future. I t must concern i t s e l f with the threats to the continuity of 
the public order and attempt to reduce the uncertainty of the future 
by controlling change. Undesirable change must, be thwarted or its 
effect minimized while desirable change must be encouraged. Complete 
stasis i s . of course, impossible. In a world where time is fundamental 
to a l l experience, change is inevitable, and no public order can ignore 
or indefinitely res ist a l l change. Things must change in some respects 
Valery, Paul, History and Po l i t i c s , Denise Fol l iot and Jackson 
Matthews, trans. , (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 69. 
3 Hobbes, Thomas, Behemouth in English Works, vol. VI , S ir Wm. 
Molesworth, ed. , (London: John Bohn, 1S43), 259. 
i f they are in any way to remain the same. Pol it ical activity must 
direct and coordinate the actions of disparate men to meet this change 
head-on i f the public order is to survive. 
Pol i t ical l i f e i s thus overwhelmingly concerned with acting in 
time to orchestrate the efforts of those who comprise the public. 
Failure to do so may well be fatal as unwelcome or disastrous changes 
invade the public order and disrupt the continuity of the common world. 
Coordinating action in time demands that one be able to decide in time, 
and the abi l i ty to command time to this extent is the privilege of 
authority. To have access to information, to have time to assess i t , 
to terminate discussion and to arrive at a decision, a l l demand the 
exercise of authority. Pol i t ical action, public order and authority 
are interdependent. A pol i t ical decision may be the act of one man, 
but although the responsibility is his , the act does not belong to him 
alone l ike a private possession which excludes others. I t is a decision 
affecting a l l members of the public order, and to the extent that i t has 
authority, i t forms the character of the public order. At the same 
time, public order is the foundation of authority. Men abide by autho-
r i t y , direct their actions according to i t , and modify the identity of 
their society as a consequence, only where that order is recognized. 
Those who prove recalcitrant and cal l the authority of political deci-
sions into question have to be compelled to adhere to the conditions 
of membership as they have been determined through political activity 
lest public order be destroyed and the opportunity for political action 
lost . 
Pol it ical activity thus takes time. I t takes time to collect and 
disseminate information, to init iate discussion and come to agreement, 
to pronounce decisions and coordinate actions, to identify the reluctant 
and compel obedience from the unwilling. To the extent that a government 
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i s incapable o f keeping abreast o f even ts , i t s a b i l i t y t o coord inate 
a c t i o n i n t ime i s reduced and the chances o f ma in ta in ing i t s c o n t i n -
u i t y through t ime are impa i red . I t i s l i k e l y t h a t i t w i l l be ou t -
f l anked by events and overwhelmed by the unexpected. I n a sense, 
those concerned w i t h p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y must at tempt not s imply to 
keep abreast o f events but t o a n t i c i p a t e them. This requ i res p r a c t i c a l 
judgement more than s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. The events which are l i k e l y 
t o be o f s i g n i f i c a n c e to those'engaged i n p o l i t i c s are not l i k e natura l 
occurrences which can be p r e d i c t e d , but are genera l l y human ac t ions 
which may reso l ve themselves i n almost any number o f ways. By a n t i c i -
pa t i ng such e v e n t s , men can a t tempt t o meet the th rea ts to the c o n t i n -
u i t y o f t h e i r p u b l i c w o r l d . The i r i n i t i a t i o n o f concerted a c t i o n can 
a t tempt t o d i r e c t and c o n t r o l the changes occu r r i ng i n the w o r l d , 
r a t h e r than r e s t r i c t i n g themselves t o merely r eac t i ng to changes. The 
more s u c c e s s f u l l y men are ab le to a n t i c i p a t e f u t u r e developments and 
to i n i t i a t e app rop r i a te p u b l i c a c t i o n , the more the wor ld o f p r a c t i c e 
w i l l come to be informed w i t h t h e i r plans and programmes; the more they 
w i l l be a c t i n g t o c rea te a wor ld r a t he r than merely reac t i ng to a wor ld 
imposed upon them. 
There i s , t h e r e f o r e , always an at tempt to c reate a k ind o f b rea th -
ing space w i t h i n which p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y can take place and w i t h i n 
which men may decide how best t o reac t to and d i r e c t change through 
t h e i r common a c t i o n s . I t i s t h i s breath ing space which g ives men the 
t ime necessary t o a c t j u d i c i o u s l y so t h a t the c o n t i n u i t y o f the p u b l i c 
o rder may be main ta ined through t ime . How i t i s t h a t such a brea th ing 
space i s sus ta ined - how p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y acts both t o main ta in and 
to modi fy p u b l i c o rder - i s the concern o f the f o l l o w i n g pages. 
Chapter 1 
ORDER, CHANGE AND IDENTITY 
When we look around us , the scene which we survey i s a complete, 
u n i f i e d and coherent one. We are able to d iscover no gaping holes 
where nothingness i n t rudes t o rup tu re the completeness o f our view. 
Every th ing which we see i s a p a r t o f a s ing le scene and noth ing i n t e r -
venes t o d i s r u p t t h i s u n i t y . The d i ve rse shapes and co lours we see are 
r e l a t e d to one another and are subord inate to the t o t a l scene. To be 
w i t h o u t o rder - t o be w i t hou t t h i s complete, u n i f i e d and coherent s t r u c -
t u r e o f d i ve rse elements - would be to e x i s t i n a wor ld o f d isconnected, 
chao t i c and meaningless sensa t ions . 
Order prov ides the con tex t which makes understanding poss ib l e . An 
o b j e c t , event or idea becomes meaningful and s i g n i f i c a n t on ly when i t 
stands i n r e l a t i o n to o the r o b j e c t s , events or i d e a s ; t h a t i s , when i t 
i s seen to be p a r t o f an o rde r . I s o l a t e d from order i t could be ne i t he r 
conceived nor understood. In even a p a r t i a l and inadequate understand-
ing o f the w o r l d , thoughts are ordered so t h a t they are r e l a t e d to each 
o the r i n a sys temat ic way, the t o t a l s t r u c t u r e render ing comprehensible 
what would o therw ise be chao t i c . ^ 
Th ings , events or people which we encounter are immediately r e l a t e d 
to an order w i t h which we are f a m i l i a r , and we begin to exp lore a new 
s i t u a t i o n i n terms o f what i s known already and makes sense to us. 
We g i ve the name o f d i s o r d e r t o any order i n which we cannot recog-
n ize the v i s i b l e essences to which we are accustomed. Chaos i s a name 
This i s the p o i n t o f Pa ra in ' s comment on language i n h is Essay on 
Human Wretchedness; 'The s ign taken i n i s o l a t i o n has no o ther r e l a t i o n 
w i t h the o b j e c t s i g n i f i e d than t h a t o f des ignat ion . . . i t i s , so to 
speak, f l o a t i n g i t acquires r e a l i t y on ly i n an ordered system. ' 
Quoted i n S a r t r e , Jean-Pau l , L i t e r a r y and Ph i l osoph ica l Essays, 
(London: C o l l i e r - M a c m i l l a n , L t d . , 1966), 133. 
2 f o r any order t h a t produces confus ion i n our m inds . ' When we d i s -
cover something washed up on the beach which we have never seen 
b e f o r e , we a t tempt to f i t i t i n t o the order which serves as a basis 
f o r our understanding o f the w o r l d . ' I t looks l i k e some k ind o f 
f i s h ' , we may say, a t tempt ing to view i t i;n terms o f a category a l -
ready a t our d i s p o s a l . Only by doing t h i s can we b r ing i t i n t o the 
bounds o f our comprehension, a t tempt ing to encompass i t w i t h i n our 
mental o r d e r , g i v i n g dimension to what would o therwise be immeasur-
a b l e . As long as i t e l udes . the framework o f our o rder , . . . i t must always 
hover on the hor izon o f our unders tand ing, d imly perceived and never 
f u l l y recogn ised. Our t e n t a t i v e asser t i on t h a t i t looks l i k e some 
k ind o f f i s h w i l l always have to be q u a l i f i e d by the admission t h a t , 
a f t e r a l l , i t i s n ' t a f i s h . And i f we are unable to determine what i t 
i s we lay i t a s i d e , a t l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y , as s u i generis. ' I n under-
s tand ing we s t a r t from the system o f the whole, which i s given to us 
as a l i v i n g r e a l i t y , to make the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e l l i g i b l e to us i n 
terms o f i t . I t i s the f a c t t h a t we l i v e i n the consciousness o f the 
system o f the whole which enables us to understand a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e -
ment, a p a r t i c u l a r g e s t u r e , or a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n . ' 
When we encounter incompleteness or con t rad i c t i ons i n an o rde r , 
we e i t h e r ignore them or a l t e r the s t r u c t u r e o f the order to account 
f o r these apparent anomal ies, t h e r e b y r e s t o r i n g i t s completeness and 
coherence. We create new ca tegor ies or modify the o l d , and i n t h i s 
way the order i s m o d i f i e d . Thus the s t r u c t u r e o f an o r d e r , t o which 
we subord inate d i ve rse e lements , may be impermanent and s h i f t i n g as 
2 
•Santayana, George, Dominations and Powers, (New York: Charles 
S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1951),. 33. 
3 Wi lhelm D i l t h e y , quoted i n Hodges, H. A . , Wilhelm Pi 1 they : An I n t r o -
d u c t i o n , (London: Kegan P a u l , Trench, Trubner and Co. , L t d . , 1944) , 
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we d iscover f laws and inadequacies i n i t and s t r i v e to make i t more 
comprehensive, but i t can never be e n t i r e l y absent. 
Al though an order makes t h i n g s , events or people comprehensible to 
us , i t i s not merely the sum o f i t s c o n s t i t u e n t elements. I t i s not a 
conglomerat ion o f pa r t s but the r e l a t i o n s h i p each element has to every 
o ther element. Recognition of o rder is not the mere perception of ob-
j e c t s , events or i d e a s , but the recogn i t i on t h a t these elements are 
r e l a t e d to one another i n some way. Order i s thus an abs t rac t i on which 
provides the con tex t f o r understanding i t s elements and f o r assessing 
t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e . However, an order does not appear i n the wor ld 
apar t f rom these elements. I t i s no t an a pr ior i which imposes i t s e l f 
upon d i v e r s i t y , bu t i s the r e c o g n i t i o n o f u n i t y a r i s i n g ou t o f the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f i t s d i s t i n c t e lements. Order cannot be i s o l a t e d from 
i t s elements any more than i t s elements can be i s o l a t e d from the order . 
The two are in te rdependen t , ach iev ing meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e on ly i n 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to each o t h e r . 
To recognize an order i s to see a complete, u n i f i e d and coherent 
s t r u c t u r e o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s between d ive rse o b j e c t s , events or ideas. 
To descr ibe an order i s s imply to p o i n t to these elements. To exp la in 
an order i s to e l u c i d a t e the p r i n c i p l e which re l a tes these elements to 
each o t h e r ; i t i s to i n d i c a t e i n what way elements are r e l a t ed t o one 
another . The more c l e a r l y t h i s p r i n c i p l e is e l u c i d a t e d , the more mean-
i n g f u l the c o n s t i t u e n t elements o f t h a t order become - not because they 
are descr ibed i n any g rea te r d e t a i l , but because t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to 
o the r elements i s made more e x p l i c i t . I f we say t h a t a scene which we 
view o r an a c t i v i t y which we wi tness i s d i s o r d e r , we mean t h a t we' do not 
recognize i n what i s before us an order t o which we are accustomed. 
That i s , we do no t recognize any p r i n c i p l e which w i l l r e l a t e d iverse e l e -
ments t o each o the r i n a complete and coherent way. More and more 
d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f these elements w i l l not make what we see more 
meaningful to us unless i t leads us to recognize the p r i n c i p l e o f order 
which un i tes i n t o a s i n g l e framework what appears to be separate and 
unconnected elements. 
I f o rder makes the wor ld comprehensible to us , i t i s i n terms of 
t h a t order t h a t we are ab le to come t o g r ips w i t h the new, thereby 
r e l a t i n g the unprecedented t o what i s already f a m i l i a r t o us . We are 
ab le t o recognize a new event or occurrence because i t resembles or i s 
s i m i l a r to something which i s not new and which we a l ready know; some-
t h i n g which i s a p a r t o f the o rder f a m i l i a r t o us. I may never have 
been i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r shop b e f o r e , and never have seen t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
a s s i s t a n t . But I am able to recognize tha t the g i r l behind the counter 
w i l l s e l l me goods because I have been i n o ther shops and have d e a l t 
w i t h o the r a s s i s t a n t s who were a l so s tand ing behind coun te rs . This 
p a r t i c u l a r shop and a s s i s t a n t make immediate sense to me because they 
are s i m i l a r to what I have p rev ious l y exper ienced, and I i n t e r p r e t the 
e n t i r e scene i n terms o f t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d order . Recogni t ion o f what 
i s s i m i l a r , t h e n , presupposes o rde r . 
We are ab le to c l a s s i f y events or th ings because, whatever t h e i r 
i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s , they have c e r t a i n elements i n common, and i n 
t h i s respect they are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from one another . The unique 
charac te r o f an i n d i v i d u a l soup spoon ' i s of no i n t e r e s t t o me i f I am 
s imply concerned w i t h ea t i ng a bowl o f soup> Any spopn, as long as i t 
i s a member o f the c lass o f soup spoons, w i l l do. There a r e , o f course, 
o ther p r i n c i p l e s o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which I may use i n r e l a t i n g d iverse 
ob jec ts to one another . I may wish to gather together a l l the s i l v e r 
spoons, or a l l the spoons o f a p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n . The p r i n c i p l e which 
I s e l e c t w i l l determine the k ind o f o rder which I c reate out o f the 
var ious d i spa ra te spoons which l i e be fo re me. But i t i s what these e l e -
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ments have i n common as a c lass which i s the focus o f my a t t e n t i o n , and 
any o the r a t t r i b u t e s w i l l be i r r e l e v a n t to my purpose. 
Most commonly we c l a s s i f y people and ob jec ts according to some 
p r i n c i p l e o f p r a c t i c a l i t y , t h e i r f u n c t i o n being most r e l evan t t o our 
purposes. An army o f f i c e r , f o r example, who wishes to rep lace a f a l l e n 
man i s concerned w i t h e f f i c i e n c y . He i s look ing f o r a man o f the appro-
p r i a t e rank who commands the necessary s k i l l s . Whether t h a t man i s 
sho r t or t a l l , marr ied or s i n g l e , w i l l most l i k e l y be o f no i n t e r e s t to 
him. What he i s a f t e r i s a man who w i l l f unc t i on p roper l y i n the p e r f o r -
mance o f a t ask . He w i l l , a c c o r d i n g l y , c l a s s i f y the men a v a i l a b l e to 
h im, c r e a t i n g an order accord ing to some p r i n c i p l e o f use fu lness , i gno r -
ing o the r i r r e l e v a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . There fo re , i f r e c o g n i t i o n o f . 
events and ob jec t s presupposes o r d e r , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n according to some 
p r i n c i p l e es tab l i shes o rde r . 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , however, i s not the same as e i t h e r r ecogn i t i on or 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . To i d e n t i f y an occurrence o r an o b j e c t i s not to make 
an a s s e r t i o n t h a t i t i s l i k e something e l s e , nor i s i t to i n d i c a t e what 
i t has i n common w i t h o ther t h i n g s . I t i s to p o i n t to what i s d i s t i n c t 
and i n d i v i d u a l i n a t h i n g . Recogni t ion t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s s i m i l a r 
to prev ious ones which I have exper ienced encourages me to assume, f o r 
example, t h a t t h i s b u i l d i n g s tand ing before me i s a p u b l i c house. From 
the a t t r i b u t e s which he has i n common w i t h o ther men I have had deal ings 
w i t h , I c l a s s i f y the man behind the bar as a pub l i can . But i n doing so 
I have not i d e n t i f i e d who he i s as opposed to what f u n c t i o n he per forms. 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a man or o b j e c t has to do w i t h what i s unique about 
him o r i t . • • ; • • 
Something which has an i d e n t i t y 
. . . i s i t s e l f and no another t h i n g . But what does i t s 
uniqueness c o n s i s t in? . . . The unique i s the unrepeatable. 
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the once and f o r a l l . But what can have t h i s charac-
t e r i s t i c o f u n r e p e a t a b i l i t y ? The most obvious cand i -
date i s an event . . . . I t can never l i t e r a l l y be 
repeated. But what i s i t about an event which makes 
i t unique and unrepeatable? The answer i s i t s s p a t i o -
temporal l o c a t i o n . I t i s not what happens which i s as 
such un ique, but i t s happening where and when i t does.^ 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f even ts , l o c a t i n g them i n unique spat io- tempora l 
c o o r d i n a t e s , presupposes o rde r . Wi thout order i t would be impossib le t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h here and now from the re and then ; one spat io - tempora l l oca -
t i o n from another . L i ke r e c o g n i t i o n and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
o f even ts , t h e r e f o r e , i s i n t i m a t e l y bound up w i t h the no t ion o f order 
and would become nonsense i n a wor ld where o rder was impossib le to 
ach ieve. 
This much i s enough to i d e n t i f y events , but what about i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
o f th ings? Here i t i s not s imply an o b j e c t ' s spat io- tempora l coordinates 
which are i m p o r t a n t , bu t i t s h i s t o r y as i t has moved from (or through) 
d i s t i n c t coord inates i n the past to i t s l o ca t i on i n the present . Unl ike 
even ts , which are o f the moment, th ings have a h i s t o r y , and i t i s i n the 
h i s t o r y o f t h e i r movement f rom the past to the present t h a t t h e i r i d e n t -
i t y l i e s . 
To be ab le t o t a l k o f the h i s t o r y o f a t h i n g , I must be able to t r e a t 
i t as a u n i t y , as a who le , and I speak o f the h i s t o r y o f t h a t whole and 
no t the h i s t o r y o f i t s components. I t i s because the elements o f a t h i n g 
are r e l a t e d to each o the r i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, c rea t i ng a d e f i n i t e and 
r e l a t i v e l y s t ab le o r d e r , t h a t I am ab le to speak o f one th ing and not o f 
many or o f innumerable t h i n g s . I f t h i s order i s not r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e , 
the re i s not a s i n g l e t h i n g which i s capable o f sus ta in ing i t s e l f long 
enough to acqu i re a unique h i s t o r y . I t i s the r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y o f 
t h i s i n t e r n a l order which enables us t o d i s t i n g u i s h between one t h i ng and 
4 
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another . Were we denied the p o s s i b i l i t y o f such a c o n t i n u i t y , we could 
never p o i n t to ' t h i s ' w i t h o u t having ' t h i s ' f l ow i n t o ' t h a t ' , c rea t i ng 
something which d i d not e x i s t a moment ago and which may not e x i s t a 
moment hence. The unique h i s t o r y which a t h i n g has, and which i s the 
basis o f i t s i d e n t i t y , i s poss ib le on ly when the s u r v i v a l through t ime 
o f a r e l a t i v e l y permanent s t r u c t u r e o f order a l lows me to speak o f a 
s i n g l e t h i ng and to t r e a t i t as a u n i t y . 
There i s , however, something f u r t h e r which i s requ i red before we 
are ab le t o i d e n t i f y an o b j e c t , as d i s t i n c t from an event . Recogn i t ion , 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a l l e i t h e r presuppose or e s t a b l i s h 
oi'der, biit identi P icaHOM o f thinq'^ tiv-iMrvIs cn^iiiq/;; in - i - i d i H o n to order. 
I t has been s a i d t h a t change threatens i d e n t i t y . By t h i s i s meant, i t 
would appear, t h a t change threatens the r e l a t i v e l y permanent i n t e r n a l 
o rder which a l lows us t o speak o f a t h i n g and enables i t t o endure long 
enough through t ime as a s i n g l e t h i n g t o have a unique h i s t o r y o f s p a t i o -
temporal coo rd ina tes . But the no t i on t h a t change threatens i d e n t i t y i s 
a h a l f - t r u t h a t b e s t , and a mis lead ing one a t t h a t . A wor ld o f no change 
would be a wo r l d w i t h no exper ience o f t ime. Nothing could be sa id t o 
have a unique h i s t o r y which would d i s t i n g u i s h i t from any o ther t h ing 
because the w o r l d would be a s i n g l e t h i n g , complete i n i t s e l f w i t h a 
s i n g l e , cont inuous and unchanging o rde r . I t i s not a l l change which 
th reatens i d e n t i t y because change o f some s o r t i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h 
i d e n t i t y . Change which seems t o occur ' o u t s i d e ' o r 'a round ' a t h i n g , 
r evea l i ng the r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y which i s on ly then seen t o be ' w i t h i n ' 
i t , c reates the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i d e n t i t y . Durham Cathedral i s a b u i l d i n g 
o f h i s t o r i c s i g n i f i c a n c e w i t h a unique i d e n t i t y , not s imply because o f 
the r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y o f the order o f i t s components which has been 
mainta ined f o r c e n t u r i e s , but a l so because the wor ld around i t has 
changed. The r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y o f the order o f the c a t h e d r a l , con-
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t r a s t e d w i t h the r e l a t i v e d i s c o n t i n u i t y of i t s su r round ings , enables 
us t o e s t a b l i s h i t as a t h i n g , and to d iscern and f o l l o w i t s h i s t o r y . 
Out o f t h i s c o n t r a s t between s t a b l e and changing orders i t s i d e n t i t y 
emerges. 
Knowing t h i n g s , i n the sense o f i d e n t i f y i n g them as un ique, t h e r e -
f o r e , takes t ime . I t takes the changes brought about by t ime t o estab-
l i s h something as a u n i t y , and i t takes the endurance through t ime o f 
t h i s i n t e r n a l o rder o f a t h i n g f o r i t s h i s t o r y to be e s t a b l i s h e d . 
When t h i s i n t e r n a l o rder does not endure long enough f o r me to know 
i t , or when I do not have t ime enough to discover i t s h i s t o r y , i t can 
be sa id to have no i d e n t i t y a t a l l . I f I deal w i t h i t i n such a case, 
I do so i n terms o f i t s being l i k e something e l s e , or being a member o f 
a c l a s s . That i s , I am not concerned e i t h e r w i t h i t s uniqueness or 
w i t h the r e l a t i v e endurance o f i t s i n t e r n a l o rder . The c i g a r e t t e which 
I am smoking, f o r example, i s soon changed i n t o ash. I t s i n t e r n a l 
o rder i s d i s r u p t e d , and I can no longer t a l k o f i t as being a s i n g l e 
t h i n g , a c i g a r e t t e . I f , before I smoke i t , I am unable to e s t a b l i s h i t 
as a s i n g l e t h i n g w i t h a unique h i s t o r y , or i f I do not take the t ime 
to do s o , i t has no i d e n t i t y . I t i s a member o f a c lass ( e . g . , a Roth-
man's c i g a r e t t e ) , and i s i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from o the r c i g a r e t t e s i n the 
packet . I t i s because I do no t o r cannot i d e n t i f y t h i s c i g a r e t t e as a 
unique t h i n g t h a t I may e a s i l y reach f o r someone e l s e ' s c i g a r e t t e , 
t h i n k i n g t h a t i t i s mine, and f o r us both to be unce r ta in whose c i g a r -
e t t e i s r e a l l y whose. 
The change which i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h the i d e n t i t y o f an ob-
j e c t can never be t o t a l change, o f course. Complete and continuous 
change would make i t imposs ib le to d i s t i n g u i s h anyth ing a t a l l . In the 
mids t o f such change, there would be no order which would make recog-
n i t i o n , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n or i d e n t i f i c a t i o n po.ssible, A l l would be chaos. 
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and the re would be no way to d i s t i n g u i s h ' t h i s ' from ' t h a t ' . Not on ly 
the i n t e r n a l order o f a t h i n g , but a l so the order which makes the wor ld 
comprehensible to us i s necessary i f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s to be poss ib le . 
The changes which take p lace ' o u t s i d e ' o r 'a round ' a t h i n g , i f they are 
t o have meaning f o r u s , must a l so be recognizable w i t h i n the order which 
g ives s i g n i f i c a n c e to a l l t h a t surrounds us. This order must i t s e l f be 
r e l a t i v e l y cont inuous and s t a b l e i f i t i s success fu l l y to o r i e n t a t e us 
i n the w o r l d . However l i m i t e d or p a r t i a l our view o f the w o r l d , we are 
always ab le t o d i s t i n g u i s h some pa r t s which appear t o change l i t t l e or 
not a t a l l i n comparison to o the r p a r t s . There i s always some r e l a t -
i v e l y s t a b l e s t r u c t u r e o f o rder wh i ch , i n e f f e c t , forms the backc loth 
before which changes w i t h i n and between other th ings are seen to take 
p l a c e . This r e l a t i v e l y f i r m s t r u c t u r e provides the framework from which 
we are ab le to perce ive and judge the w o r l d ; the r e l a t i v e l y s o l i d p l a t -
form beneath our f e e t which a l lows us t o recognize, c l a s s i f y and i d e n t -
i f y events and ob jec ts about us . 
Order and change are thus both c r u c i a l i n the estab l ishment o f 
i d e n t i t y , n e i t h e r taken i n i s o l a t i o n being s u f f i c i e n t to create some-
t h i n g which may be seen as having a unique h i s t o r y . Complete and un-
changing order would make i t imposs ib le to e s t a b l i s h a t h i n g as an i n d i -
v i d u a l t h i n g , and t o d i sce rn i t s h i s t o r y by c o n t r a s t i n g i t s i n t e r n a l 
o rder w i t h the changes going on around i t . Complete and continuous 
change, p rec lud ing any kijrid o f o r d e r , on the o ther harjd, would make i t 
imposs ib le to speak o f a t h i n g , t r e a t i n g i t as a u n i t y , and would a lso 
make i t imposs ib l e , i n a wo r l d o f t o t a l impermanence and f l u x , t o comp-
rehend any r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h i n g s . 
What c o n s t i t u t e s the ' r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y ' o f an order i s , o f 
cou rse , p rob lemat i c . How long does the i n t e r n a l o rder o f a t h i n g have 
t o s u r v i v e so t h a t i t may be s a i d t o possess an i d e n t i t y ? The answer can 
J, 
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on ly be suggested i n terms o f the leng th of t ime i t takes t o d iscern 
i t s unique h i s t o r y ; long enough f o r i t t o be known as i t s e l f and not 
s imply as being l i k e something e lse or as being merely the representa-
t i v e o f a c l a s s . 
I t i s obvious from what has been sa id so f a r t h a t i d e n t i t y i s not 
something which e x i s t s a priorit but i s recognised and es tab l i shed both 
w i t h i n a framework o f o rder and i n con t ras t t o change. I t i s a mat ter 
o f judgement and debate , and can never be sa id to be s e l f - e v i d e n t . 
Where men d ispu te the i d e n t i t y o f a t h i n g , they are a t tempt ing to estab-
l i s h what i t s unique h i s t o r y i s and to determine i n what way i t s i n t e r -
nal o rder may be s a i d t o have endured through t ime . Seldom i s there 
easy agreement on such m a t t e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when the issue a t d ispute 
i s an i n s t i t u t i o n o r soc ia l o rde r . During the Reformat ion, f o r example, 
the Roman church po in ted to the c o n t i n u i t y o f the i n s t i t u t i o n o f the 
Church, c l a im ing the Pope as the l e g i t i m a t e h e i r t o the P e t r i n e commi-
s s i o n , and the r i g h f u l c la imant to the a u t h o r i t y o f C h r i s t on e a r t h . 
Those who d issented cla imed t h a t the Roman Church had abandoned the t r u e 
doc t r i nes o f C h r i s t and t h a t the re was w i t h i n i t on ly a c o n t i n u i t y o f 
be t raya l and c o r r u p t i o n . ^ I n e f f e c t both sides claimed t h a t the o ther 
was mistaken i n i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the c o n t i n u i t y and charac ter o f 
the Roman Church. The d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t the c o n t i n u i t y o f an order i s 
never t o t a l l y d i s r u p t e d nor t o t a l l y uha l t e red . The wor ld and the th ings 
w i t h i n i t are never c rea ted e n t i r e l y a f r e s h , nor do they endure comple-
t e l y unchanged. I t i s always poss ib le to d iscover some elements i n the 
present order which are cont inuous w i t h the past o r d e r , j u s t as i t i s 
poss ib l e t o p o i n t t o innova t ions which have mod i f ied the previous o rder . 
5 • 
A l l e n , J . W., P o l i t i c a l - T h o u g h t i n the S ix teenth Century. (London: 
Methuen and Co . , L t d . , 1967), pp. 6, 8, inter a l i a . 
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As w i t h mat te r and energy, so a lso w i t h o rde r : noth ing i s c reated out 
o f a vo id and noth ing can disappear i n t o a v o i d . Never being able to 
make a c lean break w i t h the pas t , we are always faced w i t h un t i dy l e f t -
overs which f o r c e us to use such u n s a t i s f a c t o r y and imprecise phrases 
as ' s u f f i c i e n t d i s r u p t i o n o f c o n t i n u i t y ' or ' r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y * . Out 
o f such imprec i s ion debates and con t rovers ies e a s i l y a r i s e as to what 
the ' t r u e ' i d e n t i t y o f a t h i n g or i n s t i t u t i o n i s . 
When we ac t i n the wor ld we do so i n terms o f what we are able to 
recogn ize , c l a s s i f y and i d e n t i f y about us. That i s , we ac t i n l i g h t o f 
our understanding o f the order o f the w o r l d . Our ac t ions are informed 
by the o rder which we perce ive and are man i fes ta t ions o f t h i s under-
s tand ing . I t i s w i t h i n t h i s order t h a t we recogn ize , c l a s s i f y and 
i d e n t i f y t h ings and even ts , and our ac t ions are d i r ec ted i n accordance 
w i t h t h i s unders tand ing. As we t h i n k , speak and ac t i n the w o r l d , what 
we do i s made meaningful and s i g n i f i c a n t by the order which we perceive 
and the events and ob jec ts which we are able to recogn ize , c l a s s i f y or 
i d e n t i f y . I n t u r n , t h i s order i s i l l u m i n a t e d and modi f ied by the exper-
iences which g i ve r i s e t o i t . 
Such a c t i o n w i t h i n a framework o f order - t h a t i s , i n accordance 
w i t h an understanding o f the p r i n c i p l e which r e l a t e s otherwise separate 
elements - may be c a l l e d an i d i om. The p r i n c i p l e o f order i s an abstrac-
t i o n ; an id iom i s i t s man i f es ta t i on i n a c t i o n . To be i n command o f an 
id iom i s to have an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f an o rde r ; to have the a b i l i t y to ac t 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y and to respond w i t h i n the re levan t framework o f o rder . 
Descr ib ing and e x p l a i n i n g an order are d i s t i n c t from app rec ia t i ng an 
o rder . I t i s poss ib le to descr ibe i n great d e t a i l the a c t i v i t i e s o f a 
R e g i s t r a r ' s O f f i c e , a science l a b o r a t o r y , and a seminar w i t hou t e x p l a i n -
ing the p r i n c i p l e which un i t es these d ive rse elements i n t o the a b s t r a c t 
order which we c a l l a u n i v e r s i t y . I t i s a lso poss ib le t o exp la in what 
a u n i v e r s i t y i s w i t h o u t being e i t h e r requ i red o r ab le t o mani fes t an 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the o rder through the manipu la t ion o f the appropr ia te 
i d i om. 
An id iom may be desc r i bed , and the order which i t mani fests 
e x p l a i n e d , bu t a command o f the id iom can on ly be demonstrated. The 
i m p a r t i a l observer a t a c o c k t a i l pa r t y can descr ibe the behaviour of 
those who are p resent . When he does so , he does not ac t w i t h i n the 
o r d e r , but remains on the s i d e l i n e s a t tempt ing to capture as exac t l y as 
poss ib le the ac t i ons o f o t h e r s . F u r t h e r , he can at tempt to exp la in 
behaviour i n terms o f such a b s t r a c t i o n s as c lass c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , psycho-
l o g i c a l m o t i v a t i o n s , or group dynamics. Again, he i s not ac t i ng w i t h i n 
the o r d e r , but stands apa r t from i t a t tempt ing to d iscover the p r i n c i p l e 
which un i t es the var ious ac t i ons o f those he sees around him. The man 
who apprec ia tes t h i s o r d e r , on the o the r hand, i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n 
e i t h e r desc r i b i ng a c o c k t a i l pa r t y or exp la in ing i t , and, indeed, he may 
be incapable o f bo th . He acts w i t h i n i t and demonstrates h is apprec ia -
t i o n through h i s ac t ions-and responses. Apprec ia t ion, i s shown through 
the man ipu la t ion o f an id iom and occurs w i t h i n t h a t id iom a lone. I t 
exp lores the dimensions o f an i d i o m , wh i l e an exp lanat ion def ines the 
l i m i t s o f an o rde r . 
A p p r e c i a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i s not to be mastered through d e s c r i p t i o n 
or e x p l a n a t i o n . I t can on ly be observed and emulated. Those who share 
a common app rec i a t i on o f an o rder w i l l not need to exp la in themselves t o 
one another because, q u i t e l i t e r a l l y , they speak the same language. The 
r e c o g n i t i o n , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h ings and events 
which guide t h e i r ac t i ons w i l l be something wh ich , roughly speaking they 
have i n common. The ac t i ons and responses which are understood to .be 
app rop r i a te are enough t o e s t a b l i s h the communality o f t h i s app rec ia t i on 
The i n t r u s i o n o f the o u t s i d e r who n e i t h e r perceives t h i s , o r d e r nor has 
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an app rec ia t i on o f i t , requ i res e i t h e r d e s c r i p t i o n or exp lana t i on ; 
t h a t i s , the s h i f t t o another id iom because the s t ranger does not 
speak the same language. He w i l l have t o submit h imse l f t o a per iod 
o f appren t i cesh ip - a t ime o f a c t i o n , o f t r i a l and e r r o r , r a t he r than 
d e s c r i p t i o n or exp lana t ion - i f he wishes to develop an apprec ia t ion 
o f the u n f a m i l i a r o rder and to demonstrate a mastery o f i t s i d i om. 
I f our ac t i ons are to be understood by o thers and our r e l a t i o n -
ships w i t h those about us to be s i g n i f i c a n t , we must share a common 
app rec ia t i on o f o r d e r ; we must ac t i n the same id iom. This i s what 
s o c i o l o g i s t s would seem t o mean when they t e l l us t h a t meaningful 
a c t i o n w i t h o the r human beings presupposes a common set o f shared 
v a l u e s , expecta t ions and o r i e n t a t i o n s . ^ What we are t a l k i n g about i s 
p u b l i c o rde r . 
Al though the p h r a s e " ' p u b l i c o r d e r ' is:commonly Used to r e f e r to 
the absence o f v i o l ence i n p u b l i c , or the absence o f ac t i ons which w i l l 
i n t r u d e on what has been es tab l i shed as the p r i vacy o f o t h e r s , t h i s i s 
a confus ion o f the concept o f p u b l i c order w i t h i t s mpst obvious mani-
f e s t a t i o n . Pub l i c o rder i s more than mere l y i t he absence.of brawls i n 
the s t r e e t . I t i s the common app rec i a t i on o f an order which un i tes the 
ac t i ons o f d i ve rse i n d i v i d u a l s i n a p a r t i c u l a r area over t ime. To 
v i o l a t e p u b l i c o rder i s t o d i s rega rd t h i s common a p p r e c i a t i o n . I t i s 
to i n s i s t on ope ra t i ng i n an id iom which is d i f f e r e n t from the one which 
i s commonly accepted o r p u b l i c . I t i s to i n t rude a p r i v a t e , or a t l eas t 
an uncommon and unapprec iated id iom upon s o c i e t y , r e c o g n i z i n g , c l a s s i f y -
i ng and i d e n t i f y i n g ob jec t s and events i n an i d i o s y n c r a t i c manner i n 
accordance w i t h an unappreciated o rde r . 
^ B l a u , Peter M. and W. Richard S c o t t , Formal Organ isa t ions- A 
Comparative Approach. (London: Routle'dge and Regan Pau l , 1963), 
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"When J[ use a word , " Humpty Dumpty sa id i n a r a t h e r 
s c o r n f u l t o n e , " i t means j u s t what I choose i t t o 
mean - n e i t h e r more nor l e s s . " 
"The ques t ion i s , " sa id A l i c e , "whether you can make 
words mean so many d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . " 
"The ques t ion i s , " sa id Humpty Dumpty, "which i s t o 
be the master - t h a t ' s a l l . " 7 
Sure ly the answer to such a ques t ion i s t h a t the master must be 
n e i t h e r the word nor the i n d i v i d u a l who uses i t , but. the common appre-
c i a t i o n o f the p u b l i c o rder i f any sense i s t o be communicated. Words 
which mean e x a c t l y what I want them to mean, no more and no l e s s , are 
words which are w i t h o u t p u b l i c s i g n i f i c a n c e because they are not w i t h i n 
a p u b l i c o r d e r . To use a word which means on l y what I want i t t o mean 
i s t o speak a p r i v a t e language ( i f , indeed, t h i s i s p o s s i b l e ) , and un-
less I am speaking on ly to inyse l f , I am v i o l a t i n g pub l i c o rder . I am 
r e f u s i n g to manipu la te a common id iom and w i l l remain u n i n t e l l i g i b l e 
t o those who are p a t i e n t enough t o l i s t e n to me. 
An i d i o m , o f course , i s not cons tan t , and the order which i t mani-
f e s t s i s not immutable. Apprec ia t i ons can and do vary w i t h t ime . The 
i nnova to r v i o l a t e s the p u b l i c a p p r e c i a t i o n when he br ings something new 
to the o rde r . He mod i f ies the c o n s t i t u e n t elements and rea l i gns t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s accord ing t o new p r i n c i p l e s . His e f f o r t s a t f i r s t w i l l 
no t be e a s i l y unders tood, and may we l l be r e s i s t e d . He may, i n f a c t , 
remain f o reve r ou t s i de the common appj*eciat ion - the m i s f i t who i s un-
able to modi fy the common id iom and remains something o f a s t ranger t o 
the s o c i a l w o r l d . 
I t i s w i t h i n p u b l i c o r d e r , through the manipu la t ion o f the appro-
p r i a t e i d i o m , t h a t human i d e n t i t y i s e s t a b l i s h e d . Human i d e n t i t y i s 
d i s t i n c t f rom the i d e n t i t y o f a t h i n g . Smith - as j o v i a l or r e t i c e n t or 
^ g^ j ^^o^^ Lewis . Through the Looking Glass. ,(New York: Clarkson N. 
P o t t e r , I n c . , 1960) , 269. 
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Stubborn - i s d i s t i n c t from h i s body - as t a l l o r f a t or muscular. 
The i d e n t i t y o f Smi th 's body i s es tab l i shed through the r e l a t i v e c o n t i -
n u i t y o f i t s i n t e r n a l o rder i n c o n t r a s t to the changes around i t . 
'Tha t must be S m i t h ' , we may remark as we spy a f a m i l i a r f i g u r e on the 
ho r i zon . But the i d e n t i t y o f Smith as a person i s es tab l i shed through 
h i s a c t i o n s ; through h is demonstrat ion of h is app rec ia t i on o f the 
p u b l i c o r d e r . 'That must be S m i t h ' , we may remark , in q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t 
sense when we are ab le to i d e n t i f y a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c manner o f ac t i ng or 
speak ing. Both the i d e n t i t y o f a t h i n g and the i d e n t i t y o f a person 
r e q u i r e o rder before they may emerge as e n t i t i e s w i t h a unique h i s t o r y , 
and both r e q u i r e change t o e s t a b l i s h what i s unique about them. Thus 
both r e q u i r e t ime . But the change t h a t is necessary f o r the e s t a b l i s h -
ment o f human i d e n t i t y i s the r e s u l t o f conscious a c t i o n w i t h i n the 
p u b l i c o r d e r ; the product o f human i n t e n t i o n demonstrat ing an app rec i -
a t i o n o f the o r d e r , and no t mere acc iden t or co inc idence. 
As w i t h th ings and i n s t i t u t i o n s , human i d e n t i t y i s n e i t h e r s e l f -
ev iden t nor a priori, bu t requ i res establ ishment and maintenance. This 
i s a p u b l i c process and not s imply an i n d i v i d u a l achievement. Our 
i d e n t i t y i s no t a p r i v a t e possession bu t a pub l i c a f f i r m a t i o n . In t h e . 
f i r s t p l a c e , we do not own our names. They are bestowed upon us a t 
b i r t h by o t h e r s , and t h e i r constancy i s confirmed through the ac t ions 
o f o t h e r s . We can a l t e r our name on l y by recourse t o a p u b l i c p rocess ; 
by a p p l i c a t i o n to a cou r t o f law. Even so, t h i s pub l i c process w i l l be 
l i t t l e more than useless i f we are not able to convince our f r i e n d s and 
acquaintances t h a t we should now be c a l l e d by our new name. 
More than what we are c a l l e d , who we are - both i n our own eyes and 
i n the eyes o f o thers - i s es tab l i shed i n soc ie ty through the man ipu la t ion 
o f the app rop r ia te id iom and i s thus dependent upon pub l i c o rder . 'The 
c h i l d der i ves h i s i d e n t i t y f rom the soc ia l environment. The s o c i a l 
24 
environment remains t o t h i s death the only source o f v a l i d a t i n g t h a t 
i d e n t i t y ' . Ac t i ng be fo re o thers c o n s t i t u t e s a c la im t o r e c o g n i t i o n . 
I t i s not s imply an appeal f o r a t t e n t i o n , but f o r the acknowledgement 
o f an i d e n t i t y which w i l l e s t a b l i s h the ex is tence o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n 
the w o r l d . The wi thdrawal o f t h i s acknowledgement and re fusa l to 
a f f i r m another as an i n d i v i d u a l th rea tens h is i d e n t i t y because i t r e -
moves the p u b l i c wor ld i n which h i s i d e n t i t y must be fash ioned. Exc lu-
s ion th reatens him w i t h the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of h is view o f h imsel f and 
o f h i s place i n the w o r l d . S o l i t a r y confinement i s f r e q u e n t l y employed 
as an extreme form o f punishment p r e c i s e l y because i t terminates the 
p u b l i c ex is tence o f the i n d i v i d u a l and br ings him to the th resho ld o f 
the t o t a l decay o f h is i d e n t i t y . A secre t i d e n t i t y , he ld apa r t from 
p u b l i c o rder and r e c o g n i t i o n , l i k e the secret l i f e o f Wal ter M i t t y , i s 
no i d e n t i t y a t a l l . 'To lose one 's s o c i a l c r e d e n t i a l s i s t o be e x i l e d 
g 
i n t o o b l i v i o n ' . 
The p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n which i s essen t ia l t o the estab l ishment o f 
human i d e n t i t y thus presupposes a common pub l i c order w i t h i n which i t 
can be e s t a b l i s h e d . We may meet as st rangers i n p u b l i c , but i f we are 
to understand one another and to e s t a b l i s h our i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t i e s 
(and thus to d i s t i n g u i s h between one ano the r ) , we cannot meet as com-
p l e t e a l i e n s . I f there i s no way f o r you to apprec ia te n\y mastery o f 
the i d i o m , then there i s no way i n wh'ich I can e s t a b l i s h iny i d e n t i t y , 
f o r my performance w i l l not be comprehended. I t w i l l not have the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e which l o c a t i o n w i t h i n a pub l ic order g ives to i t and which 
es tab l i shes who, as opposed t o wha t , I am. 'We l i v e w i t h i n the words 
o f language, the shapes o f poe t ry and p l a s t i c a r t , the s t r u c t u r e o f 
8 
Becker, E rnes t , The B i r t h and Death o f Meaning. (London: C o l l i e r -
Macmi l lan , 1967 )T5F : ' 
^ ibid., 116 . 
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music, the framework o f r e l i g i o u s rep resen ta t i on and r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f . 
And i t i s on ly w i t h i n these t h a t we "know" each o t h e r . ' ^ ^ The pub l i c 
a f f i r m a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y i s poss ib le on ly where t h i s pub l i c 
order endures long enough f o r us t o achieve p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n o f our 
a c t i o n s ; to be known to our f e l l o w s . I f we are t o have an i d e n t i t y , 
t h e r e f o r e , we have a stake in the maintenance o f a r e l a t i v e l y continuous 
and s tab le p u b l i c o rde r . 
Pub l i c o r d e r , t h e n , makes i t poss ib le f o r us to understand one 
another because we have something i n common. As order i s necessary i f 
the wor ld i s t o be comprehensible to us , so a lso pub l i c order i s nece-
ssary i f the ac t i ons o f men are to be comprehensibje'and s i g n i f i c a n t to 
us. As change i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h the i d e n t i t y o f a t h i n g , so 
a l so change t h a t r e s u l t s f rom the man ipu la t ion o f an id iom i s necessary 
to e s t a b l i s h human i d e n t i t y . I t i s i n t h i s way t h a t we are able to 
d i s t i n g u i s h ourse lves from one another wh:il6 understanding and app rec i -
a t i n g each o t h e r . 'The p u b l i c rea lm, as the common w o r l d , gathers us 
t oge the r and y e t prevents our f a l l i n g over each o t h e r , so to speak. '^^ 
The p u b l i c order un i t es us i n what we haveon common, wh i le our ac t ions 
w i t h i n i t a l l ow us t o make ourse lves d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l s . T h i s , one 
suspects , was Herder 's p o i n t when he comments ( i n h is Travel D i a r y , 1769) 
t h a t a person ' . . . learns to adapt h imse l f t o the ways o f o t h e r s , and a t 
the same t ime to d i s t i n g u i s h h i m s e l f ' f r o m them; t h a t i s to say he deve-
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lops w i t and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . ' Wit both acknowledges and v i o l a t e s the 
s t r u c t u r e o f o rde r . Or perhaps i t would be more accurate to say t h a t i t 
Cass i r e r , E r n s t , The Logic o f the Humani t ies, (London: The Yale 
U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1961) , 143, emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l . 
A rend t , Hannah, The Human C o n d i t i o n , (London; The U n i v e r s i t y o f 
Chicago Press , 1 9 / 0 ) , 52. 
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J . G. Herder , quoted i n Barnard , F. M. , J . G. Herder on Socia l and 
P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e , (Cambridge: The U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969), 78. 
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acknowledges the s t r u c t u r e o f an order through i t s v i o l a t i o n s , which 
are conscious and not the r e s u l t o f mere acc iden t . I t i s t h i s measure 
o f c o n t r o l and a r t f u l v i o l a t i o n o f the pub l i c order which d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
w i t from v u l g a r i t y o r a b s u r d i t y . D i s c r i m i n a t i o n imp l i es the a b i l i t y t o 
s e l e c t some elements o f the common i d i o m , but to r e t a i n the independence 
and individuality to ignore others. Both wit and diseHfflination allow 
the performance o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o be understood by a pub l i c by being 
w i t h i n the p u b l i c o r d e r , wh i l e enab l ing his performance to remain d i s -
t i n c t i v e l y h i s . I n t h i s d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s l i e s h is i d e n t i t y , es tab l i shed 
and mainta ined by both o rder and change. 
W i th in the framework o f p u b l i c o r d e r , human a c t i o n , and the changes 
which are i n i t i a t e d by a c t i o n s , t h e n , e s t a b l i s h human i d e n t i t y . Ac t i on 
w i t h i n the p u b l i c order both makes the i n d i v i d u a l pa r t o f the wor ld ( i n 
t h a t he rece ived p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n and a f f i r m a t i o n o f h is i d e n t i t y ) and 
the wo r l d p a r t o f the i n d i v i d u a l ( i n t h a t his performance mani fests the 
p u b l i c order and main ta ins t he convent ional i d i o m ) . To e s t a b l i s h an 
i d e n t i t y i s t o make onese l f a t home i n the s o c i a l wor ld by making some-
t h i n g o f t h a t w o r l d . I t i s not f i x e d by one performance i n p u b l i c , i s 
never c l e a r - c u t , and ( u n t i l dea th , poss ib l y ) i s never f i n a l . For t h i s 
reason the i n d i v i d u a l cons tan t l y re tu rns to the pub l i c order shared 
amongst h is f e l l o w s t o renew and r e a f f i r m his i d e n t i t y . Denial o f the 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o a c t , by w i t h h o l d i n g e i t h e r the power or the a b i l i t y t o 
a c t , i s den ia l no t s imply o f p u b l i c approbat ion and the wi thdrawal o f 
soc i a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l , bu t is a lso a condemnation,to 
perpetua l a l i e n a t i o n from the w o r l d . Only hermits and madmen comfor-
t a b l y remain f o r e v e r i n t h e i r pu re ly p r i v a t e wo r l ds , u n w i l l i n g or un-
ab le t o recognize the shared p u b l i c order and to employ the app rop r ia te 
id iom on t h e i r a c t i o n s . 
Marx c l e a r l y saw t h i s connect ion between a c t i o n , p u b l i c order and 
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i d e n t i t y . In the Economic and Ph i losoph ica l Manuscripts he asser ts 
t h a t a l i e n a t i o n i s the r e s u l t o f c a p i t a l i s m which demands ac t i on from 
the labourer but i s unconcerned w i t h h is i n t e n t i o n s or his. i d e n t i t y . 
His labour becomes a commodity which i s sold as an economic good to 
13 
produce o the r goods which he w i l l never use o r en joy . Ac t ion thus 
becomes no longer express ive o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y , but i s i ns tead an a l i e n 
i m p o s i t i o n upon the laboure r . S t ress ing the importance o f a c t i o n i n 
the es tab l i shment o f human i d e n t i t y , Marx asks, f o r what i s l i f e 
but a c t i v i t y ? . . . ' ^ ^ He env is ions the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e s t a b l i s h i n g 
man's i d e n t i t y i n the c rea t i ons which r e s u l t f rom h is l abou r ; the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f seeing h i s own r e f l e c t i o n i n a wor ld which he has 
c o n s t r u c t e d . ' ^ ^ Under the c a p i t a l i s t system, however, Marx claims t h a t 
the capac i t y o f the worker to c rea te h is own i d e n t i t y i s denied him be-
cause o f the nature o f the p u b l i c o rder w i t h i n which he must a c t . I t 
i s an o rder which i s imposed upon him and i s a l i e n t o h im; an order i n 
which he i s on ly able to manipulate a given idiom w i t h i n es tab l i shed 
bounds. Because o f t h i s he i s a l i e n a t e d from the wor ld which o f f e r s 
him no o p p o r t u n i t y f o r express ive a c t i o n es tab l i sh i ng an i d e n t i t y which 
i s t r u l y h i s . i ns tead o f one which i s imposed upon him. The d u l l , repe-
t i t i v e r o u t i n e o f assembly - l i ne labour al lows f o r no i n d i v i d u a l manip-
u l a t i o n o f the app rop r ia te i d i o m , and the pub l i c wor ld w i t h i n which he 
f i n d s h imse l f i s not one which he creates but one which he i s fo rced to 
accept . 
I t i s , o f cou rse , no t q u i t e accura te t o c l a im t h a t the worker has 
no i d e n t i t y a t a l l under c a p i t a l i s m . C lea r l y the worker i s someone, and 
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we may presume t h a t however oppressed workers may have been i n the 
19th c e n t u r y , they were a t l e a s t recognized as i n d i v i d u a l s by t h e i r 
w i v e s , f a m i l i e s and f r i e n d s , and they d i d have some sense o f who they 
were. What Marx i s drawing our a t t e n t i o n to i s f i is no t ion t h a t the 
i d e n t i t y o f the worker under c a p i t a l i s t cond i t i ons i s not what Marx 
f e l t i t cou ld and should be. There i s , he c l a i m s , the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
a new and d i f f e r e n t k i nd o f s o c i a l o rder which w i l l make poss ib le a 
b e t t e r and more admirable k ind o f i d e n t i t y : f o r the g rea t mass o f 
people . 
Whether or not Marx 's d iagnos is and p r e s c r i p t i o n s are tenable is, 
not a r e l e v a n t ques t ion here. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t i s t h a t Marx po in ts 
ou t t h a t i f an i d e n t i t y : i s es tab l i shed w i t h i n pub l i c o r d e r , the poss ib-
i l i t y o f e s t a b l i s h i n g any i d e n t i t y a t a l l i s not open to the i n d i v i d u a l . 
A man i s not complete ly f r e e t o determine the k ind o f i d e n t i t y he would 
l i k e to have. He i s born i n t o a p u b l i c order which i s a l ready an on-
going concern. Through a process o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n he i s g radua l l y 
brought i n t o the p u b l i c order and i s expected to master the idiom which 
i s c u r r e n t around him. He i s not a t l i b e r t y to s t r i k e out i n any d i r e -
c t i o n which appeals t o h im, but must make do w i t h what i s a l ready a t 
hand. The changes he can i n i t i a t e w i t h i n the pub l i c order to e s t a b l i s h 
h i s i d e n t i t y are f a r f rom u n l i m i t e d . For most men, by the t ime they 
reach m a t u r i t y , the innumerable p o s s i b i l i t i e s which are t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
open t o them a t b i r t h have severe ly d imin ished w i t h few, i f any, r ad i ca l 
a l t e r n a t i v e s s t i l l a v a i l a b l e to them. The k ind o f i d e n t i t y which the 
i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be able to f ash ion f o r h imsel f must , i f i t i s to enjoy 
p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n and a f f i r m a t i o n , be w i t h i n the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f an 
Marx, Karl and F r i e d r i c h Engifss, The Manifesto o f the Communist 
P a r t y , (Moscow: Progress P u b l i s h e r s , 1964). 
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order which the i n d i v i d u a l almost c e r t a i n l y has played l i t t l e or no 
p a r t i n e s t a b l i s h i n g . 
To recognize the necess i t y o f o rder f o r understanding and ac t i ng 
i n the wor ld i s not the same as being committed to a p a r t i c u l a r order . 
I t i s , r a t h e r , a k ind o f non - i deo log i ca l conservat ism; the admission 
t h a t order i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e o f human a c t i o n , s i g n i f i c a n c e and i den t -
i t y , w i t hou t s p e c i f y i n g what k ind o f o rder . At the same t i m e , however, 
i t must be conceded t h a t men do become committed t o the order which make 
the wor ld comprehensible to them, and to the id iom which mani fests t h e i r 
app rec i a t i on o f t h a t o rde r . There i s a tendency to c l i n g to the f a m i l -
i a r order no mat ter how g l a r i n g the anomalies which i t con f ron ts seem to 
be. In t h e i r commitment to a p a r t i c u l a r o rder , human beings seem to have 
a g rea t capac i t y to ignore c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s , seeing 
on ly what they want t o see and what r e i n f o r c e s the v a l i d i t y o f the order 
to which they are commit ted, , the id iom which they p r a c t i s e , and the 
i d e n t i t y which they are ab le to f a s h i o n . 
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Chapter 2 
MEMBERSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP 
Being a 'member' means being a member o f something; being p a r t o f 
a g roup ; having something i n common w i t h o the rs . Depending on our pur-
pose, the p r i n c i p l e o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by which we group d i ve rse i n d i v i -
dual e n t i t i e s toge ther may focus on any one o f severa l a t t r i b u t e s which 
are he ld i n common. Being a member o f a pub l ic o rde r , however, i s d i s -
t i n c t from being a member o f a c l a s s . 
I t depends, f i r s t o f a l l , on the ex is tence o f a p u b l i c . One can-
not be a member i n a pub l i c order i n i s o l a t i o n from a l l o the r men. Not 
on ly are o the r people r e q u i r e d , but they must be people drawn toge ther 
i n a common w o r l d . Being a member o f a pub l i c order means t h a t we are 
aware o f o t h e r s ; t h a t we are conscious o f the f a c t t h a t the re i s a pub-
l i c wo r l d i n which we a c t and i n which we have a p a r t i n common w i t h 
those who surround us . This i s an awareness which i s not implanted 
f u l l y formed i n the minds o f men, but one which i s developed through 
t ime i n a process o f t r i a l and e r r o r as men mature and become more know-
ledgeable o f the cond i t i ons governing ac t i on i n p u b l i c . I t would be 
p o s s i b l e , i n c o n t r a s t , t o be a member o f a c lass which d i d no t depend 
on the awareness o f a common pub l i c o rder and the cond i t i ons governing 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i t . We m igh t , f o r example, learn w i t h s u r p r i s e t h a t 
a long w i t h o the r l i v i n g i n d i v i d u a l s we share a common t r a i t o f h igh blood 
pressure . But none o f the members o f t h i s c lass need be aware o f the 
o thers f o r the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n to hold t r u e . There need be no s e l f -
conscious awareness about the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f our ac t ions f o r us to be 
placed i n t h i s c l a s s . Indeed, the knowledge t h a t t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s 
poss ib l e could w e l l be hidden f rom us and we could be t o t a l l y unaware o f 
any such c o n d i t i o n i n ourselves or i n anyone we know or have ever seen. 
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Y e t , a l though t h i s c lass would not c o n s t i t u t e a p u b l i c o r d e r , we would 
s t i l l be members o f the c lass o f i n d i v i d u a l s who s u f f e r from high blood 
p ressure . 
This awareness o f being a p a r t o f a pub l i c order i s poss ib le only 
i f one has some app rec i a t i on o f the ac t ions which mani fes t t h a t o rde r ; 
i f one has developed a mastery o f the s t y l e and nuances o f a c t i n g i n 
the r e l e v a n t p u b l i c . Those who l ack such an app rec ia t i on are l i k e l y 
t o perce ive on ly d imly t h a t the p u b l i c order even e x i s t s , or they w i l l 
over look i t a l t o g e t h e r . With no app rec ia t i on o f the idiom which mani-
f e s t s the p u b l i c o r d e r , they can n e i t h e r understand nor judge the ac-
t i o n s o f those who are members o f t h a t order and who do have the aware-
ness t h a t comes from an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f i t . The i c y g ree t i ng or fe igned 
l ack o f r e c o g n i t i o n on the p a r t o f the s o c i a l i t e , i n d i c a t i n g super io r 
p o s i t i o n and s o c i a l d i s t a n c e , may be t o t a l l y l o s t on the s t ranger who 
f a i l s t o apprec ia te both the d e l i b e r a t e s l i g h t and the h i e r a r c h i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p which i t a t tempts t o en force . 
The more ex tens ive our exper iences , provided we are reasonably 
s e n s i t i v e to those around u s , the more sure w i l l be our command o f the 
a p p r o p r i a t e i d iom. The more e a s i l y we are able t o demonstrate our 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the o r d e r , the more aware we become not s imply o f the 
o rde r i t s e l f , bu t o f who i s i n and who i s o u t . D i s t i n c t i o n s become 
c l e a r e r to us as our a p p r e c i a t i o n develops. A room which was merely 
f i l l e d w i t h people becomes a room o f groups and d i v i s i o n s , o f h i e r -
archy and s t a t u s . We know who i s a member and who i s not by the way 
i n which t h e i r ac t i ons man i fes t an apprec ia t ion o f the pub l i c o rde r . 
We are ab le to d i s c r i m i n a t e between those who do share i n our common 
p u b l i c o rder and those who do n o t , between members and non-members, 
because, as members, we are i n a p o s i t i o n t o apprec ia te t h a t o thers 
app rec ia te the same pub l i c o rde r . 
The ac t i ons which man i fes t t h i s app rec ia t i on must be p u b l i c i n the 
sense o f being p u b l i s h a b l e . They must be capable o f being brought to 
the a t t e n t i o n o f and disseminated amongst those who c o n s t i t u t e the, 
s o c i e t y ; capable o f being d isp layed to a l l . An i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i o n s , 
f o r example, must be seen to be apprec iated by those who c o n s t i t u t e h is 
p u b l i c . Even i f we were no t present a t the t i m e , they can be r e l a t ed 
to us l a t e r ; se t before us f o r our judgement and comment. The myst ic 
v i s i o n s o f San Juan de l a Cruz, however, are p r i v a t e f o r they c o n s t i t u t e 
experiences which by t h e i r very nature cannot be shared, and which are 
incapable o f be ing d i s p l a y e d . The myst ic appeals to no p u b l i c , nor does 
he seek to submit h imse l f to the s c r u t i n y o f o the rs . His experiences 
are not w i t h i n a p u b l i c order c o n s t i t u t e d by h is f e l l o w man. Only those 
experiences and ac t i ons which are capable o f being communicated, o f being 
he ld up f o r a l l t o see and a p p r e c i a t e , can escape the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f 
the pu re l y p r i v a t e t o seek con f i rma t i on w i t h i n the pub l i c o rde r . 
Conspiracy has no proper place here, and anonymous a t tacks are 
r i g h t l y seen as an a t t a c k no t merely aga ihs t a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l , bu t 
aga ins t the nature o f the p u b l i c order i t s e l f . We c la im not s imply the 
a t t e n t i o n o f o t h e r s , but i n v i t e t h e i r judgement and commentary as w e l l , 
and i t i s t h i s g i ve and take o f pub l i c ac t i on and judgement, o f ac t i on 
and r e a c t i o n , which es tab l i shes and maintains pub l i c o rder . Along w i t h 
t h i s openness goes t r u s t which i s au toma t i ca l l y extended to any who 
choose to speak and a c t a p p r o p r i a t e l y i n p u b l i c . I t i s assumed t h a t 
statements and ac t i ons are t r u t h f u l u n t i l some evidence t o the con t ra ry 
i s produced. D e c e i t , l i k e secrecy and consp i racy , undermines the s t r u c -
t u re o f the p u b l i c o rder by a t t a c k i n g the very cond i t i on o f i t s appear-
ance. Where the re i s a pervas ive susp ic ion o f a l l who ac t and a r e l u c -
tance to extend a u t o m a t i c a l l y t r u s t and credence, pub l i c o rder i s i n 
danger o f d isappearance. The common wor ld shared amongst men who know 
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themselves to be members o f i t can be susta ined on ly when men know, 
not on ly who they a r e , but who o thers are and where they stand i n r e -
l a t i o n to one another . This i s p r e c i s e l y what consp i racy , dece i t and 
susp ic ion make imposs ib le . 
Thus, awareness o f membership i s a two-way process. Not only does 
the i n d i v i d u a l ac t a p p r o p r i a t e l y , but he must be seen and understood to 
ac t a p p r o p r i a t e l y . The app rec i a t i on o f his ac t ions must be a pub l i c 
one, based on t r u s t and credence. I t i s both the ac t i on and the appre-
c i a t i o n o f i t s appropr ia teness which makes membership a common aware-
ness r a t h e r than an i n d i v i d u a l one, and makes i t r e l a t i v e l y continuous 
r a t h e r than momentary. Recognizing t h a t another i s a member, through 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the appropr ia teness o f his a c t i o n s , i s recogn iz ing him 
to be l i k e ou rse l ves . I t i s an a f f i r m a t i o n o f the pub l i c order which i s 
n e i t h e r h is nor mine, but ou rs . The same recogn i t i on o f communality i s 
e n t a i l e d i n moral judgements, wh i ch , i n modern Western exper ience, i n c l -
udes the o t h e r i n our wor ld by recogn iz ing t h a t he, l i k e us , i s a being 
who i s a s u b j e c t o f moral r i g h t s and who may command our respect o f 
those r i g h t s . 
Membership i n such a common p u b l i c order impl ies not on ly mutual 
app rec i a t i on and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between those who are members arid those 
who are n o t , i t a lso imp l ies t h a t the r i g h t s and du t ies o f membership 
(whatever form these may take) must be equ i tab ly d i s t r i b u t e d . The i n -
e q u a l i t y between members and non-members, between those who are i n and 
those who are o u t , i s p a r a l l e l e d by the e q u a l i t y amongst members. Inso-
f a r as they share membership i n a common pub l i c order which i s t h e i r s , 
men are i n t h a t respect equa l . I n d i v i d u a l d i s t i n c t i o n s are n o t ' o b l i t e -
ra ted by the e q u a l i t y o f membership, f o r otherwise i t would be impossib le 
to fash ion an i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y w i t h i n the pub l i c o rder . But no man 
may c la im p r i v i l e g e s f o r h imse l f which are denied to o t h e r s , or assume 
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t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s f a l l upon o thers which he h imse l f i s not ob l iged to 
acknowledge and meet. Where unequal p r i v i l e g e s and du t ies d i s t i n g u i s h 
one man from another , they a lso d i s t i n g u i s h one p u b l i c order from an-
o t h e r . I f a man has r i g h t s and du t i es which are s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
f rom mine, then we are n o t , i n t h a t respect a t l e a s t , members o f the same 
s o c i e t y . We are o f d i f f e r e n t orders o r castes or c lasses ra the r than 
members o f the same p u b l i c . P r i o r to the upheaval o f 1789, France was 
composed o f th ree l e g a l l y d i s t i n c t es ta tes . What d i s t i n g u i s h e d one 
es ta te from another were the r i g h t s enjoyed by and du t i es incumbent upon 
the i n d i v i d u a l members o f each e s t a t e . Wi th in each es ta te the members 
o f t h a t order enjoyed equal r i g h t s and incur red equal o b l i g a t i o n s i n law. 
The Revo lu t ion sought t o a b o l i s h these d i s t i n c t i o n s , speaking o f the 
fundamental r i g h t s and du t i es o f man, and thereby attempted to weld a 
s i n g l e p u b l i c o rder i n place o f the p rev ious ly d i v i d e d o rders . ^ 
The pr imary r i g h t which i s con fe r red by membership i s the r i g h t o f 
a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h i n t h a t p u b l i c o rder ; the r i g h t o f ac t i ng i n 
p u b l i c both to ma in ta in and modi fy the pub l ic o rder . I f the oppo r tun i t y 
to ac t i n pub l i c i s den ied , membership ceases f o r there would be no way 
i n which a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the p u b l i c o rder and mastery o f the appropr ia te 
id iom cou ld be e i t h e r d i sp layed o r acknowledged. I f membership d id not 
confer the r i g h t o f a c t i n g i n p u b l i c , there would be noth ing to a p p r e c i -
a t e ; no ac t i on to hold up to the scru-t' iny and judgement o f those who a lso 
en joy membership. Nor would t he re be any way i n which the c o n t r i b u t i o n 
o f the i n d i v i d u a l to the p u b l i c o rder could be acknowledged, f o r j udge-
ment and c r i t i c i s m themselves are ac t i ons d i sp lay ing a p p r e c i a t i o n . 
The r i g h t o f a c t i n g i n p u b l i c which i s confer red by membership i n a 
p u b l i c o rder i s no t u n l i m i t e d , however. I t demands t h a t c e r t a i n c o n d i -
^ Le febv re , Georges, The French Revo lu t ion , f rom i t s Or ig ins to 1793. 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Pau l . ' l 9 6 2 ) , 38-53, 145-152. ~ " 
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t i o n s be met. Not j u s t any a c t i o n i s acceptable. Ac t ion must be r e -
s t r a i n e d by an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the character o f the pub l i c o r d e r ; by 
an app rec i a t i on o f what i t means to be a member and a w i l l i n g n e s s to 
acknowledge the l i m i t s o f membership. I f membership confers the r i g h t 
o f a c t i n g i n p u b l i c , i t a lso e n t a i l s the duty o f app rec ia t i ng the l i m -
i t s o f the p u b l i c o rde r . F a i l u r e to abide by these cons t ra i n t s i s not 
s imply a v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s r u l e o r t h a t p r e s c r i p t i o n . I t i s a den ia l 
o f the du t i es e n t a i l e d i n membership. 
Membership i n a s o c i e t y thus imp l ies commitment to a pub l i c o rder . 
I t , i s not on ly t h a t one can , i f one chooses, ac t w i t h i n the cons t ra i n t s 
o f the pub l i c o r d e r , but t h a t one undertakes to do so. This i s not an 
unconscious or acc iden ta l out-come o f human a c t i o n . Faced w i t h the 
o p p o r t u n i t y o f s t e a l i n g a l a rge sum o f money from my employer, I must 
decide whether o r not to ca r r y ou t the t h e f t . By re fus ing to s tea l the 
money I a f f i r m my commitment to and membership i n a pub l i c order which 
l i m i t s and r e s t r a i n s i n d i v i d u a l capr i ce when i t comes to the proper ty o f 
o t h e r s . The dec is ion c a r r i e s i m p l i c a t i o n s beyond the moment o f re fus ing 
to take the money. I t i s a dec i s ion which a l i gns me w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r 
k i nd o f p u b l i c o r d e r , man i f es t i ng niy app rec ia t i on o f the c o n s t r a i n t s 
incumbent upon members o f t h a t o rde r . Those who r e j e c t such an order and 
want no pa r t o f i t w i l l very probably scorn my d e c i s i o n , or w i l l be i n -
credulous t h a t I cou ld be such a f o o l as to pass up t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y . 
They w i l l f a i l t o apprec ia te my a c t i o n as I w i l l f a i l to apprec ia te t h e i r 
r e j e c t i o n o f i t . This mutual incomprehension reveals the d i s t i n c t i o n s 
between the d i ve rse p u b l i c orders i n which we seek t o fash ion our sepa-
r a t e i d e n t i t i e s , and the r i g h t s and du t ies which we fee l are incumbent 
upon us as members o f these d i s t i n c t o rde rs . 
There i s another aspect o f commitment which i s imp l ied i n the con-
cept o f membership i n a p u b l i c o rde r . The more t h a t I undertake to ac t 
i n accordance w i t h the r i g h t s and du t i es of membership, the more I be-
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come def ined by and w i t h i n t h a t o rde r . Seeking to act w i t h i n an order 
and guided by my a p p r e c i a t i o n o f what i s appropr ia te to i t , who I am 
becomes i n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h t h a t o rder . I become committed 
to i t because i n ma in ta in ing i t s c o n t i n u i t y through t i m e , I e s t a b l i s h 
and main ta in niy own i d e n t i t y I My i d e n t i t y cannot be understood apar t 
f rom the p u b l i c order w i t h i n which i t i s es tab l i shed . 
A commitment to the id iom appropr ia te to a p a r t i c u l a r o r d e r , t h e n , 
i s a c o n d i t i o n o f a c t i n g i n t h a t p u b l i c . .But i t i s a lso a cond i t i on 
f o r the appearance o f the pub l i c order i t s e i l f . : A c t i o n . w i t h i n a pub l i c 
order i s o f a t w o f o l d na tu re . The i n d i v i d u a l speaks and acts before a 
group o f h is f e l l o w s , and h is a c t i o n must conform to the cond i t i ons o f 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h a t p u b l i c . He i s withi^n the c i r c l e o f t h e i r a t t e n -
t i o n and w i t h i n the recognized boundaries o f appropr ia te speech and 
a c t i o n . At the same t i m e , such a c t i o n also c o n s t i t u t e s the pub l i c 
o rde r . Were the re no such a c t i o n a t a l l , the pub l i c would d isappear. 
An id iom remains an id iom on ly as long as i t i s p r a c t i s e d , and once an 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the p u b l i c order f a i l s to be manifested i n the ac t ions 
o f men, i t no longer e x i s t s . The p u b l i c order i s c o n s t i t u t e d by my 
a c t i o n s , and the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f my ac t ions i s i l l u m i n a t e d by the pub-
l i c o rde r . The two are in te rdependent . 
Because every a c t i o n e s t a b l i s h i n g the i d e n t i t y o f an i n d i v i d u a l 
seeks t o d i s t i n g u i s h the i n d i v i d u a l and a t the same t ime t o a f f i r m h i s 
communality w i t h o t h e r s , a c t i o n both mainta ins and modi f ies pub l i c 
o rde r . Man ipu la t ion o f the id iom keeps the id iom a l i v e , but i t a lso 
changes i t w i t h every a c t i o n . Pub l i c o rde r , t h e n , i s never f i r m l y and 
f i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d , assuming a f i x e d and r i g i d s t r u c t u r e , but i s cons-
t a n t l y mod i f ied through t ime by i n d i v i d u a l ac t ions which main ta in i t s , 
l i f e as changes are brought about w i t h i n i t . The establ ishment o f 
i d e n t i t y through a c t i o n i n pub l i c presupposes the communality o f the 
p u b l i c o r d e r , and a t the same t ime cons tan t l y modi f ies the basis o f t h i s 
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communal i ty. 
V i o l a t i o n o f p u b l i c order i s d i s t i n c t from such mod i f i ca t i ons o f 
i t . A v i o l a t i o n i s a t h r e a t to a l l who are members o f t h a t order be-
cause i t r e j e c t s a commitment to the c o n t i n u i t y o f the common framework 
o f understanding w i t h i n which men a c t . I t consc ious ly t h r u s t s aside 
the du t i es e n t a i l e d i n membership, and thus threatens the d i s r u p t i o n o f 
the o rder which gives s i g n i f i c a n c e t o a c t i o n s , making them meaningful 
t o o the r men and making the estab l ishment o f i d e n t i t y poss ib l e . The 
d i s s o l u t i o n o f the pub l i c order would not only cut one man o f f from 
ano the r , i t would a lso te rmina te the i d e n t i t y o f a l l members, f o r there 
would be no framework w i t h i n which any i d e n t i t y could be fashioned and 
app rec ia ted . I t i s not s imply the man who i s robbed, t h e r e f o r e , but 
a l l members who have a mot ive f o r chasing a f t e r the t h i e f . 
Punishment i s imposed f o r v i o l a t i o n o f the pub l i c o rde r . I t may be 
p a i n f u l and thus ac t as a d e t e r r e n t t o those who would o therwise contem-
p l a t e pursu ing t h e i r own immediate desires a t the expense o f the demands 
o f the p u b l i c o rde r . Or i t may seek t o r e s t r i c t the freedom o f the 
i n d i v i d u a l t o a c t , thereby reduc ing the p o s s i b i l i t y o f f u r t h e r t r a n s -
gress ions o f the l i m i t s o f order by t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . I t s aim i s to r e -
s t r i c t the r i g h t s o f membership because the person concerned has not 
been mindfu l enough o f the concomitant dut ies o f membership. Impr ison-
ment, f o r example, removes those who. have been judged , through a p u b l i c 
p rocess , t o c o n s t i t u t e a t h r e a t to the c o n t i n u i t y o f the pub l i c o rde r . 
They are conf ined to pr isons so t h a t they w i l l no longer be i n a p o s i t i o n 
to f u r t h e r undermine the f a b r i c o f o rde r . The i r r i g h t s are removed from 
them and they a r e , t e m p o r a r i l y , denied t h e i r s ta tus as f u l l members o f 
the p u b l i c o rde r . 
C i t i z e n s are members o f a p u b l i c order i n the sense we have been 
d i s c u s s i n g . They are those who are members o f a c i v i l s o c i e t y . They 
are members o f the p u b l i c o rder whose concern i s the s t r u c t u r e and 
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charac ter o f the e n t i r e s o c i e t y ; t h a t i s , whose concern i s p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y . Al though c i v i l s o c i e t y i s c l ose l y l i n k e d w i t h the l a rge r 
s o c i e t y w i t h i n which p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y takes p l a c e , being a member o f 
a s o c i e t y i s not to be equated w i t h being a member o f c i v i l s o c i e t y ; 
w i t h being a c i t i z e n . 
Legal p r e s c r i p t i o n s s p e c i f y under what cond i t i ons an i n d i v i d u a l 
may be accorded the r i g h t s and d u t i e s o f c i t i z e n s h i p . Mere f u l f i l m e n t 
o f these requirements can never make a man a member o f a soc ie ty by t h a t 
f a c t a l o n e , however. Membership i n soc ie ty i s not a mat ter o f simple 
l ega l requ i rements , and. i t cannot be taken up or sloughed o f f through 
the man ipu la t ion o f l ega l procedures. B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s o f Pak is tan i 
o r i g i n are s t i l l commonly r e f e r r e d to as P a k i s t a n i s , desp i te t h e i r 
membership i n B r i t i s h c i v i l s o c i e t y . Thei r d i s t i n c t i v e na t iona l d ress , 
customs and tas tes i d e n t i f y them as members o f a non-Engl ish soc ie t y 
desp i t e the f a c t t h a t t hey .en joy the r i g h t s and du t i es o f B r i t i s h c i t i -
zensh ip . Becoming what we now accept as f u l l y B r i t i s h would be f o r 
such c i t i z e n s a massive and u l t i m a t e l y f u t i l e task . No mat ter how d i l i -
g e n t l y they seek to emulate B r i t i s h customs and acqu i re B r i t i s h t a s t e s , 
they w i l l never succeed i n t rans fo rm ing themselves i n t o f u l l y f ledged 
n a t i v e s . Whatever the f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the lega l p r e s c r i p t i o n regard ing 
such immigran ts , which may a t one moment depr ive them o f t h e i r c i t i z e n -
sh ip and a t the next r e s t o r e i t t o them aga in , they w i l l always remain 
a t l e a s t i n pa r t members o f another soc ie ty who are never complete ly i n 
command o f the app rop r i a te B r i t i s h id iom as i t i s now p r a c t i s e d . They 
w i l l always remain , i n some sense, f o r e i g n e r s . 
The on ly way i n which i t would be poss ib le f o r P a k i s t a n i s , or any 
o the r immigrant group, to become f u l l y B r i t i s h would be f o r our under-
s tand ing o f what i t means to be f u l l y B r i t i s h t o change. The extens ion 
o f the r i g h t s and d u t i e s o f c i t i z e n s h i p to immigrants may we l l r e s u l t 
i n a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the app rec i a t i on we now have o f what being B r i t i s h 
demands. This means t h a t the charac te r of" the soc ie ty would have to 
change before what was p rev ious l y considered to be a l i e n could become 
accepted as n a t i v e - a process which takes t ime . I t cannot be accomp-
l i s h e d o v e r n i g h t , nor can i t be e f f e c t e d through the man ipu la t ion o f 
lega l procedures. I t i s a process which i s both gradual and e l us i ve as 
the charac te r o f a people i s impercep t ib l y mod i f ied day by day through 
the encounter w i t h the new cond i t i ons and demands o f the p resent . 
The f a c t t h a t the immigrant can never become a t rue na t i ve may or 
may not be a bad t h i n g f o r a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y . Diverse e thn ic and 
c u l t u r a l groups w i t h i n a s i n g l e c i v i l soc ie t y may not cause f r i c t i o n , 
and may even be welcomed by a l l concerned. However, i f the d i s p a r i t y 
between the cha rac te r o f the c i v i l soc ie t y and the e n t i r e soc ie t y be-
comes too g r e a t , the p u b l i c order may we l l be unstable and i t s r e l a t i v e 
c o n t i n u i t y t h rea tened . I n the Austro-Hungar ian empire, f o r example, 
Serbian n a t i o n a l i s t s c laimed t h a t those determin ing the charac ter o f the 
e n t i r e soc ie t y were no t those who commanded an app rec ia t i on o f t h a t 
s o c i e t y . An a l i e n o r d e r , i t was suggested, was being imposed by men who 
had l i t t l e o r no th ing i n common w i t h those whom they r u l e d , and sub jec ts 
were g iven none o f the r i g h t s o f c i t i z e n s h i p i n determin ing the charac-
t e r o f t h e i r s o c i e t y . The pe rs i s tence o f such c la ims lead to dec l i ne i n 
the s t a b i l i t y o f the p u b l i c order as v io lence and repress ion replaced 
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argument and d i s c u s s i o n . 
I t i s f o r these reasons t h a t the lega l p r e s c r i p t i o n s according to 
which c i t i z e n s h i p i s bestowed upon i n d i v i d u a l s are designed t o ensure 
t h a t , i n s o f a r as i t i s poss ib le to do s o , the i n d i v i d u a l who i s made a 
member o f c i v i l s o c i e t y w i l l exe rc i se h i s r i g h t s w i t h an app rec ia t i on 
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of the character of the society within which pol i t ica l act iv i ty takes 
place. Language qual i f icat ions, for example, and the requirement that 
aliens reside in a country for an extended period of time before natu-
ral izat ion is granted, both attempt to ensure that the new cit izen is 
one who may be rel ied upon to manifest an appreciation of the entire 
society. Mere bir th within the geographic confines of a state is thought 
to be enough of a guarantee because the child is assumed to be socialised 
into the society from his earl iest experiences. That i s , he is a native 
and appropriate action, i t is assumed, w i l l come naturally to him once 
he is mature. In England the age at which his apprenticeship is pre-
sumed to be complete has been set, through a public legal process, at 
the age of eighteen. There is no absolute surety that a l l who reach the 
age of eighteen, or who f u l f i l the legal requirements for naturalization, 
w i l l necessarily manifest an appreciation of what is appropriate to the 
public order. Nevertheless, the intention of the legal stipulations 
governing the conferment of citizenship is to be as sure as possible. 
Civ i l society, then, is not to be divorced from the larger society 
of which i t is but one part. I t does not exist on i ts own, in isolation 
from a l l other aspects of the l ives of the men who are members of i t and 
the men who are subject to the decisions which emanate from i t . The 
experience of empire, where a few from an alien culture rule over a 
society, presents the extreme of the possible separation between those 
who are able to participate in po l i t i ca l l i f e and those who are merely 
subjects and must simply obey whatever is resolved. In modern l iberal 
democratic societies, the attempt is made to extend c i v i l society to a l l 
who are members of that society. Generally speaking, only those who con-
sistent ly demonstrate that they are unwilling or unable to appreciate 
the demands of membership in the c i v i l society, or those who are consid-
ered too immature or too alien to be capable of such appreciation, are 
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excluded. The others, whose who know what i t is to act in public and 
to be a member of a public order, enjoy the privileges of f u l l c i t i -
zenship. 
The primary privi lege of f u l l citizenship is the r ight of po l i t -
ical action; of engaging in po l i t i ca l act iv i ty to determine the charac-
ter of the entire society. Specific rights which are guaranteed by 
modern l iberal democratic states are designed to ensure that the indi-
vidual w i l l enjoy the capacity to exercise his r ight of determining 
the character of his society. Freedom of the press, for example, is 
concerned with safeguarding the r ight of public consideration and 
discussion of whatever issue is of interest to the cit izens. Freedom 
of speech, freedom of peaceful public assembly, freedom from arbi-
trary arrest - a l l are concerned with maintaining the rights of c i t i -
zens to participate in po l i t ica l act iv i ty . 
Like membership in other public orders, the rights and duties of 
citizenship entail public recognition. I t is not simply a matter of 
one cit izen acting appropriately, but of his fellows allowing him to 
act and acknowledging his contributions. Inequitable distr ibution of 
rights and duties, as in the effective disenfranchisement of the Amer- -
ican Negro in the past century, creates, in ef fect , two public orders 
with two quite d is t inct groups of members. The public recognition of 
the rights and duties of cit izenship*is reflected in the fact that the 
requirements of membership in c i v i l society are a public matter, and 
are susceptible to publicly approved changes. The requirements which 
must be met for a man to become a ci t izen are, as we have noted, speci-
f ied in law. They are both determined and modified by legal processes 
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and can be enforced by public inst i tut ions such as a court of law. 
Similarly, the equitable distr ibut ion of rights and duties can be 
secured through recourse to such public procedures. The Race Relations 
Act in Great Br i ta in , for example, provides the means by which those 
who are denied the rights of cit izenship, by others who are unwilling 
to acknowledge their claim to membership in c i v i l society, may appeal 
to courts or the Race Relations Board for the enforcement of equal 
rights and duties. . 
Therefore, at least in theory, a l l members of c i v i l society are 
equally free to participate in po l i t ica l l i f e . None may claim an in-
herent privilege to silence, override, or coerce another who is acting 
in accordance with the demands of this public. In theory, pol i t ica l 
action is within a c i rc le of equals, and a l l have at least a potent-
i a l l y equal claim on public attention and an equal opportunity to act. 
In practice, however, relat ively few desire the attention of 
others in po l i t ica l ac t i v i t y , and these few must compete with one an-
other for the attention of the many. Some w i l l become known for the 
acuteness of their judgement, and their views w i l l be attended more 
carefully than others, thus allowing them to appropriate a relat ively 
large portion of the public time and giving their speech and action 
greater weight. Some w i l l be entrusted with an off ice which allows them 
to claim ex officio precedence for their views over those of others. 
The majority of citizens in our society enter actively into pol i t ica l 
l i f e only intermit tent ly. Every few years the cit izen votes, on occa-
sion he may be moved to write a le t ter to the press or to lobby his MP. 
More commonly, however, his participation is passive: he gives his 
attention to those who are acting in po l i t i cs , seldom seeking to focus 
public attention on himself. In pol i t ica l l i f e , the passivity of the 
majority is a recognized fact , and polit icians frequently attempt to 
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appeal over the heads of their colleagues and rivals to the audience 
which they feel is attending the debate. The assumption is that some-
one out there is l istening. 
The passive participation of the majority of citizens is not to be 
denigrated, for po l i t ica l l i f e is in danger of decay when their atten-
tion is withdrawn. Civi l society, l ike other public orders, can be 
maintained only as long as men count themselves as members and are con-
cerned as to the fate of their common world. I f po l i t ica l act iv i ty 
shrinks unt i l the members of the government are acting in a public com-
prised only of themselves, while the mass of their fellows have concen-
trated their energies elsewhere, then c iv i l society has disappeared. 
In such a case pol i t ica l l i f e has ended and a l l the action, along with 
a l l the attent ion, has moved somewhere else. 
Being a member of c i v i l society, and attending to pol i t ica l a f fa i rs , 
distinguishes the cit izen from the subject. Citizens enjoy the right of 
participation in the determination of the character of their society. 
They are free to engage in po l i t ica l act iv i ty . To the extent that the 
rights and duties of membership are impaired or l imi ted, the v i t a l i t y 
of c i v i l society is diminished. When men are not afforded the f u l l 
extent of their rights or are prevented from participating in pol i t ica l 
l i f e , the relevance of their membership declines. I t no longer has 
significance for them, and the public" order in which they might act to 
fashion their identi t ies is in dissolution. I f , for one reason or 
another, po l i t ica l act iv i ty is impaired, citizenship begins to lose i t s 
meaning and men become mere subjects instead. Subjects have obligations 
but no r ights. The subject must obey but he may well have undertaken no 
conroitment to do so. He may, for example, be a member of a conquered 
community who is excluded from any possibi l i ty of determining the laws 
which w i l l govern his act iv i t ies and the character of his society. The 
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man who is merely the subject of a state, and not the member of a c i v i l 
society, is alienated from po l i t i ca l act iv i ty . While there may well be 
public order, his identity is not established through pol i t ica l activ-
i t y for he is given no opportunity to act publicly there. Consequently 
he does not depend upon po l i t ica l l i f e to establish who he Is . Pol i t -
ical act iv i ty is l ike ly to appear remote and irrelevant to the l i f e In 
his vi l lage or community, for example, where he is able to participate 
and establish an ident i ty. The result of pol i t ica l deliberations w i l l 
seem to be Imposed upon him from another world, rather than emanating 
from the world which surrounds him, is familiar to him, and is main-
tained by his actions. For the subject, pol i t ica l l i f e has a l l but 
disappeared and c i v i l society has no relevance for him. His compliance 
and obedience may be secured by other means (for example, his accept-
ance of custom, fear of coercion and reprisal, or adherence to a moral 
code), but i t w i l l not arise from his identif ication with c i v i l society. 
To the subject the po l i t ica l world is not a world which Is his because 
i t is not a world of which he is a member*, in which he acts and has 
either rights or duties. I t Is always a world which is ' t he i rs ' . 
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Chapter 3 
LAW AND OBLIGATION 
The conditions of membership in c i v i l society, the rights and 
duties of citizenship, are not l e f t to the interpretation of each and 
every individual. They are specified in law. Laws are rules, binding 
on a l l members of a society, determining what every member is entit led 
to and in what way each is obligated. Thus laws manifest the struc-
ture of the public order by formalizing and making binding on a l l 
members what i t means to be a member and to have the right to par t i -
cipate in the public order as well as the duty to adhere to the l im i t -
ations incumbent upon a l l members of that order. 
By creating obligations which men who are members of a public 
order must meet, law helps to stabi l ize the public order. The future is 
always to some extent uncertain. The possibi l i ty of unforeseen events 
disrupting our plans and destroying our expectations can never be 
fu l l y eliminated. But the creation of obligations amongst men serves 
to diminish the possibi l i ty of the unexpected; to mitigate the uncertain 
nature of the future by imposing some measure of control on the changes 
that may occur in the world as a result of human action. Obligations 
which are imposed by law allow us to be more certain about the actions 
of those about us than we might otherwise be. Because others, l ike my-
sel f , are obliged by law to drive on the left-hand side of the road in 
Great Br i ta in , and are forbidden to cross an intersection when a red 
l igh t is against them, I am able to be reasonably certain that by driving 
on the l e f t , and by crossing an intersection only when the l ight is 
green, I w i l l avoid a col l is ion with another motorist. Collisions do 
occur, of course, for the world and the changes that take place within 
i t are not completely within our powers to control. The imposition of 
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obligations contained in the t r a f f i c code, however, reduce the chances 
of just anything at a l l happening when I drive through town. The area 
of individual caprice is restr icted; some things a man must do, and 
others he must not do. Insofar as we al l know what obligations are 
imposed upon a l l of us, we are able to make reasonable projections 
about our Interaction In public. 
Law is thus a conservative force. By imposing obligations upon 
men i t seeks to structure their act iv i ty within certain bounds; to 
reduce the possibi l i ty of the completely unexpected and unforeseen, and 
to uphold the conditions of membership in the public order. Law is 
concerned with the maintenance of the structure of the public order 
rather than the contemplation of change within i t . Contemplation and 
deliberation belong to the realm of pol i t ica l ac t iv i ty . Once a deci-
sion is reached there, i t is manifested in law, the purpose of which is 
to impose obligations so that act iv i t ies in public are more or less 
regulated, more or less predictable and more or less structured over 
time. In this way the continuity of the public order is maintained. 
Through the specification of the rights and duties of membership, 
law draws a l ine between what is designated as 'public' and 'pr ivate ' . 
What law does is to indicate those areas which are the concern of public 
bodies, such as the state, and where particular kinds of behaviour may 
be enforced upon a l l members of a society. The manner in which a l l 
people drive on public highways is a concern of the police organisations 
of the state, and particular behaviour can be demanded of drivers while 
other behaviour is forbidden. An individual's l i terary taste, by con-
t rast , is not regulated by law and (for the moment, at any rate) fa l l s 
outside the area of public concern. There Is no generalized rule pre-
scribing certain kinds of l i terary tastes and forbidding others, and 
therefore no public body may act to enforce one or prohibit another. 
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Until such a time as the law is changed, this is a private concern 
and forms no part of the conditions of membership in the c i v i l society. 
The l ine between what is designated public and what private is 
never a steady one, however. I t is constantly shi f t ing through time 
as some areas are brought under the regulation of law, and thus made 
the concern of public bodies, while others are returned to the relative 
freedom of privacy where there are no legal obligations which impose 
themselves upon a man's actions. Debate in po l i t ica l l i f e , which may 
focus on any aspect of the society, is largely debate about how the 
division between the two areas shall be drawn; about the rights and 
duties of membership. Working conditions in coal-mines were once out-
side the sphere of legal obligations. There were no standards which 
had to be maintained, no practices which were forbidden, no rights to 
be upheld or duties to be enforced. In legal terms this was a private 
matter. 'Private' not in the sense that i t did not affect a large 
body of men, for i t obviously d id , but in the sense that the legally 
defined boundary between what was subject to public regulation and 
what was.not l e f t the operation of coal-mines on the side of those 
areas free from the imposition of legal obligations. In time this was 
altered. Debate about the character of the society and the rights and 
the duties of membership resulted in a redefinition of those rights 
and duties, and thus a redef ini t ion'of what was considered to be pub-
l i c . Certain aspects of coal mining came under public regulation, and 
the l ine between what was designated as public and what as private was 
re-drawn. 
The rights and duties of c i t izens, established in law, are thus 
public in that they are incumbent upon al l members of a c i v i l society. 
Their violat ion becomes a public concern. Men may resort to courts of 
law to have their rights upheld or to ensure that others meet the 
obligations which, as members, they have incurred. In private af fa i rs 
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there is no possibi l i ty of making an appeal to any public procedures. 
The claims upon other Individuals are perhaps moral claims or claims of 
af fect ion, but such claims are irrelevant to the conditions of member-
ship in the c i v i l society. The betrayed lover, emotionally deprived 
chi ld or long-suffering friend cannot turn to the courts to get what 
they want, and the inconstant lover, unresponsive father and unfeeling 
friend cannot be held to have violated the conditions of membership in 
c i v i l society. Although' not beyond reproach, they are beyond the law. 
The obligations which are imposed by law are generalized obliga-
t ions. They deal with classes of men and organizations, rather than 
specific men or organizations. A1J_ automobile owners must register their 
vehicles, for example. : No man may make faUe claims for- his merchandise. 
Unlike a promise between two individuals, a law imposes an obligation 
upon nameless men; on 'whosoever'. I t deals with classes of men and 
organizations and not particular identif iable ones. A restaurant, for 
example, is obliged to maintain a certain hygienic standard in i ts 
kitchens. This is not because of any promise to various customers, or 
even to the general public, but because i t f a l l s into the general class 
of businesses whose act iv i t ies have been designated as being of public 
concern and which are regulated by public health laws. 
Because laws are public, imposing generalized obligations through 
a public process on classes of men, they are open to public inspection. 
Indeed, their efficacy is dependent upon their being generally known and 
not hidden away in secrecy from those who comprise the public. Laws are 
open to scrutiny by a l l , and any member of a society may demand to see 
the law under which another is said to have a claim against him. There 
can be no esoteric body of law, known only to a chosen few, which regu-
lates the public order. 
The imposition of legal obligations upon generalized classes of men 
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means that although laws may be changed by the relevant pol i t ica l i ns t i -
tut ions, they are not open to renegotiation between individual parties. 
A law is not a business contract whose conditions may be modified by the 
two parties direct ly concerned. Barring corrupt practices (which under-
mine the rule of law), a t r a f f i c offender may not try to persuade the 
arresting of f icer that together they should agree to revise the speed 
l im i t on a road. 
Promises, esoteric rules and regulations known only to a few,' busi-
ness contracts and commercial agreements a l l may impose some kind of 
obligations upon men. They may oblige.some men to perform certain act i -
v i t ies and enjoin them from performing others. But from what has been 
said above, i t should be clear that these kinds of obligations are dis-
t inc t from a legal obligation and should not be confused with i t . Obey-
ing a law is not keeping a promise, abiding by secret rules or f u l f i l l i n g 
a contract. 
I t is the invocation of conventions and the adherence to procedures 
within po l i t i ca l ins t i tu t ions, whatever form these conventions and pro-
cedures may take, which establishes new laws, and thus new conditions of 
membership, or repeals old laws, and thus abolishes old conditions of 
membership. Where these conventions are properly invoked, the procedures 
correctly followed, and the relevant inst i tut ions acknowledged as author-
i t a t i ve , the decisions which are made'have authority. That i s , they 
create obligations which are incumbent upon a l l members. Violation of 
any of these conditions deprives the law of any claim to legitimacy. I f 
Parliament were to enact a law without the requisite three readings or 
Royal Assent, or attempted to ignore the view of the majority o f i t s 
members, the claim that the resulting decision created any legitimate 
obligation would be regarded as false. In such a case what claimed to 
be the law would be rejected as no law at a l l , and no obligation would be 
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held to be Imposed upon the members of the society. 
This emphasis on the importance of adherence to commonly recognized 
procedures and proper invocation of accepted conventions distinguishes 
law from custom or mere habit. Obedience may be habitual in the loosest 
sense of the word, meaning that i t is unreflective or automatic obedi-
ence. But law, and the obligations which i t creates, are neither unre-
f lect ive nor automatic. The fact that i t Is my habit to have my morning 
tea in bed cannot be made either legitimate.or i l legi t imate by reference 
to conventions or procedures, nor is i t a practice which carries autho-
r i t y . I t Is simply my habit. I t may be viewed as a good habit or a bad 
one, but i t cannot be said to be legitimate, binding or authoritative. 
Simi lar ly, customs amongst: a..group of people^ are: not established by re-
course to public conventions or procedures and they do not remain in 
force unt i l they are repealed. They are practised over time, and their 
gradual abandonment by a society results in^their dissolution. They then 
become simply irrelevant. 
As conventions and procedures can only be consciously employed, so 
also laws can only be consciously established or repealed. New laws, 
unlike new customs or habits, cannot creep up on us, catching us una-
wares. And old laws remain on the statute books, not to be abandoned 
simply because of disuse or because they are out of fashion. The ob l i -
gations created by laws may be i l l -advised or unfair(whatever we may 
mean by such judgements), but they can never be accidental or tota l ly 
inexplicable.^ 
Laws are not only created through the invocation of the appropriate 
authoritative conventions, imposing generalized obligations upon a l l 
members of a society, they also form a coherent system. In this sense 
^ Hart makes a similar point in his discussion of what he calls 
'secondary ru les ' , which are here referred to as conventions and 
procedures. Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1961), 77-96. 
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laws may be said to be reasonable, rather than arbitrary, in the oblig-
ations^ which they impose. Many things can be meant by claim that laws 
are 'reasonable', but a few definite characteristics are indicated by 
such a description. 
F i rs t , a body of laws must be relatively continuous. Laws do not 
appear one day and disappear the next; one moment quite arb i t rar i ly cre-
ating obligations and the next dissolving them. Although laws obviously 
are amended and repealed, i t is only i f , they remain relatively constant 
over a period of time that they are able to maintain a fa i r l y stable 
structure of public order. The obligations which we fai led to f u l f i l 
yesterday must s t i l l make us l iable for prosecution today, and the laws 
we make today must be assumed to be in force tomorrow. Only then can we 
know where we stand with one another, and hope to meet our obligations, 
thereby reducing the potential chaos of our interaction with other men. 
Ambiguity in the meaning of a law is inevitable, however much those 
draft ing legislation may attempt to be as expl ic i t and precise as poss-
ib le . But, despite the possibi l i ty of changing interpretations and sig-
nificance, laws are written down and preserved over time. As a corpus, 
laws are always in force as long as the public order which they manifest 
and stabi l ize is in existence. 
Secondly, a corpus of laws must be coherent. A proposal to give 
eighteen year-olds the r ight to vote cannot be made law without repealing 
or amending the existing law which has established the requisite cige as 
twenty-one. I f two laws within a society are contradictory, i t must be 
assumed that one or both of them is inval id, creating no legitimate ob l i -
gation. However d i f f i c u l t the task, attempts are made to achieve coher-
ence, both over time and at one point in time. Historically we remember 
great law givers less than great law codifiers who have made the law co-
herent so that i t may speak with one voice and impose compatible obliga-
tions upon members of a society. 
For this reason, judges w i l l refer to precedent, desiring to make 
their present judgements consistent with past judgements, maintaining 
the coherence of the corpus of law over time. I f , in the view of a 
judge, the case before him is analogous in a l l i t s relevant aspects to 
one which has been decided previously, he wi l l feel bound to follow that 
precedent. I f he chooses for some reason to violate the precedent, he 
w i l l attempt to j us t i f y his decision, giving reasons why this case may 
not be considered analogous to the previous one, or why precedent should 
not be followed in the case at hand. Such attempts at jus t i f icat ion 
test i fy to the significance of coherence to a body of law. 
Thirdly, a body of law w i l l be coherent only i f i t is universal in 
i ts application, and this is what is generally meant by equity; treating 
equal claims equally. Where this principle is violated, law does not 
serve to stabi l ize relations amongst men in public, but rather adds to the 
uncertainty of interaction with others. In a society where equity is not 
observed, I can never be sure that others wi l l respect the conditions of 
membership as they are defined in law, and can never have confidence that 
they w i l l respect the rights which I ought to enjoy as a member of the 
public order. I f equity is successfully violated, the equality between 
members is attacked and the coherence of the public order is threatened. 
In such a case, the claim of law to be a reasonable system of obliga-
tions Imposed upon a l l members of the society is undermined, and the re l -
ative continuity of the public order comes to depend more on whim and 
caprice. 
Deciding what constitutes an equal claim and what treatment of that 
2 
Berman, Harold J . and William R. Greiner, The Nature and Functions of 
Law, (Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.7 1966), 384-87: 
3 Hart, ibid., 153-60. 
53 
claim would count as equal i s , of course, seldom an easy task. A large 
part of the sk i l l of judging l ies in the abi l i ty to decide whether or not 
the particular case now before the court fa l ls in the general class 
regulated by the law ci ted, and whether i t should be treated exactly l ike 
other members of that class. Is a powered wheelchair a member of the 
class of motor vehicles which are banned by law from using footpaths, in 
public parks? The decision to include the particular case at hand in the 
general class regulated by law, or to exclude i t from that general class, 
requires reasoning and jus t i f i ca t ion . I t is never an arbitrary or ran-
dom classi f icat ion, but can be elucidated, discussed and debated. Judges 
explain and defend the process of reasoning and the cr i ter ia which have 
led to their decision, and a higher court, in reversing this decision, 
w i l l put forward what i t feels are better reasons for arriving at the 
contrary conclusion. 
Continuity, coherence and equity - those aspects of a body of law 
which transform i t from a series of random and arbitrary commands to a 
system of obligations incumbent upon a l l members of a society - a l l i n -
volve the use of reason. As the establishment of law cannot be an un-
reasoning process, so also i t s maintenance and application cannot be an , 
unreasoning one. Actions and'decisions must be taken-with reference to 
a whole corpus of existing laws, and require jus t i f ica t ion in terms of 
their reasonableness. I t is the impbrtance of continuity, coherence 
and equity which allows us to speak of a corpus of law instead of a mere 
collection of laws. 
I f this is what is entailed in the notion of a corpus of law, what 
does i t mean to have an obligation under law? To what or whom is one 
obligated? I may obey the law out of a sense of prudence. The fear of 
4 Ladd, John, 'Morality and Philosophy', in Sidney Hook, ed., Law and 
Philosophy. Proceedings of the New York University Institute"oT 
Philosophy, (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 70 
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what w i l l happen to me i f I do not may convince me that i t is in my 
interest to obey, my decision being the result of the most careful and 
rational calculation I am able to make on the basis of the information 
which l ies before me. Fear of the coercive powers of the police or of 
the retr ibution of my neighbours may lead me to conclude that on balance 
i t is better to obey the law than not, But this 1s not the same as re-
cognizing an obligation to obey. Prudence may explain why people do in 
fact obey the law, and coercion may be a practical necessity for the 
enforcement of law, but neither prudence nor coercion alone explain what 
i t is to have an obligation to comply with the law. 
The calculation as to which is the most prudent course of action is 
a self-interested one. I t is a calculation which rests upon the assump-
tion that niy primary commitment is to thyself. I t is possible that a cal-
culation w i l l lead me to conclude that evasion of the law is on balance 
the most prudent course of action for me to take. Indeed, i t would seem, 
as suggested by the Sophists, that the most prudent course to follow over 
time would be to appear to uphold the law, encourage others to obey i t , 
support the state in enforcing compliance from others, while secretly 
evading the law oneself. Prudence resolves i t se l f into sel f - interest , 
and the recognition of sel f- interest is not the same as the acknowledge-
ment of an obligation. 
What is missing in any account of obligation in terms of prudence 
is a clearer understanding of the public character of law. Just as the 
man who lives in complete isolation can be neither witty nor moral, so 
also he can have neither legal obligations nor legal duties. Laws 
create obligations. They are prescriptions declaring what the relations 
between men ought to be, and not definitions or explanations stating 
5 The argument of Callicles is perhaps a classic statement of this 
view. Plato, Gorglas, Walter Hamilton, trans., (London: Penguin 
BookSj L td . , 1971), § 482 f f . 
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necessary relationships, as sc ient i f ic laws may be said to assert. 
These prescriptions arise out of social situations. What we owe under a 
system of law, we owe to other men and not to the law as an abstract con-
cept. The obligations we incur are mutual obligations, enabling other 
men to make claims on us as their obligations enable us to make claims 
on them. Such obligations cannot be understood simply as a matter of 
prudence, which does not require a social situation where men confront 
one another in order to make i t s appearance. 
We incur these mutual obligations as members, and i t is to other 
members that we are obliged. I t is only between men who are members of 
the same public order that the possibi l i ty of law presents i t se l f . • Out-
side any shared public order, i t would be impossible to determine what 
claims men could be said to have against one another because there would 
be no common framework within which each man could locate those he con-
fronted, and no way of knowing what action would be appropriate to the 
situation. While law stabil izes the conditions of membership in a public 
order, i t is the public order which provides the necessary context within 
which a system of law is both possible and meaningful. 
The fulf i lment of legal obligations to other members is a manifesta-
tion of a commitment to the public order within which we interact with 
those about us. The recognition of a legal obligation, l ike the recog-
ni t ion of a moral obligation, is an affirmation of membership in the 
common world which together members sustain through their actions, and 
which binds them to one another. I t is in this sense that any violation 
of the law is an offence against a l l cit izens, whether or not they wit-
nessed or were direct ly affected by i t . A broken law threatens the sta-
b i l i t y of the public order in which a l l men have a stake. This is not 
simply a matter of prudence, which may or may not encourage violation of 
the law, but of commitment to a common world - a commitment which is 
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brought into question by those whose actions undermine the relatively 
stable and continuous public order within which we are able to act and 
to establish an identity for ourselves. No member of the public order, 
therefore, may consider himself unaffected by the violation of the law. 
In helping to maintain the continuity of the public, order, the 
obligations created by law are an expression of the character of the 
society. They are, in a sense, a manifestation of the collective iden-
t i t y or character of those who comprise the public; a statement as to 
what sort of people 'we' are. Law is the result of a temporary halt in 
the continuing debate about the structure of the public order and the 
conditions of membership.^ Like the identity of the individual, the 
system of law establishing the rights and duties of members is never 
completed. I t can never be said to be concluded l ike a work of ar t or 
solved l ike a puzzle. I ts development is an on-going process as the 
public order which i t helps to sustain is modified through time. 
Laws which contradict the popular understanding of what sort of 
people 'we' are, are l ike ly to meet with only reluctant compliance or 
even widespread evasion. In either case, the character of the public 
order is called into question, and the reluctance or unwillingness of men 
to accept the legal stipulations of the rights and duties of members may 
be the basis of resistance. Resistance to law on moral grounds, on the 
grounds that i t is contrary to the kind of people 'we' are, or on the 
grounds that i t does not further the common good (that i s , on other than 
prudential grounds) i s , in ef fect , a refusal to accept the outcome of 
po l i t i ca l debate. I t is an unwillingness to adopt the resulting legal 
statement as to what sort of people 'we' are. In this i t is not simply 
a rejection of the structure of the public order as i t has come to be 
o! : ^]^°'^^ ^" Vecchio, Giorgio, The Philosophy of Law, 
8th ed., T. 0. Martin, t rans., (Washington: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 1953), 308 f f . 
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defined in law, but is at the same time an affirmation of another public 
order with a dist inct character. By refusing to obey a law, a man 
. . . means, for instance, that "this has been going on 
too long", "so far but no further", "you are going 
too far " , or again "there are certain l imits beyond 
which you shall not go". In other words, his "no" 
affirms the existence of a borderline ' ' 
which defines the l imi ts of his i d e n t i t y . ' I t is in this way that the 
rebel says yes and no at the same t ime': 'no' to the obligations created 
by the law, and 'yes' to a particular kind of public order which he sees 
as threatened by that law; a society to which he is committed. 
The result of such a refusal to obey may be complete isolation from 
those around him who were formerly part of his public world but who now 
are able neither to understand his intentions nor support his actions. 
The intent ion, however, is one of solidarity with what he sees as the 
appropriate character of his society, not opposition to i t . Refusal to 
obey a law w i l l bring the individual into confl ict with the state, but 
that conf l ic t does not undermine his affirmation of a commitment to a 
particular kind of society. ' . . . The society into which we are born is -
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not the same enti ty as the state that governs us . . . . ' 
This sort of refusal is far di f ferent from the refusal of the thief 
who would l ike everyone e.lse to obey the law so that be may be assured 
of keeping with some degree of security what he has stolen. The thief 
Camus, Albert, The Rebel, Anthony Bower, trans., (London: Penguin 
Books, L td . , 1971), 19.;; • 
i b i d . 
9 
Walzer, Michael, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience. Mar and . 
Citizenship, (Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard University Press, 1970), 
TIT. The same point is made in Locke's Second Treatise, where he 
states that 'He that w i l l with any clearness speak of the Dissolution 
of Government, ought, in the f i r s t place, to distinguish between the 
Dissolution of Society and the Dissolution of Government.' Locke, 
John, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed., (London: The 
New English Library, L td . , 1963), 454. Also cf. Knvitz, Milton R., 
'C iv i l Disobedience and the Duty of Fair Play', in Hook, ed., iMik cjt 
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must insist on a dist inct ion between himself and others. Stealing 
property from others can only be a profitable enterprise i f one has 
confidence that the wealth which is accumulated w i l l not be stolen in 
turn. The man who refuses to obey the law for conscientious reasons, 
however, must insist upon his sol idari ty and communality with others, 
and upon the dist inct ion between the character he feels legal obligations 
are attempting to impose on his society and the kind of character he 
feels i t ought to have. His is not a commitment to mere sel f- interest, 
nor is he advocating one law for himself and another for the rest of his . 
fellows. Rather he refuses to obey the Taw because he is committed to a 
di f ferent kind of public order to be shared in common with others. 
A refusal to obey the law on conscientious grounds is a d i f f i c u l t 
position to combat. The man who takes this position w i l l not be l ikely 
to be persuaded on grounds of prudence; that i s , that he w i l l be impris-
oned, for example, i f he does not obey. Nor is i t l ike ly he wi l l be 
persuaded on grounds of legal authority; that i s , the appropriate con-
ventions have been followed and procedures adhered to in the relevant 
po l i t ica l inst i tut ions. Nor even is he l ikely to be moved on the grounds 
that the law is reasonable; that i s , i t is continuous, coherent and equi-
table, forming a consistent corpus of law. Because identity and charac-
ter are debatable qual i t ies, not open to quantification or empirical 
ver i f icat ion, what is being questioned in this kind of refusal to abide 
by a legal obligation is judgement. One may attempt to show the man who 
refuses that his views are logical ly inconsistent; that he has misunder-
stood the past; that he has unreasonable expectations about 'our' future. 
But a l l arguments w i l l eventually return to the problem of identity and 
to the fact that the conscientious objector has not only an idea of who 
he i s , but also a d ist inct idea of who 'we' ought to be; of the kinds of 
rights and duties which should be incumbent upon us as members of this 
society. 
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Chapter 4 
AUTHORITY 
The laws which establish the conditions of membership in c i v i l 
society are not determined b^ just anyone in the society. Only a rela-
t ively few are accorded the privilege of establishing the legal oblig-
ations which shall be binding upon a l l members of the society. These 
few enjoy positions of authority, and i t is the exercise of their auth-
or i ty which helps to ensure the s tab i l i t y and relative continuity of 
the public order through time. 
I t is obvious, therefore, that authority has to do with men acting 
together in a public order. An isolated man cannot exercise authority 
for there is no-one over whom he may exercise i t , nor can he make autho-
r i ta t ive judgements for there i-s no-one to receive them. Authority is 
pre-eminently po l i t i ca l . I f arises out of the experierice of men inter-
acting with each other and is intimately related to the very conditions 
which make possible the creation of public order amongst men. But 
while a l l agree on the importance of authority to an understanding of 
po l i t ica l ac t i v i t y , there is l i t t l e agreement as to i t s nature. 
I t is widely acknowledged that somehow authority involves one (or 
a few) commanding, and others (or the many) following their directives. 
For some this much is enough of a dist inct ion. 'By authority I mean the 
faculty of gaining one man's assent. Or i t may be called, though i t 
comes to the same thing, the e f f ic ient cause of voluntary associations'.^ 
By inducing another man to select the alternative which I have proposed 
and to follow the course of action which I have suggested, I am, according 
^ de Jouvenel, Bertrand, Sovereignty; An Enquiry into the Pol i t ical 
Good, J . F. Huntington, trans., (Cambridge: The Cambridge Univer-
s i ty Press, 1957), 29. • 
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to this view, exercising authority. However, i f authority is nothing 
more than ' . . . the ab i l i t y of a man to get his proposals accepted', 
i t is d i f f i c u l t to see what, i f anything, distinguishes authority from 
persuasion, threat, or coercion. My rational arguments or rhetorical 
sk i l l s may induce others to adopt a particular course of action. Or I 
may threaten them with some punishment or other disastrous consequences 
i f they do not follow r^ y suggestion. Or I may physically coerce them i f 
other methods f a i l . The reasoned argument of a mathematical proof, the 
prospect of heavenly reward or promise of earthly punishment, the f l a t t -
eries and deceits of a seducer, the pressure of a bayonet at the throat -
a l l may secure the acceptance of a proposal. However, to claim that in 
every case authority has been exercised is to ignore crucial distinctions 
between these various examples. Such an understanding of the character 
of authority, by including too much, distinguishes too l i t t l e . 
What is i t , then, that makes one statement authoritative and another 
not, even when both induce others to act in a particular way? An autho-
r i ta t i ve statement, i t has been suggested, must be one which is capable 
of being defended as reasonable. Far from being arbitrary, i t must (at 
least potential ly) be explained in terms of reason.^ Unreasonable state-
ments, then, must sacrif ice any pretensions to being authoritative, i f 
this view is to be accepted. While i t is true, for reasons which w i l l 
be examined below, that the exercise Of authority is never arbi t rary, the 
attempt to use reasonableness (whatever that is taken to mean) as a dis-
tinguishing cr i ter ion is misguided. I t is not so much what is said that 
makes a statement authoritat ive, as who says i t . Papal Bulls are autho 
^ ibid., 31. 
^ Friedrich, Carl J . , 'Authority, Reason and Discretion', in Carl J . 
Friedrich, ed.. Authority, Nomos I , (Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard 
University Press71Wy7'28-40. This same point is also presented 
in his more recent work, Tradition and Authority. (London: The 
Pall Mall Press, 1972). 
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r i ta t i ve for Catholics not because they can be defended or explained in 
terms of their reasonableness. Their very character, i t may be argued, 
precludes such an e f fo r t . I t is because they issue from the Pope that 
they are recognized as authoritative and are able to command respect and 
compliance. Similarly, i t is not absurd to say that, whatever statements 
Parliament may endorse and laws i t may approve, they are authoritative 
and should (and in a l l probabil ity w i l l ) meet with the compliance of the 
subjects of the United Kingdom, The abstract statement asserting that 
Parliament is an authoritative inst i tut ion does-not depend on what is 
said in any given instance, nor can i t be said to rest upon any cr i ter ion 
of the reasonableness of one or another Parliamentary decision. I t is 
Parliament which is in a position of authority, and what emerges from 
Parliament is signif icant because Parliament has decided upon i t and not 
because i t is either reasonable or unreasonable. 
Authority is exercised by those who are acknowledged to have some 
particular competence; men who are acknowledged to have some position 
which sets their statements, whatever their content, apart from the 
statements of others.^ Competence in this sense does not mean simple 
expertise or ef f ic iency, although these may play a part in establishing-
who is an authority. I t is not enough just to do a job wel l , however. 
Competence must be recognized by others, and to establish authority this 
recognition must be a recognition of the right to make decisions, re-
solve differences, or sett le disputes within the entire group. Without 
this public acknowledgement establishing the legitimacy of making deci-
sions for others, for resolving disputes amongst men, there is no autho-
r i t y . No man can be a secret authority, unknown to his contemporaries. 
Nor can he exercise authority in the face of universal rejection of his 
4 Jacobson, Norman, 'Knowledge, Tradition and Authority' , in Friedrich, 
ed., ibid., 113-15. . 
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r ight to make decisions affecting the relations and act iv i t ies of men 
who comprise the relevant public. We go to a person in a position of 
authority when we are unable to agree amongst ourselves how to go about 
a task, how to decide between confl ict ing views, or which course of 
action to adopt. The person we approach is an authority because we go 
to him. The fact that we approach him to so l i c i t his judgement is 
acknowledgement by us that he has more of a r ight than any of us to re-
solve the dispute, and that his views ought to take precedence over our 
own in determining the outcome of the disagreement. 
Thus the authority which a man has does not adhere to him alone. 
I t is not something which he can pack up and take with him i f he decides 
to move on and make his home amongst a dif ferent group of people. I t 
exists only as long as i t i? recognized, and i t can be recognized only 
within an already established public order. I t requires the relatively 
stable and continuous public order to make i t s judgements heard and 
obeyed. Without this public order there is no-one who may speak with 
authority, resolving differences, and no-one who may comply, recognizing 
the authority by adhering to i t s judgements. I f a judgement is neither 
heard nor followed, i t cannot be said to be authoritative. 
This public recognition of a particular competence or legitimate 
right to make decisions for a group and resolve differences within a 
group distinguishes the exercise of authority from the use of reason or 
the attempt to persuade. 
Authority is incompatible with persuasion, which pre-
supposes equality and works through a process of argu-
mentation. Where arguments are used, authority is 
l e f t in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of 
persuasion stands the authoritatian order which is 
hierarchical.5 
The man in a position of authority judges, the rest comply. He does not 
5 Arendt, Hannah, 'What was Authority?' in Friedrich, ed., ibid,, 
82. 
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attempt to persuade, nor is there anything in his judgement that allows 
i t to claim precedence because i t is reasonable. Discussion may follow 
i f the judgement is unclear, but once i t is understood, i t must be f o l l -
owed. I f those commanded refuse, authority is already brought into 
question and the superior position of the man in authority called into 
doubt. He may coerce the recalci t rant, threaten them, or plead with 
them, but these are a l l measures of the extent to which the hierarchical 
relationship of authority has broken down. However "authority" is 
being used, i t is true that when a number of people begin to ask in a 
mutinous and not theoretical tone of voice, "Why should I obey X?", X 
has already los t , or is in the processing of losing, his authori ty ' .^ 
Authority, therefore, is not a thing. I t is not something to be 
conserved fearing that the more i t is used, the less there is of i t . To 
speak of authority is to point to action in public; the manipulation of 
an idiom within the public order. Only in action amongst men does auth-
or i ty manifest i t se l f . I t exists only in relationships amongst men, 
and is a capacity rather "than'a commodity. ' Just as the man who is un-
known or is publicly discredited can never be an authority, so also the 
man who never speaks or acts in the appropriate idiom can never command 
authority. Like the human body, authority must be exercised. I t must 
make i t se l f f e l t within .the public, or else i t becomes,.W.e.ak and no longer 
enjoys the attention, respect and compliance of those who once acknow-
ledged i t s pre-eminence. Continued silence leads eventually to the decay 
of authority because the incessant conflict? and differences of the pre-
sent demand the judgements and decisions of those in authority. I f one 
man refuses to exercise his authority, the need to resolve differences 
amongst the men who comprise the relevant public w i l l persist, and another 
^ U J ^ ! " l ^ 5 o ; ° ' o o ^ ^ ^ Vocabulary of Pol i t ics. (London: Penguin Books, 
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man w i l l arise to take his place. This is why the dead, i f they are to 
remain authorit ies, need the l iv ing to speak in their name and to con-
front the dilemmas of the present, as the church claims to speak for 
Christ and the Communist Party to speak for Marx. 
To exercise authority, then, is to be publicly acknowledged to 
possess the r ight to resolve differences within a group; to have one's 
judgements heard in public, and to direct the efforts of those who com-
prise that public. I t is this public recognition of who you are - that 
i s , of a hierarchical relationship - more than what you say that makes 
your statements authoritative. However, i f we are to examine the po l i -
t i ca l significance of authority, we must distinguish between being an 
authority and being in (a position of) authority. Both demand public 
recognition i f they are to be possible, but the f i r s t demands acknow-
ledgement of the man, while the second demands acknowledgement of the 
o f f ice . I t is primarily this second which is pol i t ica l and is of inte-
rest to us in attempting to understand the relationship between autho-
r i t y and public order. 
The difference is between acknowledging the authoritative state-
ments of Einstein, because he is recognized as being an expert in theo-
ret ical physics and has a history of reliable judgements in that f i e l d , 
and acknowledging the authoritative statements of the king, whoever he 
may be, because he occupies an of f ice which is recognized as entailing 
the r ight to make certain kinds of decisions and to take certain kinds 
of action. I t i s , in short, the difference between having a reputation 
and holding an o f f ice . Both are concerned, in a sense, with recognition 
of who a man i s , but in one case reference is made to an individual's 
personal reputation, while in the other reference is made to the public 
of f ice which he occupies. 
Experts become authorities through the recognition and acknowledge-
ment of their colleagues. They may publish ar t ic les , write books. 
deliver papers, organize symposia, or participate in discussions - al l 
of this gaining them a reputation amongst those who comprise a particu-
lar public. There is no formally established procedure or path that 
leads to this recognition. Through the accident of being in the right 
place at the r ight time, some men become authorities at an early age, 
while others are not acknowledged unt i l after their deaths, when their 
writings and disciples must speak on their behalf. There are no rules 
governing the length of time that they may.be authorit ies, nor specific 
regulations st ipulating how others may come to replace them. I t is in 
this sense that a man may become an authority by being the originator, 
the author^  of an idea or programme, in the way that Marx is an authority 
for Marxists and Hi t ler was for National Socialists. Their authority 
rests, or rested, upon the recognition of their pre-eminence as creators, 
and reference could be made either to them or their works to resolve 
disputes and divergent interpretations or schools of thought amongst the 
f a i t h f u l . The way in which this kind of public acknowledgement is formed 
and flourishes, however, is f l u i d . I t is not bound by rules and regula-
t ions, formal procedures or established requirements. I t would be as 
absurd to claim that we ought no longer to regard Darwin as authorita-
t ive because his theory of evolution has occupied a position of pre-
eminence for too many terms, as i t would be to have a vote as to whether 
or not we should s t i l l regard Rembrandt as one of the great masters of 
painting. Reputations do not have terms of o f f ice , nor are they estab-
lished by conventions or procedures. The authority which a man of repu-
tation enjoys may come to be established in any number of ways just as 
i t may fade and eventually disappear in any number of ways. 
Pol i t ical authority, in contrast, is carefully circumscribed by 
rules and procedures. The way in which one comes to occupy a position 
of authority (as opposed to being an authority) is not f l u id nor is i t 
0 0 
l e f t open to question or to the fashion of the moment. To achieve a 
position of pol i t ica l authority one must, for example, be the eldest 
legitimate son of the deceased monarch, or -receive a simple majority 
of the popular vote of the ci t izens, or manifest specific and recognized 
signs of divine favour. How long one may occupy such a position, and 
how another may succeed to the of f ice are similarly specified. What is 
publicly acknowledged in po l i t i ca l authority is not the legitimacy of 
the man, but the legitimacy of the off ice and of the rules and proced-
ures by which a man comes to occupy i t and within which he must act while 
he occupies i t . That i s , what is acknowledged is the establishment and 
maintenance of specific hierarchical relationships which are circum-
scribed by formal rules, procedures and conventions.'' 
The pronouncements of those who hold an o f f i ce , and who speak with 
authority because of their posit ion, have immediate effect. Or, at 
least they should have immediate effect i f the authority of the off ice 
is in tact . This is not necessarily the case with those who are autho-
r i t i es because of their reputations. The decisions of Parliament are 
acted upon. The state immediately takes the appropriate steps to i n i t -
iate the action which has been authorized by Parliament. An a r t i s t , on 
the other hand, may only become a recognized authority long after his 
death, his works remaining unacknowledged during the period that he 
practised his ar t . 
I t i s , of course, d i f f i c u l t in pol i t ical act iv i ty sharply to dis-
tinguish the significance of statements of a man in authority and those 
of a man who is an authority. The elder statesman, who presently occu-
pies no of f ice of inst i tut ional authority, may be widely listened to 
The dist inct ion made here is similar to Weber's dist inct ion between 
charismatic authority - what is here, referred to as having a repu-
tation or being an authority - and legal authority - what is here 
referred to as having an off ice or being in a position of authority. 
Cf. Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. 
Talcott Parsons, ed. , A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, t rans., 
(London: Collier-Macmillan, L td . , 1964), 328 f f . 
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and highly inf luent ia l as a po l i t ica l actor. On the other hand, the 
personal reputation of an of f ice holder may decline to the point that 
he is less able to exercise the authority of his o f f ice. Poli t ical 
authority, however, is largely formalized and revolves around the 
acquisition of o f f ice . A man, out of off ice gradually declines in 
importance. He is unable' to command the power of the state organization 
which gives him access to information and renders him a qualif ied expert. 
And he is unable to act within the pol i t ical inst i tut ions, invoking 
po l i t i ca l conventions to resolve disputes and to inform the public order 
with his judgements. The longer he is out of o f f ice , the greater the 
danger that his judgements w i l l become irrelevant as events pass him by, 
and he w i l l eventually become more of a spectator and less of an informed 
commentator or effective actor. His position is l ikely to become purely 
honorary, while the actual problems and dilemmas of pol i t ica l l i f e are 
confronted by those who do occupy an office and may s t i l l claim to exer-
cise the authority of that o f f ice . 
Pol i t ical ideologies, amongst other things, attempt to establish 
the legitimacy of or to discredit the system of procedures governing 
the accession to a position of authority and the rules circumscribing 
i t s operation. A defence of the legitimacy of the authority of a hered-
i tary monarchy or elected representative centres not on this king or 
that representative, but on the of f ice of kingship and on the procedure 
of election. Those who clamour-for a different kind of authority do 
not seek a new version of authority, for the exercise of authority in 
one pol i t ica l situation is very much the same as the exercise of autho-
r i t y in another. Authority in a democracy, l ike authority in an abso-
lute monarchy, ultimately rests upon common recognition of the pre-
eminence of the of f ice holder and the legitimacy of his right to resolve 
disputes and to make decision involving the entire group. Crucial to 
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both is the hierarchical relationship which allows the judgements of 
those in authority to be heard and followed. The difference comes not 
between two di f ferent kinds of authority but in determining who is 
going to be in a position of authority, how they are going to attain 
that posit ion, and what rules and regulations w i l l circumscribe the 
conduct of their o f f i ce . The claims of divine favour, of popular man-
date, of superior wisdom, or of higher caste may a l l be put forward. 
However, these claims focus on questions which are dist inct from the 
problem of what i t is to exercise authority and the relationship bet-
ween authority and public order. 
From what has been said so far i t can be seen that authority 
speaks with a public voice, in opposition to private claims. In a 
sense, i t puts the collective seal of approval on a proposal for public 
action, for men in authority act as public men and their authority 
appears only in public. To bend authority to the fulf i lment of private 
needs is to abuse i t and w i l l result in the debasement of the off ice 
and the destruction of the reputation of those involved. In order to 
speak with this public voice to resolve issues of public disagreement, 
authority must exist within the context of public order. Far from be-
ing ' . . . the creator of the social t i e — ' authority entai ls the 
social t ies which make i t s establishment possible. Without public 
order there could be no authority; and without authority, i t is unlikely 
that public order would survive for very long. The two are mutually 
dependent upon one another, each ensuring the existence of the other 
and thus of i t se l f . 
Al l characteristically human act iv i t ies involve refer-
ence to an established way of doing things. The idea 
of such an established way of doing things in i t s turn 
presupposes that the practices and pronouncements of a 
certain group of people shall be authoritative in 
^ de Jouvenftl, ^ f t . , 39. 
connexion with the act iv i ty in question.'^ 
' . . . The notion of an "established" way of doing things is essential 
to the notion of authority as such.'^^ 
Because authority is bound up with public order and not created 
anew each day, i t is h is tor ica l , established through time and providing 
a l ink between past and present. An element of the collective identity 
of a people, i t is a product of the past, possible only when a l iv ing 
tradi t ion provides continuity and establishes a common public order. 
Insofar as po l i t ica l authority is exercised, i t is a confirmation of 
the present identi ty derived from the past. I t seeks to maintain that 
histor ical l ink ; to preserve public order through time. I t is in this 
sense that authority is necessarily conservative, always carried forward 
into the present from the past. 
Revolutionary regimes, which self-consciously and deliberately 
attempt to cut themselves o f f from the past, are regimes which have made 
any use of authority to structure the public order impossible. The trad-
i t ions that exist are ones which the revolutionary regime wishes to repu-
diate, and the identity which i t seeks is one which l ies in the future 
and has yet to be created. I t is in terms of an envisioned future that 
i t s actions must be understood and jus t i f ied . Any attempt to use the 
authority of the ancien regime is a compromise with the old order. Until 
such a time as the new order has been established, there is no shared 
public order within which authority may make i t s appearance. In the ab-
sence of authority, the revolutionary regime may only have recourse to 
the power of the revolutionary party or to persuasion in i t s attempts to 
restructure the public ordeif'. Lenin's quite expl ic i t use of the Commu-
nist Party is an example of the former, and Marat's numerous appeals to 
9 
Winch, Peter, 'Authority' in Anthony Quinton, ed., Pol i t ical 
Philosophy, (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 1967), 100. 
^° i M d . , 101. 
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the people of France is an example of the la t ter . . And, as the 
success of Lenin and the fa i lure of Marat indicate, in the absence of 
authority, power is more l ike ly to be effective in the creation of a 
new public order than is persuasion. 
How i t is that the power of revolutionary groups is transformed 
into authority is d i f f i c u l t to say. There must, however, be a period 
when the ab i l i t y of a man or party to enforce obedience becomes the 
publicly acknowledged r ight to expect compliance. Even so, i t is impor-
tant to note that even in revolutionary situations authority can never 
be entirely absent. In order to use the Communist Party as a source of 
power in the establishment of the Soviet Union, Lenin had to exercise 
authority within the party. The effective power of the party depended, 
as Lenin clearly appreciated, on the immediate and unquestioning com-
pliance of i ts members to the directives of the party hierarchy. 
Whatever his standing in the country as a whole, i f he was to get any-
where Lenin had to be certain of his authority within the party. 
To say that authority is conservative is not to say that i t is 
s tat ic . As has been seen, authority must be exercised. I t manifests 
i t se l f only in action, and every action is a modification of the world. 
As events bring new problems, new responses are required. Each decision 
w i l l change both the structure of the public order and the way in which 
authority is exercised within that order. The exercise of authority, 
therefore, cannot be understood as mere imitation of the past nor can i t 
be equated with the automatic application of f ixed formulae. The autho-
r i t y of an inst i tu t ion depends in part on i ts continuity with the past. 
Lemn, V. I . , What is to be Done?, (London: Panther Books, 1970, 
164-73; and Gottschalk, Louis R., Jean Paul Marat: A Study in 
Radicalism, (London:, The University of Chicago Press, 1967), eso. 
52-57, 97, 100-01, 104-05, 109 f f . . ' ^ 
12 Lenin, ibid., 184-91. 
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but i t also depends upon i t s ab i l i t y to resolve disputes within the 
public order ef fect ively. What is required in addition to continuity 
is the successful encounter with the problems of the present; problems 
which are always unprecedented. The exercise of authority must always 
be creative i f the of f ice (or the man) is to retain i ts position of 
pre-eminence within the public order. The celebration of the tercent-
enary of the Romanov Dynasty in 1913 highlights the distinction between 
mere formal continuity and the successful maintenance of authority. By 
that time the Tsar's authority was already disintegrating, along with 
the po l i t ica l t radi t ion which made i t possible, as the regime proved 
13 
more and more incapable of meeting the demands of a new era. 
The exercise of authority, therefore, is as concerned with bringing 
about change in an attempt to meet the demands of the present as i t is 
with preserving the continuity of the society within which makes i t se l f 
f e l t . I t both grows out of public order and in turn manifests and modi-
f ies that public order. This is true both for pol i t ical authority and 
for other kinds of authority. A physicist cannot be recognized as an 
authority in his f i e l d except by other physicists who are able to judge 
his contributions to the discipline and to recognize his excellence 
only within the established context of physics. Once-his reputation is 
established amongst his fellows and his authority recognized within the 
context of physics, he, in turn, manifests and establishes that context. 
Other men w i l l be measured against his excellence, and members of his 
profession w i l l defer to his judgements. His actions wi l l modify the 
context within which contributions to physics are acknowledged, thereby 
altering the character of physics through his practice as a physicist. 
Similarly, a pol i t ic ian cannot even aspire to of f ice unt i l there is 
Von Laue, Theodore, Why Lenin?, Why Stalin?: A Reappraisal of 
• I^^^PJ"^^'""' 19QQ-1^^U. (New York: J . b. l ipp- in rn f f Co., 1964), 68-85. ~~~ 
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a commonly shared framework o f p u b l i c order which es tab l i shes t h a t o f f i c e 
and the procedures governing access t o i t , as we l l as the common acknow-
ledgement o f the l eg i t imacy o f the ho lder o f the o f f i c e to make c e r t a i n 
kinds o f d e c i s i o n s . Once i n a u t h o r i t y , the p o l i t i c i a n must meet t h rea t s 
to p u b l i c order w i t h a u t h o r i t a t i v e dec is ions which d i r e c t the ac t ions o f 
those who comprise the r e l e v a n t p u b l i c . Thus he w i l l i n i t i a t e change 
w i t h i n p u b l i c o rde r . Wi thout p u b l i c order c r e a t i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the 
o f f i c e , and the a u t h o r i t y o f the o f f i c e ma in ta in ing t h a t order a t the 
same t ime t h a t i t mod i f ies i t , the hopeful p o l i t i c i a n e x i s t s i n a vacuum -
an a c t o r i n search not merely o f a r o l e , but a stage on which t o ac t as 
w e l l . 
When a u t h o r i t y i s exerc ised by p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , f o r example, 
the s t a t e i s commissioned to undertake comprehensive medical c a r e , to 
p rov ide un i ve rsa l compulsory e d u c a t i o n , o r t o enforce c e r t a i n standards 
i n commerce and i n business p r a c t i c e s . The boundary between what has been 
des ignated as p u b l i c and what as p r i v a t e s h i f t s , and the i d e n t i t y o f the 
s o c i e t y i s a l t e r e d i n i t s on-going c r e a t i o n . The l i n k w i t h the p a s t , 
c r u c i a l t o a u t h o r i t y , can be mainta ined only i f events i n the present do 
no t overwhelm and dest roy the es tab l i shed pub l i c o rder . To preserve t h i s 
c o n t i n u i t y , some change must be au tho r i zed . A u t h o r i t y which r e l i e s en-
t i r e l y upon the past and refuses t o meet the chal lenges o f the p resen t , 
i s a u t h o r i t y which i s d imin ished and Which w i l l soon be drawing on an 
empty account . In t h i s sense, a u t h o r i t y must be progress ive i f i t i s t o 
s u r v i v e . 
I t i s because o f the i n t i m a t e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p and interdependence 
o f a u t h o r i t y and order t h a t i t was s ta ted p rev ious ly t h a t a u t h o r i t y i s 
never a r b i t r a r y . (Th is i s n o t , as has been i n d i c a t e d , the same as say ing 
t h a t i t i s always r a t i o n a l . ) A u t h o r i t a t i v e pronouncements do not a r i s e 
and demand compliance ex ni'hiio. They come ou t o f the con tex t o f p u b l i c 
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order and may on ly be judged w i t h i n t h a t con tex t . I t was e a r l i e r s ta ted 
t h a t i t i s not so much what i s sa id t h a t makes a statement a u t h o r i t a t i v e , 
as who says i t . Al though, t h i s i s g e n e r a l l y - t r u e , i t i s - n o t e n t i r e l y so. 
As we have seen, the con tex t o f pub l i c order w i l l determine whose judge-
ments w i l l be heard i n the s o c i e t y . A judgement which i s made by those 
i 
who are acknowledged t o be a u t h o r i t i e s or i n p o s i t i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y can-
not b e l i e t h i s c o n t e x t , c o n t r a d i c t i n g the es tab l i shed pub l i c order and 
undermining i t s own bas is o f a u t h o r i t y . A man cannot say j u s t anyth ing 
and s t i l l be a u t h o r i t a t i v e . The p h y s i c i s t cannot deny the ex is tence o f 
mat te r o r t ime and s t i l l have h is pronouncements rece ived as a u t h o r i t -
a t i v e . Attempts may be made t o rede f ine what we mean by mat ter o r t ime -
t h a t i s , t o modi fy the s t r u c t u r e o f the pub l i c o rder and the basis o f 
a u t h o r i t y - but i f the e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e i s j e t t i s o n e d a l t o g e t h e r , so 
a lso must the a u t h o r i t y be abandoned which i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f i t . 
'The d i f f e r e n c e between ty ranny and a u t h o r i t a r i a n government has always 
been t h a t the t y r a n t r u l e s i n accordance wi th h is own w i l l and i n t e r e s t , 
whereas even the most d racon ic a u t h o r i t a r i a n government i s bound by 
laws'^*^ which p rov ide a s t r u c t u r e o f pub l i c order w i t h i n which the con-
duct o f those who ho ld o f f i c e must operate. Al though the exerc ise o f 
a u t h o r i t y must be c r e a t i v e , the.man i n a u t h o r i t y i s not a t l i b e r t y t o 
exe rc i se t h a t a u t h o r i t y i n j u s t any way a t a l l . 
The l e g i t i m a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y . L ike the exerc ise o f a u t h o r i t y , can-
not be separated from the p u b l i c order o f which i t i s . a n i n t e g r a l p a r t . 
The id iom i n which a u t h o r i t y i s exerc ised i s meaningful on ly w i t h i n the 
con tex t o f a p a r t i c u l a r p u b l i c o r d e r , and i t gains f o r ce from the order 
i t s e l f . As long as t h a t order i s s t i l l i n t a c t , and the id iom man i fes t ing 
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A rend t , Hannah, Between Past and Fu tu re . (New York: Mer id ian 
Books, The World HubHshlng Co . , 1968) , 97. P la to makes the 
same p o i n t i n h is d i scuss ion o f ty ranny. Cf. Pla1i% Republ ic , 
i t i s s t i l l v i a b l e , the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the exerc ise o f a u t h o r i t y i s 
es tab l i shed through the re levance and p r a c t i c e o f the. id ibm i t s e l f . 
Claims t h a t the Crown i n Par l iament i s sovereign have not a u t h o r i t y ou t -
s ide the t r a d i t i o n o f B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l p rac t i ce^ Wi th in t h a t t r a d i t i o n 
i t i s enough t h a t Par l iament a c t s . The simple f a c t t h a t i t 2S Parl iament 
g ives i t s ac t i ons a u t h o r i t y ; ' a u t h o r i t y w h i c h ' w i l l on ly be acknowledged 
amongst those who count themselves members o f the c i v i l soc ie t y we c a l l 
the Uni ted Kingdom. The cont inued man i fes ta t i on o f t h a t pub l i c order i n 
the ac t ions and p rac t i ces o f the B r i t i s h people va l i da tes t h a t a u t h o r i t y . 
A d i f f e r e n t k ind o f p u b l i c o r d e r , mani fested amongst a d i f f e r e n t group 
o f people w i t h d i f f e r e n t idioms and p r a c t i c e s , would f i n d no place f o r 
the pre-eminence o f the Crown i n Par l iament . They would n e i t h e r acknow-
ledge the l e g i t i m a c y o f i t s c la im t o pre-eminence nor g ive i t s judge-
ments the p r i v i l e g e d hear ing reserved f o r those who are i n p o s i t i o n s o f 
a u t h o r i t y . 
To exerc ise p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , then , i s to be p u b l i c l y acknowledged 
to have the r i g h t to make dec is ions f o r , and to rece ive obedience f rom, 
those who c o n s t i t u t e a p u b l i c o rde r . I t is t o come to occupy an o f f i c e , 
c i rcumscr ibed by r u l e s and procedures, which g ive one's judgement weight 
i n determin ing the charac te r o f the pub l i c o r d e r , and to be i n a p o s i t i o n 
to au tho r i ze ac t i ons e i t h e r to ma in ta in the c o n t i n u i t y o f the soc ie ty or 
to b r i n g about changes w i t h i n i t . I n the face o f the demands o f an ever-
changing p resen t , p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y maintains through t ime the c o n t i -
n u i t y o f a p u b l i c order and i s exerc ised in the cont inua l c r e a t i o n o f a 
c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y . I t s success i s marked by i t s s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n and 
the pe rpe tua t ion o f the p u b l i c , o r d e r w i t h which i t i s i n t i m a t e l y i n t e r -
r e l a t e d . I t s f a i l u r e i s marked no t s imply by the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f i t s 
own a b i l i t y to guide and d i r e c t , but a lso by the decay o f the order which 
i t man i f es t s . 
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Chapter 5 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
An i n s t i t u t i o n , however i t may be s t r uc tu red and whatever the area 
o f i t s a c t i v i t i e s , i s concerned less w i t h the accomplishment o f a s p e c i f i c 
task than w i t h the p rese rva t i on o f a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c pa t te rn o f a c t i v i t y . 
There i s no f i n a l goal or s i n g l e achievement on which an i n s t i t u t i o n 
fas tens i t s a t t e n t i o n to the exc lus ion o f a l l o ther concerns. Rather i t 
i s more a 'way o f l i f e ' , however vague t ha t term may be , which i s i t s 
concern. Re l i g ious i n s t i t u t i o n s , f o r example, are not en te rp r i ses which 
may be wound up l i k e an o r g a n i z a t i o n once a p a r t i c u l a r product has been 
produced or goal reached. I t i s the charac ter o f the r e l i g i o u s way o f 
l i f e which i s t he focus o f such i n s t i t u t i o n s . What they seek i s the main-
tenance o f a manner o f a c t i n g i n the w o r l d , and t h i s i s a constant endea-
vour . 
Fundamental t o the maintenance o f a pa t te rn o f a c t i v i t y or way o f . 
l i f e i s the n o t i o n o f c r i t e r i a and standards. I n s t i t u t i o n s are the 
guardians o f the standards o f judgement appropr ia te to a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i -
v i t y . They a t tempt to ma in ta in the c r i t e r i a which form the background 
aga ins t which any p a r t i c u l a r performance may be judged. Re l ig ious i n s t i -
t u t i o n s , to con t inue our example, seek to mainta in the c o n t i n u i t y o f the 
r e l i g i o u s way o f l i f e , p reserv ing the c r i t e r i a o f judgement which d i s t -
i ngu ish between good ac t i ons and e v i l ones. I t i s aga ins t these s tand-
a r d s , which have been upheld over t ime by i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h a t any p a r t i -
c u l a r a c t i o n i s measured. Standards o f ac t i ng or c r i t e r i a o f judgement 
endorse one course o f ac t i on and condemn another. Some ac t ions w i l l meet 
the requ i red s tandard and w i l l rece ive both the b less ing and support o f 
the i n s t i t u t i o n , w h i l e o thers w i l l not and w i l l be faced w i t h oppos i t i on 
from i t . • • • • • 
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The success wh-^ch an i n s t i t u t i o n has i n gu id ing the ac t ions o f men 
so t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r way o f l i f e i s preserved depends on the popular 
r e c o g n i t i o n accorded i t and the acceptance o f the standards i t br ings t o 
bear on an a c t i v i t y . What i s recognized by those who comprise a pub l i c 
i s t he pre-eminence o f the i n s t i t u t i o n . What i s acknowledged i s the 
e n t i t l e m e n t o f the i n s t i t u t i o n to j u d g e ; to decide what the re levan t 
standards are and how they are to be app l ied i n the present circumstances. 
I t s pronouncements are g iven weight and take precedence over the views o f 
o thers who are ou ts ide the i n s t i t u t i o n . I t makes i t s e l f heard because 
o thers are w i l l i n g to be q u i e t and l i s t e n . I n s h o r t , an i n s t i t u t i o n 
exerc ises a u t h o r i t y . I f an i n s t i t u t i o n i s no t recogn ized, i t s judgements 
w i l l no t be heard i n p u b l i c . I f i t s judgements are not accepted, i t w i l l 
be incapab le o f d i r e c t i n g men so t h a t the re levan t standards are main-
t a i n e d . An i n s t i t u t i o n which i s n e i t h e r heard nor accepted can have no 
c la im t o being an i n s t i t u t i o n a t a l l , f o r i t has shown i t s e l f incapable 
o f m a i n t a i n i n g a n y t h i n g . 
Because i t i s concerned w i t h the p reserva t ion o f a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
p a t t e r n o f a c t i v i t y , an i n s t i t u t i o n cannot be created ove rn igh t . An 
i n s t i t u t i o n i s not l i k e a pressure group organized a t a p a r t i c u l a r moment 
t o accompl ish the goal o f b l ock ing a government p roposa l , nor i s i t l i k e 
a business founded w i t h the hope s imply o f secur ing the maximum amount o f 
p r o f i t . An i n s t i t u t i o n cannot be created overn igh t because the charac-
t e r i s t i c p a t t e r n o f a c t i v i t y which i t seeks to p reserve , the standards 
i t seeks t o pe rpe tua te , cannot be c rea ted ove rn igh t . I t cannot come i n t o 
ex i s tence u n t i l the way o f l i f e i t s e l f has come t o be es tab l i shed . I t i s 
f rom e x i s t i n g ways o f l i f e , shared amongst a group o f people , t h a t i n s t i -
t u t i o n s emerge and g radua l l y e s t a b l i s h themselves. They are not suscep-
t i b l e to c r e a t i o n by f i a t , government decree or acts o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n . 
Rather , the emergence o f an i n s t i t u t i o n i s a process which takes t i m e . 
S i m i l a r l y , i t i s on l y through t ime t ha t i n s t i t u t i o n s decay and event -
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u a l l y lose t h e i r capac i t y t o preserve c o n t i n u i t y and t o ma in ta in s tan -
dards. They are not te rminated a t one moment, b u t g radua l l y lose t h e i r 
g r i p as t ime b r ings about changes i n the way o f l i f e they seek t o p re -
se r ve , opening up the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the i n s t i t u t i o n may be made 
i r r e l e v a n t t o the present i f i t i s not s e n s i t i v e t o the t ime. One can-
not imagine, f o r example, t h a t the Roman church could be terminated by 
Papal b u l l , i n the way t h a t a commercial venture s imply goes out o f 
business by d e c l a r i n g bankruptcy. As i n s t i t u t i o n s are on ly g radua l l y 
es tab l i shed through t i m e , so a lso they g radua l l y dec l i ne through t ime , 
t h e i r a u t h o r i t y s l ow l y d i m i n i s h i n g i n s i g n i f i c a n c e and even tua l l y laps ing 
a l t o g e t h e r . 
I n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , tend t o be l o n g - l i v e d and do not come and 
go w i t h the seasons. Because the re i s no f i n a l or u l t i m a t e purpose 
which i s r e a l i z e d , a f t e r which the i n s t i t u t i o n may wind up i t s a f f a i r s 
and shut down o p e r a t i o n s , the purpose o f an i n s t i t u t i o n i s always i n the 
process o f being ach ieved. I t i s always un fo ld ing through t i m e , as the . 
men who comprise i t exe rc i se a u t h o r i t y t o mainta in c o n t i n u i t y between 
the past and the p resent . I n a sense, the on ly product o f an i n s t i t u -
t i o n i s i t s e l f - the adherence to c e r t a i n standards and the p rese rva t ion 
o f a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p a t t e r n o f a c t i v i t y , which i n t u rn makes poss ib le 
the cont inued l i f e o f the i n s t i t u t i o n . 
The a u t h o r i t y o f an i n s t i t u t i o n i s exerc ised to designate what i s 
a p p r o p r i a t e and what i s n o t ; what i s i n keeping w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r a c t i -
v i t y or p u b l i c o r d e r , and what i s no t . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , i n a p o s i t i o n 
n o t s imply t o p rese rve , but a l so t o endorse change. An i n s t i t u t i o n must 
not on ly ma in ta in c o n t i n u i t y w i t h the pas t , but i t must a lso success fu l l y 
deal w i t h the p resent . The present cons tan t l y br ings new chal lenges 
which must be conf ronted and overcome, not s imply i gno red , i f the way o f 
l i f e o r p a t t e r n o f a c t i v i t y i s t o remain r e l e v a n t . By endorsing one p ro -
78 -
posal and condemning ano ther , an i n s t i t u t i o n i n v a r i a b l y author izes 
changes a t the same t ime t h a t i t seeks to ma in ta in c o n t i n u i t y . 
Because the exerc ise o f t h e i r a u t h o r i t i y modi f ies as we l l as pre-
se rves , i n s t i t u t i o n s cannot be seen as r i g i d s t r uc tu res incapable o f 
undergoing changes. I f the re levan t way o f l i f e i s changed, the i n s t i -
t u t i o n i s not necessa r i l y l e f t beh ind. Like a l l men, those who com-
p r i s e i n s t i t u t i o n s can be more o r less s e n s i t i v e t o the occas ion , more 
or less capable o f ensur ing t h a t t h e i r judgement i s appropr ia te to the 
moment. The p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n o f the B r i t i s h Par l iament , f o r 
example, has been s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r e d over t ime as the p u b l i c order 
and pa t t e rn o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y which i t sought to main ta in has 
changed. The process , o f course, has been a long and p ro t rac ted one -
one which cannot be s a i d t o be completed - bu t the i n s t i t u t i o n has been 
s e n s i t i v e t o the occas ion . While Par l iament i s not now what i t was 
f i f t y , or one hundred, or f ou r hundred years ago, i t has remained an 
i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h a long and cont inuous h i s t o r y , exe rc i s i ng i t s a u t h o r i t y 
i n a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t ways. 
The changes which men who exerc ise i n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y come to 
accept and endorse are l i k e l y to be l i m i t e d ones, however. Piece-meal .. 
m o d i f i c a t i o n may be condoned and standards may be a l t e r e d s l o w l y , a l l o w -
. ing what was f o rme r l y unacceptable to be acknowledged as pe rm iss ib le . 
Sudden, wholesale changes, however, w i l l be r e s i s t e d because t h i s would 
amount to a complete r e p u d i a t i o n o f the es tab l i shed way o f l i f e upon 
which the a u t h o r i t y o f the i n s t i t u t i o n r e s t s . 
Being concerned w i t h a way o f l i f e and the p reserva t ion o f c r i t e r i a 
o f judgement, an i n s t i t u t i o n i s charac te r i zed less by ru les and regu la -
t i o n s , which s p e c i f y how a p a r t i c u l a r task i s to be performed, than by 
norms and va lues , which prov ide the context f o r judg ing whether t h a t task 
was done we l l or poor ly ._ The Royal Society i s not preoccupied w i t h d e s i g -
na t i ng which s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s should be undertaken, and p r e c i s e l y 
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what s h a l l be done i n each case, but ra the r w i t h the establ ishment o f 
c r i t e r i a f o r j udg ing the r e s u l t s o f any one i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I t i s the 
charac te r o f s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t y which i s the concern o f the Soc ie ty . 
Does t h i s p a r t i c u l a r exper iment f u l f i l the requirements o f the sc ien -
t i f i c method as those requirements have come to be understood over 
t ime? Does i t meet the standards o f the s c i e n t i f i c community? In 
s h o r t , does the e f f o r t count as ' sc ience '? What counts as science and 
what does not i s not e s t a b l i s h e d by reference to a s p e c i f i c canon o f 
r u l e s o r body o f r e g u l a t i o n s . There i s no handbook which w i l l t e l l you 
how to be s c i e n t i f i c i n your approach t o a problem, i n the way t h a t there 
are handbooks which w i l l t e l l you e x a c t l y how to go about r e p a i r i n g your 
au tomobi le . Being s c i e n t i f i c i s something which i s achieved through the 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the norms and values o f the s c i e n t i f i c community. I t i s 
the concern o f the Royal Soc ie ty to preserve these norms and va lues , and 
not to produce handbooks o f r u l es and r e g u l a t i o n s . 
As w i t h ru les and r e g u l a t i o n s , e f f i c i e n c y i s less p r i zed i n an i n s t i -
t u t i o n than exper ience and judgement. An i n s t i t u t i o n i s hot l i k e a comm-
e r c i a l e n t e r p r i s e , a t tempt ing to u t i l i z e resources i n the most e f f i c i e n t 
manner to produce the maximum number o f goods a t the lowest cos t . Pro-., 
duc t i on i s not what i n s t i t u t i o n s are concerned w i t h . E f f i c i e n c y i s not 
i r r e l e v a n t , o f course. A n ' i n s t i t u t i o n must.be a b l e t o .speak a t the 
app rop r i a te t ime o r e lse i t w i l l f i n d ' t h a t the oppor tun i t y f o r exe rc i s i ng 
i t s a u t h o r i t y and making i t s judgements heard has passed. I t s success i n 
p rese rv ing a way o f l i f e and ma in ta in ing i t s p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the pub l i c 
o rder depends i n p a r t on i t s capac i t y to act i n t ime. T h i s , i n t u r n , 
depends p a r t l y upon the e f f i c i e n c y o f those who comprise the i n s t i t u t i o n . 
However, the judgements o f an i n s t i t u t i o n are not suscep t ib le to cos t -
b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s , t ime and mot ion s t u d i e s , or any o f the o the r measures 
o f e f f i c i e n c y . I t i s , i n s t e a d , the q u a l i t y o f a man's judgement and 
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experience which lends we igh t to what he says and susta ins the autho-
r i t y o f the i n s t i t u t i o n on whose beha l f he a c t s . S e n s i t i v i t y t o the 
re l evan t norms and va lues , app rec i a t i on of the uniqueness o f the moment, 
discernment o f what i s s i g n i f i c a n t and what i s n o t , and awareness o f the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the present w i l l be more valued i n an i n s t i t u t i o n - t h a n 
the a b i l i t y to take o r d e r s , devot ion to s u p e r i o r s , o r aggressiveness i n 
g e t t i n g one's views accepted. I t i s a man's judgement and h i s exper-
ience which are l i k e l y to make him successful i n ma in ta in ing the c o n t i -
n u i t y o f a p a t t e r n o f a c t i v i t y i n the face o f the ever-changing present . 
I m i t a t i o n o f the p a s t , r e l i a n c e on mechanist ic fo rmu lae , s t r i c t adherence 
to a body o f r u l es a l l s p e l l the dec l i ne and eventual demise o f an i n s t i -
t u t i o n w h i c h , unable to recognize and adapt t o change, w i l l f i n d i t s e l f 
i r r e l e v a n t to the p resen t , w i t h i t s a u t h o r i t y evaporated. 
The emphasis on judgement and experience means t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s are 
l i k e l y t o be more i n t e r e s t e d i n a man's cha rac te r , i n h i s i d e n t i t y , than 
i n h is f u n c t i o n . I t i s r e l e v a n t to ask o f the man who works i n a f a c t o r y , 
per forming a r o u t i n e t a s k , i s he dependable? W i l l he f o l l o w orders? By 
t h i s i s meant, can he d ischarge h is j ob e f f i c i e n t l y ? When i t comes to an 
i n s t i t u t i o n , however, we are much more l i k e l y to ask, what s o r t o f man i s 
he? What i s h i s charac te r l i k e ? Can we r e l y on h i s judgement? . Un l ike 
the former i n d i v i d u a l , the man who exercises a u t h o r i t y i n an i n s t i t u t i o n 
i s always c a l l e d upon t o address h imse l f to unprecedented problems and 
new s i t u a t i o n s where no book o f r u l es can prov ide a guide f o r h is a c t i o n s . 
He must, i n s t e a d , r e l y upon the s e n s i t i v i t y o f h is judgement and apprec ia -
t i o n . 
A u n i v e r s i t y i s perhaps a good example o f an i n s t i t u t i o n as i t has 
been cha rac te r i zed so f a r . A u n i v e r s i t y i s not concerned w i t h processing 
i n d i v i d u a l s to produce a commodity c a l l e d ' u n i v e r s i t y g r a d u a t e s ' , i n the 
way t h a t an automobi le manufacturer processes raw mate r ia l s to produce a 
c a r . Rather , i t i s concerned w i t h ma in ta in ing a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p a t t e r n o f 
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a c t i v i t y - academic enqu i ry - and w i t h the p reserva t ion o f c e r t a i n s t an -
dards i m p l i c i t i n t h a t a c t i v i t y . Cheating i n exams, f o r example, or 
p l ag i a r i sm i n essays, undermines t h a t a c t i v i t y , p e r v e r t i n g i t s charac te r . 
Consequently n e i t h e r are p rope r l y t o l e r a t e d by the i n s t i t u t i o n . Degrees 
w i l l not be awarded f o r those who chea t , nor marks g iven f o r essays which 
are p l a g i a r i z e d . I f these standards were to be mod i f ied o r abandoned, 
the q u a l i t y o f academic l i f e and enqu i ry would change and the i n s t i t u t i o n 
would no longer be e x e r c i s i n g i t s a u t h o r i t y t o preserve what i t had once 
s t r i v e n to m a i n t a i n . 
Al though u n i v e r s i t i e s have been recen t l y created i n the Uni ted 
Kingdom, the way o f l i f e which these i n s t i t u t i o n s seek to ma in ta in was 
long e s t a b l i s h e d . The var ious new u n i v e r s i t i e s which were es tab l i shed 
were not expected to c rea te a pa t t e rn o f a c t i v i t y where none had ex is ted 
b e f o r e , but t o con t inue an es tab l i shed o rde r , ensur ing i t s r e l a t i v e con-
t i n u i t y through t ime . Over the past cen tur ies t h i s order has , o f course, 
been m o d i f i e d , and the i n s t i t u t i o n , a long w i t h the way o f l i f e i t seeks 
to pe rpe tua te , has changed. Alcheniy i s no longer p a r t o f the recognized 
f i e l d o f l e g i t i m a t e e n q u i r y , and more recen t l y a mastery o f L a t i n has 
been dropped by some u n i v e r s i t i e s as a requirement f o r e n t r y . So the 
i n s t i t u t i o n has not been s t a t i c , even i f i t has been conse rva t i ve , 
a t tempt ing t o preserve and a t the same t ime acknowledging and adapt ing 
t o change. 
Whi le t he re i s a bureaucracy i n every u n i v e r s i t y , ensur ing t h a t the 
death or r e t i r emen t o f any one member does not s igna l the co l lapse o f 
the e n t i r e i n s t i t u t i o n , i t i s not the bureaucracy which def ines the aca-
demic way o f l i f e , dec id ing what i s and what i s not appropr ia te t o aca- • 
demic enqu i ry . Men w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n , based on t h e i r experience and 
judgement, r a t h e r than on t h e i r f u n c t i o n which i s bound by ru l es and r e g -
u l a t i o n s , succeed to o f f i c e s which enable them to guide and judge the 
a c t i v i t i e s o f those who pursue academic enqu i ry . The i n s t i t u t i o n w i l l 
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t h r i v e t o the ex ten t t h a t these men d isp lay an exce l lence i n t h e i r judge-
ments which ensures t h a t they w i l l rece ive the r e c o g n i t i o n and respect o f 
o t h e r s . 
Un l i ke i n s t i t u t i o n s which come on l y g radua l l y t o be acknowledged, 
o rgan i za t i ons are founded. This f o u n d a t i o n , a t l eas t i n t heo ry , i s an 
h i s t o r i c a l ac t which can be t raced to a p a r t i c u l a r moment i n t ime. A 
leader founds a p a r t y , a prime m i n i s t e r creates a new department, an 
ent repreneur s t a r t s a bus iness. In each of these cases, o rgan iza t ions 
are consc ious ly created or es tab l i shed a t a p a r t i c u l a r moment. In add i -
t i o n , o rgan i za t i ons are ' . . . e s t a b l i s h e d f o r the e x p l i c i t purpose o f 
ach iev ing c e r t a i n g o a l s ' . ^ These goals are l i k e l y to be e x p l i c i t and 
l i m i t e d , and they w i l l determine the behaviour o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n s o f a r as 
they are members o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . A leader founds a pa r t y f o r the 
e x p l i c i t purpose o f competing f o r p o s i t i o n i n p o l i t i c s . A prime m i n i s t e r 
c reates a new department f o r the e x p l i c i t purpose o f dea l ing w i t h a new 
prob lem, o r assuming p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r an o l d one. An e n t r e -
preneur s t a r t s a business f o r the e x p l i c i t purpose o f maximizing h is 
p r o f i t s i n the market p lace . A recogn i t i on o f such e x p l i c i t goals w i l l 
determine what an i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i n the o rgan iza t i on should be d o i n g ; 
what tasks are l e g i t i m a t e and how they should be undertaken. 
The goals o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n , o f course, may s h i f t over t ime as the 
o r i g i n a l goal i s achieved and i s combined w i t h or replaced by more recen-
t l y acqu i red ones. A community o rgan i za t i on may achieve i t s o r i g i n a l 
goal o f b l ock ing plans f o r a new motorway, and then go on to organize 
suppor t f o r the development o f a park . I t may become man i f es t l y imposs-
i b l e t o achieve the goal o f the o rgan i za t i on as i t was o r i g i n a l l y d e f i n e d , 
B l a u , Peter M. and W. Richard S c o t t , Formal Organ iza t ions : A 
Comparative Approach, (London: Routledge and Kegan Pau l , 1963), 
C T . a l s o , Caplow, Theodore, P r i n c i p l e s o f Organ iza t i on , 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, " Inc . , 1959), pp 2 "m 
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and a l t e r n a t i v e goals may come to be adopted. A communist pa r t y may 
abandon i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y a s p i r a t i o n s and decide t h a t , a f t e r a l l , i t 
would be b e t t e r to accept a p lace i n a c o a l i t i o n government. Or the 
o r i g i n a l goal o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n may be made i r r e l e v a n t by t ime , and i t 
must e i t h e r a d j u s t or become moribund. In an age o f modern war fare 
techno logy , the V a t i c a n ' s Swiss Guard has become merely ornamenta l , 
w h i l e the women's su f fe rage movement i n B r i t a i n has ceased t o e x i s t . 
A common understanding o f the purposes o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n , o f i t s 
e x p l i c i t g o a l s , a l lows i n d i v i d u a l s to coord inate t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and to 
u n i f y t h e i r e f f o r t s towards the achievement o f the g o a l . This subo rd i -
na t i on o f the i n d i v i d u a l , whereby h is a c t i v i t y becomes on ly one element 
i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f e f f o r t , c reates the power o f o rgan iza t ions i n 
c o n t r a s t to the a u t h o r i t y o f i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Power corresponds to the human a b i l i t y not j u s t to ac t 
but t o a c t i n concer t . Power i s never the proper ty o f 
the i n d i v i d u a l ; i t belongs to a group and remains i n 
ex is tence on ly as long as the group keeps t oge the r . 2 
Organ iza t ions thus come t o achieve an ex is tence which i s g rea te r than 
the sum o f t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s , both more powerful and longer l a s t -
ing than the subord inate elements which combine t o c rea te t h e i r s t r e n g t h . 
Power does not grow ou t o f the b a r r e l o f a gun , but ou t o f the c o o r d i n -
ated ac t i ons o f a la rge group o f men. 
Coord ina t ion o f e f f o r t demands not only a common understanding o f 
the goals o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n , but o f the means as w e l l . Where la rge 
groups o f men are i n v o l v e d , t h i s w i l l mean t h a t some men must ensure 
t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l understands h is r o l e i n the achievement o f the 
g o a l , and ensure t h a t each p rope r l y performs h is task . Only by making 
c e r t a i n t h a t each knows e x a c t l y what he i s ;to do , and does i t as he has 
been d i r e c t e d , can e f f o r t be coord ina ted i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Th is 
2 
P r e s s ! ' l 9 7 S r 4 4 ° " P^"9uin 
84 
means t h a t a h ie ra rchy i s necessary, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n d i -
v idua ls w i t h i n the h ie ra rchy i s one o f super io r to i n f e r i o r ; o f command 
and obedience. 
I t i s necessary . . . t h a t there should be a 
r e l a t i v e l y h igh p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the ac t i on o f 
a d e f i n i t e , supposedly r e l i a b l e group o f per-
sons w i l l be p r i m a r i l y o r i en ted to the execu-
t i o n o f the supreme a u t h o r i t y ' s general p o l i c y 
and s p e c i f i c demands,^ 
The d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h i s h ie ra rchy o r unce r ta in t y t h a t the commands o f 
the supe r io r w i l l be obeyed by h i s i n f e r i o r s w i l l r e s u l t i n the impo-
tence and eventual co l l apse o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
L i ke in terchangeab le par ts o f a machine, men i n an o rgan iza t ion 
are de f ined by the f u n c t i o n which they per form. I f a man i s e f f i c i e n t 
i n the execut ion o f h is d u t i e s , o the r in fo rmat ion about him i s i r r e l -
evant . In c o n t r a s t to an i n s t i t u t i o n , i t i s h is c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and 
no t h i s i d e n t i t y which i s impo r tan t . I t i s assumed t h a t h e . w i l l be 
equa l l y e f f i c i e n t wherever he i s s e n t , f o r he i s being asked on ly to 
repeat a de f ined task and to respond i n a r o u t i n i z e d manner. The r e -
c o g n i t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n c e s - t h a t i s , the necess i ty f o r 
c r e a t i v i t y and the exerc i se o f judgement - d i s r u p t s the es tab l i shed 
r o u t i n e and i s l i k e l y to throw the o rgan iza t i on o f f balance. The ce r -
t a i n t y which i s e s t a b l i s h e d by the regu lar performance o f r o u t i n e tasks 
i s brought i n t o doub t , and the i n d i v i d u a l s who comprise the organ iza-
t i o n become unsure o f themselves. C r e a t i v i t y i s a p r i v i l e g e which i s 
reserved f o r the e l i t e o f the h ie ra rchy of the o rgan iza t i on l e s t the 
rhythm o f the machine be d i s rup ted and the power o f the o rgan i za t i on 
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d im in i shed . 
The ope ra t i on o f a h ie ra rchy o f o f f i c e s and coo rd ina t i on o f e f f o r t 
i s main ta ined by the es tab l ishment o f ru les and regu la t i ons governing 
i n d i v i d u a l behav iour . Not a standard o f judgement or c r i t e r i a o f 
eva l ua t i on i s demanded, as i n an i n s t i t u t i o n , but the performance o f 
s p e c i f i c ac t i ons accord ing to a determined p lan i s requ i red i f the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n i s t o ma in ta in i t s power, 'Company p o l i c y ' or 's tandard 
ope ra t i ng procedures ' w i l l i n fo rm subordinates how they should reac t 
to a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . Rules and regu la t i ons w i l l e s t a b l i s h a 
man's p o s i t i o n i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , and w i l l de f ine the proper scope 
o f h i s e f f o r t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , denot ing both h i s powers and h is 
l i m i t a t i o n s . These ru l es are es tab l i shed n e i t h e r by agreement nor by 
conven t ion . Nor do they s imply emerge through t ime as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
way o f doing t h i ngs comes t o be es tab l i shed . They are imposed a t one 
moment i n t ime by super io rs upon i n f e r i o r s . F a i l u r e to adhere to them 
w i l l c o n s t i t u t e grounds f o r expu ls ion from the o rgan i za t i on as the 
i n d i v i d u a l concerned w i l l r i g h t l y be considered to be a t h r e a t to i t s 
s t r u c t u r e and the maintenance o f i t s power. Capr ice , whim, o r the 
views o f an e c c e n t r i c , i f t o l e r a t e d a t a l l , w i l l be severe ly r e s t r i c -
t e d . For most men, the opera t ion o f an o rgan iza t ion i s a mat ter o f 
adherence to the r u l e s ; o f c o n s u l t a t i o n o f the handbook o r manual 
where the app rop r ia te ac t i on to mee t -a l l cont ingenies has been formu-
l a t e d , cata logued and c i r c u l a t e d . Judgement and s e n s i t i v i t y , h i gh l y 
p r i zed i n an i n s t i t u t i o n , are not r e l e v a n t t o most members o f an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n . 
Because the importance o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n an o rgan iza t i on i s 
l i m i t e d to h is f u n c t i o n , h i s ac t i ons severe ly r e s t r i c t e d by estab-
l i s h e d ru les and r e g u l a t i o n s , the appeal o f a p e t i t i o n e r to h is e t h i c s 
o r sent iments i s no t l i k e l y t o be heard. I f there i s t i m e , the bureau-
c r a t may sympathize w i t h the predicament o f the p e t i t i o n e r , but he 
w i l l r e t r e a t from the exposure o f h is i d e n t i t y . Unw i l l i ng to reveal 
who he i s , he w i l l be qu ick to make the excuse t h a t he doesn ' t formu-
l a t e the r u l e s , but merely f o l l o w s them. R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h is 
a c t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , at taches i t s e l f to the p o s i t i o n he occupies i n 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n , but not to him p e r s o n a l l y . ^ To g ive i n to the 
appeal to h is personal i d e n t i t y would be to v i o l a t e the ru l es o f h is 
o f f i c e , and would open him up to the charge o f abusing h i s p o s i t i o n o r 
a c t i n g c o r r u p t l y by i n t r u d i n g personal cons idera t ions i n t o the imper-
sonal realm o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s . 
The l i m i t a t i o n by h i e r a r c h i c a l con t ro l and by ru l es and regu la -
t i o n s t o de f i ned areas o f competence w i l l c rea te s p e c i a l i z e d t a s k s ; 
a d i v i s i o n o f labour w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Men w i l l develop exper-
t i s e , and s p e c i a l i z e d t r a i n i n g w i l l be acknowledged as essen t i a l as 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n grows and i t s purposes become more complex.^ T h i s , 
i n t u r n , w i l l impose an even more demanding burden upon those con-
t r o l l i n g the h i e ra r chy , 'Whose d is tance from the performance o f any 
g iven i n d i v i d u a l becomes more remote as the necess i ty f o r c lose super-
v i s i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n becomes more p ress ing . 
I n f o r m a t i o n a t the d isposal o f such experts i s always c r u c i a l to 
an o r g a n i z a t i o n . To have ' i n fo rma t i on about; the. wor ld . is to be i n a 
r e l a t i v e l y advantageous p o s i t i o n to ac t success fu l l y . In fo rmat ion i s 
p r a c t i c a l . I t t e l l s us o f the cond i t i ons t h a t p e r t a i n i n the wor ld ' 
which are r e l evan t to our a c t i v i t i e s . The_better informed we are 
about these c o n d i t i o n s , the b e t t e r we w i l l be able to fo rmula te plans 
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and p r o j e c t s which take account o f every th ing o f re levance , and wh ich , 
t h e r e f o r e , enjoy a g rea te r l i k e l i h o o d o f success. In a very real 
sense knowledge, and the a b i l i t y to u t i l i z e i t , i s power. The more 
i n f o r m a t i o n we have about the w o r l d , the less the chances are t ha t our 
e f f o r t s to ma in ta in a p u b l i c order i n the face o f change w i l l be over-
whelmed. 
The i n t e r e s t an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l have i n the p a s t , t h e r e f o r e , 
w i l l be a p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t . An o rgan iza t ion w i l l want to know about 
those aspects o f the past which are re levant to i t s present a c t i v i t i e s . 
H i s t o r i c a l accounts and ch ron i c l es o r a rcheo log ica l evidence w i l l ex-
c i t e the a t t e n t i o n o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n only to the ex ten t t h a t they 
i l l u m i n a t e the p resen t , g i v i n g in fo rmat ion about how and why the wor ld 
we c o n f r o n t i s the way i t i s and how t h i s w i l l a f f e c t our contemplated 
a c t i o n s . As t ime lapses , however, the s ta te o f a f f a i r s descr ibed by 
such records w i l l become p r o g r e s s i v e l y 'ou t o f d a t e ' . By t h i s we mean 
t h a t successive changes i n the wor ld w i l l make the s t a t e o f a f f a i r s 
they descr ibe q u i t e remote from what i t i s now. The relevance o f . t h i s 
past s t a t e f o r our p r a c t i c a l undertak ings i n the present w i l l be i n -
c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o determine as t ime passes and changes in te rvene 
between the way th ings were ' t h e n ' and the way they are 'now' . The 
records s imply become less i n f o r m a t i v e f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes. Cons-
e q u e n t l y , the importance o f past records to o rgan iza t ions dec l ines over 
t i m e , t h e i r p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e being d iminished by the a c q u i s i t i o n 
o f more up - to -da te i n f o r m a t i o n which gives a more immediate and c l e a r 
i n d i c a t i o n o f what i s r e l e v a n t t o the present purposes o f the o r g a n i -
z a t i o n . The h i s t o r i a n ' s love o f the past f o r i t s own sake i s a l uxu ry 
i n which o r g a n i z a t i o n s , concerned w i t h succeeding i n the achievement 
o f some goal , - cannot i n d u l g e . 
The i n f o rma t i on an o r g a n i z a t i o n requ i res must be received q u i c k l y 
- «a 
i f i t is to be relevant and to allow the organization to respond in 
time. The longer i t takes to communicate this information, the less 
l ike ly i t is that i t s significance can be assessed and i ts usefulness 
exploited. The demand for completeness and accuracy of information 
has to be weighed against the need to obtain information quickly - a 
dilemma which no organization can afford to ignore. 
The viewpoint of cybernetics suggests that a l l organizations 
are alike in certain fundamental characteristics, and that every 
organization is held together by communication.''' ' I t is communication, 
that is the ab i l i t y to transmit messages and react to them that makes 
o 
organizations While communication of information does not define 
an organization, as the enthusiastic proponents of cybernetics seem to 
suggest, i t is crucial . The destruction of i t s means of communication 
paralyses an organizati'on by cutting the threads which b;ind i ts diverse 
elements together. With a complete disruption of the internal commun-
ication system of an organization, i t s constituent parts are isolated, 
and the capacity to act in concert disappears. 
The size of an organization, the sp,eci:alized nature of the tasks 
of i t s components, the d i f f i cu l t i es in obtaining information, a l l place 
those in the upper echelons of the hierarchy, who are most responsible 
for the coordination of e f fo r t , in a d i f f i c u l t and contradictory posi-
t ion. Specialized knowledge and training make the act iv i t ies of the 
experts of an organization increasingly d i f f i c u l t to penetrate and 
judge. Thus the potential for control over the act iv i t ies of those who 
comprise the organization become l imited. The upper echelons of the 
hierarchy must rely upon the lower not only for the transmission of 
^ Deutsch. Karl W., The Nerves of Governmentr Models of Poli t ical 
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information, but for i t s interpretation and assessment as wel l . The 
relationship of superior to in fer ior , of command and obedience, is 
mitigated by the fact that the infer ior can (and frequently w i l l ) 
edit reports, including only the information which he wants his supe-
r ior to see, and interpret the significance of the information pres-
ented, suggesting to his superior the suitable alternative which 
should be selected. Quite accurately Weber speaks of the king f lee-
ing to his cabinet in order to seek refuge from the expertise of his 
9 
bureauracy. 
An organization as a whole, and constituent elements within an 
organization, thus have a vested interest in maintaining the quality 
and exclusiveness of their information i f they wish to secure a posi-
t ion of advantage over any r i va ls , actual or potential. 
Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superi-
or i ty of the professionally informed by keeping 
their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureau-
cratic administration always tends to be an ad-
ministration of "secret sessions": insofar as 
i t can, i t hides i t s knowledge and actions from 
cr i t ic ism, 
or from any discovery which w i l l imperil i ts possession of exclusive 
e x p e r t i s e . ' T h e concept of the "o f f i c ia l secret" is the specific 
invention of the bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended 
by the bureaucracy as this at t i tude. '^^ Inst i tut ions, in contrast, 
have no body of information which is the basis of their superiority 
and which they must retain exclusive control over. Nor are those who 
9 
Gerth, i W d . , 236-37. A similar point is made by an analyst of 
the American presidency. Nominally the president is a commander. 
In practice he is a persuader who is subject to the conflicting' 
pressures of his subordinates, who control the information he 
receives and can claim to have better qualifications than he for • 
assessing i t . Cf. Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power, (New 
York: The New American Library, 1964). 
^° Gerth, ibid . , 233. 
ibid. 
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comprise an inst i tu t ion experts whose mastery of specific information 
alone gives them an advantage over the less well-informed. Their 
deliberations are open, not secretive, and their judgements public, 
not restr icted. 
I f information and control over i t are a means of coordinating 
action, and as thus one of the sources of the power or organizations, 
misinformation and deceit are a source of power as wel l . An organi-
zation which faces competition or opposition from another organization 
may well attempt to mislead i t s r ivals as to i t s intentions, or to 
provide i t with false information in the hope that i t w i l l act upon 
this misinformation and bring "disastrous results upon"itself. Care 
must be taken, however, to ensure that the organization does not begin 
12 
to believe i t s own propaganda and f a l l victim to i ts own trap. 
Inst i tut ions, however, have no interest in obscuring their act iv i t ies 
or in misleading those about them, for i t is:only by openly acting in 
public that their authority may make i t se l f f e l t . 
In a l l these ways, organizations are designed to bring about 
change; to i n i t i a te action as e f f i c ien t ly and as effectively as poss-
ib le . Inst i tu t ions, in contrast to organizations, are not so concerned 
with i n i t i a t i ng action as with providing a context and cr i ter ia for 
judging actions. The values and norms of inst i tut ions, the pattern of 
behaviour which they seek to maintain,'are not in themselves actions 
but rather prescribe a mode of action. Institutions are suited for 
deliberation. The men who comprise them consider and evaluate the 
12 
I t must be pointed out that this has been known to happen, 
most recently and on the grandest scale, perhaps, in Indo-
china, where American policy-makers began to believe the 
misinformation which they were putting about in order to 
create the impression that a l l was going well . Cf. Arendt, 
Hannah, 'On Lying in Po l i t i es ' , The New York Review of 
Books, 18th November, 1971. 
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actions and proposals of others. The institutions of which they are 
a part are singularly unsuited for the in i t ia t ion of action, which 
requires the rules and regulations, sense of goals and hierarchies 
of o f f ices, collection and control of information, and cult ivation of 
expertise, a l l of which are the characteristics of an organization. 
Pol i t ical inst i tu t ions, l ike other inst i tut ions, are concerned 
with the maintenance of a characteristic pattern of act iv i ty and with 
providing the context and cr i te r ia for judging actions. They are, 
therefore, to be distinguished from pol i t ical organizations. Like 
other ins t i tu t ions, they authorize actions in the sense that they 
validate them, putting a seal of approval on them, without themselves 
i n i t i a t i ng any action. Whatever form they may take in a given society, 
po l i t i ca l inst i tut ions discriminate between the various alternative 
courses of action suggested to them, sanctioning some and not others; 
authorizing change and at the same time preserving continuity. Weight 
is given to the judgements of those who comprise insti tut ions because 
they speak as representatives of the inst i tut ions, and i t is the i ns t i -
tutional character of their pronouncements which is of significance in 
the maintenance of public order. They do not speak as individuals, but 
as embodiments of the ins t i tu t ion , exercising i t s authority and not. 
their own personal authority in maintaining the character of the public 
13 
order.' What they are presumed to 'khow' is not a body of knowledge 
but the character of the public order. What they are presumed to have 
mastered is not the specialized information of the expert, but the 
appropriate idiom. 
Like anything else, po l i t ica l institutions can be abused and de-
based, with the result that they w i l l no longer enjoy pre-eminence, and 
their attempts to maintain a way of l i f e w i l l neither be listened to 
13 Weber, ibid., 331-32. 
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nor followed. As with other kinds of authority, the authority of 
po l i t i ca l inst i tut ions w i l l remain intact to the extent that i t is 
exercised. Furthermore, l ike other kinds of authority, the authority 
of po l i t ica l inst i tut ions w i l l be respected only as long as the men 
who comprise the inst i tut ions are f e l t to be upholding the public 
order and acting with sensi t iv i ty and discernment in giving .their 
judgements. The judgements which such men render and the actions which 
they authorize must enable the public order to combat successfully the 
challenges to i t s continuity and s tab i l i t y . The manifest fai lure of 
the Ulster Parliament to maintain the continuity of the public order in 
the face of disagreement which eventually destroyed any pretence of 
communality amongst the citizens of Ulster resulted in the gradual with-
drawal of confidence and the ultimate collapse of i t s authority. I ts 
judgements were no longer listened to with respect, and the public began 
at f i r s t to attend more closely to debate outside the pol i t ical ins t i tu -
t i on , and f ina l l y to withdraw altogether from pol i t ica l l i f e as coercion 
and the power of organizations eclipsed the authority of the insti tut ion.^^ 
Like other inst i tu t ions, po l i t ica l insti tut ions in more sophisti-
cated societies are l i ke ly to be highly formalized, their continuity in . 
part ensured by a bureaucratic structure and expl ic i t procedures which 
endure beyond the l i f e of any one member and serve to socialize new 
in i t i a tes . The way that the bureaucracy and the procedures operate, 
the specific structure of the one and formulations of the other, may 
well be the subject of intense debate within the inst i tu t ion. But gene-
ra l l y speaking they are the means by which pol i t ica l insti tut ions help 
maintain their relevance to the present and make their weight f e l t in 
the constant exchange of views within pol i t ical l i f e . Parliament and 
14 
Rose, Richard, Governing Without Consensus: An Ir ish Perspective, 
(London: Faber and Faber, L td . , 1971), IUU-l2. 122, i^ter a l ia . 
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the authority which i t exercises as a body is not contained within the 
Palace at Westminster, the House of Commons Library, or the Standing 
Orders of procedure. However, these do ensure that the death or retire-
ment of members over time and the advent of new members do not leave 
Parliament in a state of uncertainty about how to go about i ts business 
1 
or where and when to meet in order to continue i ts deliberations. 
The dist inct ion between po l i t ica l in^ tu t ions and other kinds of 
inst i tut ions l ies in the scope of their authority. The deliberations 
of a pol i t ica l inst i tu t ion may range far and wide over the entire 
structure of the public order. They are not confined to one area as, 
for example, the Royal Society is confined to the area of scient i f ic 
enquiry, or religious inst i tut ions are confined to moral l i v ing . A 
po l i t i ca l ins t i tu t ion may focus on any aspect of the public order. To-
day i t may be the price of goods in the market place, tomorrow the 
l iberal izat ion of laws governing abortion, and the day after the pro-
priety of an alliance with a neighbouring nation-state. The character 
of the entire public order is i ts concern, and the maintenance of the 
whole society is i t s responsibi l i ty. There is no area of society 
which cannot be of interest to po l i t ica l inst i tut ions. Over the time 
some aspects of the society may not receive attention, but that does 
not preclude the possibi l i ty of a pol i t ical inst i tut ion taking an 
interest in i t and deliberating about i t . The culling of seal cubs, 
the conditions of coal miners, the proper conduct of state o f f i c ia ls 
may suddenly f ind themselves topics of debate and deliberation after 
years of obscurity and inattention. 
I t is not only in their scope that pol i t ica l institutions may be 
distinguished from other inst i tut ions. In pol i t ica l act iv i ty they 
stand in a unique posit ion, able to have the last word in the debate; 
to indicate which actions are acceptable and in keeping with the 
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character of the society and which are not. Pol i t ical insti tut ions 
enjoy almost a complete monopoly on authority in pol i t ica l l i f e . 
The way in which diverse pol i t ica l insti tut ions are related to each 
other, and the procedures which govern their operation w i l l vary from 
one society to another, and within any given society over time. How-
ever, whatever the particular configuration of the inst i tut ions and 
procedures at hand, po l i t ica l inst i tut ions, as long as their pre-
eminence is acknowledged, make the f inal determination. Debate may be 
lengthy and heated within the society as to whether or not they should 
go to war against their neighbours, for example.. But once those who 
comprise the relevant inst i tut ion have deliberated and decided what, 
in their judgement, w i l l .preserve the contihuity of the' public order, 
the issue has been resolved; the last word spoken. Only by rejecting 
their authority and overthrowing that inst i tut ion can that judgement 
be disregarded and di f ferent action in i t ia ted. When that happens the 
continuity of the public order, preserved particularly by its pol i t ica l 
inst i tu t ions, is threatened with revolt or c i v i l war. 
In contemporary Western societies, the pol i t ica l assembly, along 
the lines of a Chamber of Deputies or a House of Commons, while not 
the only po l i t i ca l ins t i tu t ion , is the one charged with the primary 
responsibil ity of authorizing changes and maintaining the character 
of the public order. I ts concern is -the preservation of a character-
i s t i c pattern of act iv i ty - the English way of l i f e , for example - and 
i t provides the context within which various proposals and alternatives 
are judged, and c r i te r ia are preserved. Debate elsewhere, as in the 
correspondence column of The Times or television discussions, while 
perhaps informative, is not l ike ly to be decisive or perhaps even very 
signif icant. They w i l l be of relat ively minor importance as long as 
the deliberations of Parliament.are recognized as pre-eminent, giving 
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i ts members collectively the f inal word in any debate. 
The members of a po l i t i ca l assembly are not there simply to per-
form e f f i c ien t l y , but to bring their experience and judgement to bear 
upon the problems and perspectives which are laid before them. I t is 
primarily on the grounds of their experience and judgement, not merely 
their eff ic iency, that they are either praised or blamed. Efficiency 
is not unimportant, of course. Experience and judgement are useful 
only insofar as they are timely, and no amount of experience can com-
pensate for le t t ing the moment s l ip by. I t is in fact the sk i l l of 
judging when the moment is r igh t , gained through experience, which is 
highly valued in a po l i t i c ian. Here i t is the identity of a member 
more than his function which is of crucial importance and which wi l l 
determine the cred ib i l i ty he enjoys amongst his colleagues, as well 
as the honour he brings upon the pol i t ica l ins t i tu t ion. His sensi-
t i v i t y and discernment outweigh the value of his ab i l i t y to follow 
orders. The member of an organization may be dismissed for refusing 
to obey his superiors, but an MP, as a member of a pol i t ica l assembly, 
can never be excluded from Parliament for refusing to obey his party 
leader. The dismissal of Enoch Powell from the Shadow Cabinet in 
1968 did not al ter his r ight to speak as an MP. While his refusal to 
to toe the party l ine may have injured the party organization, i t did 
not necessarily bring disrepute upon-the pol i t ica l assembly. His 
individual identity and the independence of his judgement were a l l the 
more f irmly established by his refusal to repudiate his judgements and 
follow the party l ine. At most the member of a pol i t ica l assembly can 
be told by the presiding of f icer that he is 'out of order'; that i s , 
that his remarks are not relevant at this time. But the member can 
never be to ta l ly silenced or directed what l u :.,dy. He is bound by the 
procedures of the ins t i tu t ion , but cannot be ordered to endorse one 
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proposal and condemn another. I t is only as a member of a pol i t ical 
organization, such as a po l i t ica l party, that he may be ordered to 
follow a three-line whip. As a member of such an organization, he 
may well f ind i t advisable to obey such orders, particularly i f he 
wishes to advance in the party hierarchy and turn i ts power to the 
advantage of his career. I t is quite possible, however, that he may 
experience a conf l ic t between his commitment to the inst i tut ion and 
his allegiance to the organization; between being at once an MP and a 
member of a party. 
Because a po l i t ica l assembly is an ins t i tu t ion, which is perhaps 
assisted by but not to be equated with an organization, i t is quite 
mistaken to c r i t i c ize i t on organizational grounds. To ask MPs whether 
they think ' . . . the House of Commons does i t s work eff iciently? ade-
quately? ineff ic ient ly? •may not be very revealing i f the primary 
concern of a po l i t i ca l assembly is less to act e f f ic ient ly than jud i -
ciously.^^ Similarly, a mistaken parallel is drawn by asserting that 
'the declining effectiveness of the House has been paralleled . . . by 
a r is ing efficiency of the Executive'.^^ : The ppl i t ica l . assembly is 
not in competition with the state, and i t cannot be said to be fa l l ing 
behind in this non-existent race. The pol i t ica l assembly exercises 
authority, while the state possesses power, The pol i t ica l assembly 
authorizes actions, while the state in i t iates actions. The two con-
duct themselves in d ist inct ways because they are different kinds of 
groups of men, both maintaining and modifying the public order in 
di f ferent manners. 
15 
The questionnaire forms part of the evidence for Crick's 
thesis of the decline of Parliament. Cf. Crick, Bernard, 
The Reform of Parliament, (London: Weidenfeld and Nichol-
son, 1%4), 74. 
ibid., 11. 
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Within the po l i t i ca l l i f e of any given society there is l ikely 
to be any number of po l i t i ca l organizations, such as pol i t ica l parties, 
pressure groups and interest lobbies. These are a l l pol i t ica l organ-
izations to the extent that their goals may be expressed in terms of 
the kind of society which they would l ike to see developed or preserved; 
the character of the public order within which they would l ike to esta-
blish individual ident i t ies and to which they are therefore committed. 
Obviously some organizations, such as large corporations or trades 
unions in our contemporary pol i t ica l l i f e , are l ikely to have pol i t ica l 
as well as• specif ical ly economic goals. They w i l l in part be pol i t ical 
organizations, but their primary goals may be expressed in terms of the 
interest of their members rather than in terms of the character of the 
entire society. 
The various po l i t ica l organizations which do participate in pol i -
t ics w i l l f ind themselves in competition with one another. Presenting 
diverse and often incompatible views on the character of the public 
order, i t w i l l not be possible for the view of a l l pol i t ica l organi-
zations to be accommodated, or even listened to. Their relationship 
with each other w i l l be one of r i va l ry , with patterns of allegiance 
which emerge and decay as goals coincide and reinforce one another and 
then diverge again. Each organization attempts to have i t s view 
adopted; the public order altered or .maintained in accordance with i ts 
vision. To the extent that an organization is powerful, i ts chances 
of success w i l l be increased. Like every other kind of organization, 
po l i t ica l organizations require a hierarchy of of f ices, rules and regu-
lat ions, collection and control of information, and development of 
expertise i f they are to achieve their goal. To be without any of 
these, or weak in any one area, is to invite defeat in the competition 
with other po l i t ica l organizations for the attention and support of 
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those who make the decisions that count, in po l i t i cs . 
Those who make the decisions that count are primarily, as we 
have seen, those who comprise the pol i t ical institutions of a society. 
What pol i t ica l organizations compete for , then, is not a lower price, 
as in the market place, but access to the time, attention, and event-
ually the support of those who deliberate within pol i t ica l ins t i tu -
tions. They may set about this in several ways. They may, for example, 
mobilize the support of the mass of the members of the public, thus 
making a claim of popular support for their perspective. Or they may 
provide information and access to d i f f i c u l t and complicated knowledge, 
attempting to influence the basis on which the member of an ins t i tu -
tion w i l l formulate his judgement. I t is in this way that they wi l l 
seek to impress their proposals upon the character of the society, 
thereby achieving the goals for which they were established. 
The state, too, is a po l i t ica l organization as i t has been char-
acterized so far . Like a pol i t ica l party, a state has a hierarchy of 
of f ices, relationships of command and obedience, rules and regulations, 
and is very much concerned with the collection and dissemination of 
information. In both a state and a pol i t ica l party, i t is legitimate 
to speak of the efficiency of the organization; of maximizing outputs 
and minimizing costs. Efficiency is not necessarily the same as 
effectiveness here, but the two are closely related. As with other 
large organizations, the state both benefits from and is plagued by 
specialization and expertise. And as with other organizations, where 
the hierarchy of command is threatened, rules abused or ignored, 
communication inhibited or disrupted, information infer ior or lacking, 
i t s power is diminished and i t s capacity to act is in decline. 
Unlike other po l i t ica l organizations, however, the state is not 
in competition with other po l i t ica l organizations within a society. 
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I t is not, at least while i t is effective as a state, thrown back on 
the necessity of entering into alliances and calculating the cost of 
r iva l r ies with others in po l i t ica l l i f e . I t has been suggested that 
the distinctiveness of the state as a pol i t ical organization l ies in 
the fact that i t enjoys a monopoly of legitimate coercive power within 
the society, Other organization! may legitiniatily mobillEe opinion 
and seek to disseminate information, but the state alone may l e g i t i -
mately employ coercion. When this monopoly on legitimate coercion is 
broken, i t is suggested, the power of the state is in decay. 
This is true enough as far as i t goes. However, i t is important 
to note that the legitimacy of the coercive power of the state is not 
determined by the state i t se l f . The goals which the state has do not 
originate within the state i t se l f but are imposed upon i t by the po l i -
t ical inst i tut ions of the society. I t is not up to o f f i c ia ls of the 
state to determine what actions may be ini t iated by the state, what 
coercion is allowed, and what changes must be undertaken. The actions 
in i t ia ted by the state are authorized by the pol i t ica l inst i tut ions, 
and i f i t can be shown that the state has exceeded i t s w r i t , then i ts 
actions w i l l be held to be iTlegitimate, Therefore, the state is to 
be distinguished only partly from other pol i t ical organizations by 
saying that i t enjoys a monopoly on legitimate coercion. I t is to be 
distinguished more fundamentally by the fact that unlike other po l i t -
ical organizations, the state alone is authorized or commissioned by 
the po l i t i ca l inst i tut ions to i n i t i a te action. In the United Kingdom, 
the authority of the police to make an arrest does not originate with-
in the police force, but rests with the Crown. The police are commi-
ssioned to act on behalf of the Crown to arrest those who appear to be 
""^  Nieburg, H L., Pol i t ical Violence. (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1969), 99, as just one example of such a view of the 
100 -
violating the law. I t is in the name of the Queen that one is arres-
ted, not in the name of the Commissioner of Police. The leader of a 
po l i t ica l party, in contrast, acts to f u l f i l the goals of the party 
and requires no authorization from pol i t ica l inst i tut ions to take 
action to achieve that purpose. I t is not in the name of the Crown 
that expenditures are approved for pol i t ical campaigns, but with the 
agreement of the party hierarchy. 
Because pol i t ica l inst i tut ions enjoy the privilege of having 
the f inal word in debate, and because the state alone is authorized 
by po l i t ica l inst i tut ions to undertake changes and in i t i a te action, 
the state is in a unique position vis-a-vis other pol i t ica l organi-
zations. I t is i t s relationship with pol i t ical insti tut ions which 
removes the state from the realm of competition with other pol i t ica l 
organizations, and the monopoly of legitimate coercive power is just 
one aspect of th is . Other advantages with relationship to various 
po l i t ica l organizations are also enjoyed by the state. I ts position 
is also maintained by an overwhelming superiority of information, 
enabling i t to coordinate action on a mass scale. 'State secrets' 
are jealously guarded by the state not simply because of the dangers 
of exposing v i ta l information to external enemies, but also because of 
the threat of potential internal r iva ls . No state can tolerate an 
alternative organization which knows 'as much as i t does i t se l f . The 
superiority of the information of the state allows i t to in i t ia te 
action, while other organizations are forced to wait and to react to 
what has already been undertaken. I f this position of unchallenged 
supremacy in information is los t , the state is on the way to sacri-
f ic ing i t s capacity to coordinate action on a mass scale and to con-
t ro l the structure of the public order; that i s , to sacrif icing i ts ' 
claim to be a state. The ab i l i t y to collect taxes and deliver the 
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post were as effective in establishing the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government as the de f a c t o government in much of South Vietnam as 
the coercive power i t was able to bring to bear against i ts r i va l . 
Not simply the mi l i tary achievements of the National Liberation 
Front, but i t s demonstration of superior organizational ab i l i t y made 
clear the effectiveness of i t s challenge to the state of South Viet-
nam.''^ 
The successful maintenance of the position of the state in rela-
tion to other po l i t ica l organizations stabilizes the public order 
over time, creating relat ive certainty as to the character of the 
future. Future consequences of present actions become calculable, 
and this calculabi l i ty becomes crucial information for other organi-
zations. Modern culture, and specifically . . . i ts technical 
and economic basis, demands this very calculabi l i ty of results. ' 
Without this climate of relat ive certainty, which is in part estab-
lished by the state, the existence of any other organization would be 
d i f f i c u l t and i t s operation hazardous. I t is within the public order, 
the character of which is debated in pol i t ica l l i f e , determined by 
po l i t i ca l inst i tut ions and enforced by the state, that our economic, 
and social organizations are able to f lourish. The state is thus not 
only above the competition of other pol i t ical organizations, i ts posi-
t ion of superior power allows i t to enforce an order within which 
other organizations, pol i t ica] and non-pol i t ical , are able to survive. 
However, although po l i t ica l insti tut ions commission the state, 
Ahmad, Eqbad, 'Revolutionary Warfare', in Marvin E. Gettle-
man, ed., Vietnam: History, •Documents and Opinions, (Green-
wich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., :1965), 353, 356-57. 
A similar point is made with regard to'the Viet'Minh ' in 
McAlister, John T. J r . , Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution, 
(London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1959), pp. 351-64. 
Gerth, , 215. 
they are vulnerable to i t . Suited for deliberation rather than ac-
t ion , their authority can be forcibly overcome by the power of the 
state. To the extent that the state acts beyond the bounds of i ts 
commission, the authority of the po l i t ica l inst i tut ions is called 
into question and the v iab i l i t y of pol i t ica l l i f e is threatened. 
Modern history is f i l l e d with examples of societies where the power 
of the state has been employed to crush pol i t ica l inst i tut ions. The 
two, state and po l i t ica l assembly, are interdependent. The state 
requires the authorization of the assembly, and the assembly requires 
the power of the state to implement i t s decisions. They are, however, 
d is t inc t , and their interdependence is fraught with tensions arising 
from their di f ferent natures and the diverse ways in which they ope-
rate to maintain public order. They pull in opposite directions and 
yet together they function to preserve the character of the society 
through time. 
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Chapter 6 
COERCION, VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC ORDER 
In many cases, or in most cases, enforcing the conditions of 
membership in the public order, as these conditions have been defined 
by po l i t i ca l inst i tu t ions, w i l l resolve i t se l f into a matter of ad-
ministration by the state. Laws which have been approved by the pol i -
t ical assembly are l ike ly to be readily complied with as long as the 
authority of the inst i tu t ion is intact and i ts judgements are in 
keeping with the collective identity of the people concerned. When 
this is the case, merely administration wi l l generally be enough to 
see that these laws are enforced. I t is for this reason that the 
state is popularly seen mainly as a source of red tape, innumerable 
forms and banks of f i l e s . 
However, there is a signif icant number of cases where compliance 
is not readily given, and consequently where enforcement of the law 
cannot be simply a matter of processing forms. Where men knowingly 
and deliberately violate the law, and thus threaten the relative con-
t inu i ty and s tab i l i t y of the public order, the state must be prepared 
to take action against them. I t must use i ts coercive power in order 
to ensure that the conditions of membership in the society as defined 
in law are not w i l f u l l y disregarded. 
The words 'coercion' and 'violence' are used repeatedly and often 
without reference to the significance of the context within which such 
actions occur or the differences between them. The assumption seems to 
be that the terms speak for themselves and that no c lar i f icat ion of 
them is necessary. Thus the police are able to speak of the violence 
of demonstrators, for example, and demonstrators, in turn, are able to 
complain about the violence of the police. .Both sides employ the term 
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in a pejorative sense and both assume that the common element of vio-
lent physical action is enough to ensure that in both cases the word 
refers to the same thing. The coercive forces of law and order are 
praised by government o f f i c i a l s , while criminal forces are condemned. 
In one case, coercion is admirable and in the other i t is deplorable. 
Yet no dist inction is made between the various uses of the word 
' force' and none apparently is f e l t necessary. I t is assumed that i ts 
meaning is clearly enough understood and that any ambiguity is easily 
avoided when talking about these terms with reference to pol i t ics and 
public order. 
I t i s , however, far frofti clear that these terms refer to the same 
thing in every case, that no useful distinctions can be made, or that 
one may rely on a kind of in tu i t ive understanding of the import of these 
words. The danger is that these terms have become so much a part of our 
po l i t i ca l vocabulary and^so. f irmly established :in,, the ..cliches which pass 
for explanations of po l i t ica l l i f e , that their significance has become . 
obscured and their meaning ambiguous.^ 
The fact that on the whole these term.s have not been c la r i f ied , 
however, does not mean that attention has not been devoted to explaining 
their appearance in human relationships. A great deal of recent l i t e r -
ature has been preoccupied with the themes of violence and coercion, and 
these terms have been the subject of-humerous essays. One attempt to 
account for what is violent in society explains i t in terms of man's i n -
herent characteristics. Such behaviour, we are to ld , is the result of 
natural aggressions or even k i l l e r instincts which can never be evaded. 
Pol i t ica l order, then, is necessarily at cross-purposes with these natu-
Hannah Arendt's recent essay, On Violence, (London, Allen Lane. 
The Penguin Press, 1970), is perhaps an exception io th is , be-
ing an attempt to analyse just what is meant by terms such as 
force and violence. 
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2 ral human tendencies. Such psychological/anthropological explana-
tions seem to stop at this point * however', and never attempt to ex-
plore the po l i t i ca l implicoitions of this'view.' 
Closely related to the psychological theory of natural human 
aggression is the theory that violence is int r ins ic to the social 
process. According to this understanding', coercion and violence are 
not the intrusion of alien elements into social interaction, but are 
the natural and perhaps unavoidable outcome of the social process. 
To attempt to treat coercion and violence as elements dist inct 
from the processes that are characteristic of society is to ignore 
the continuum that exists between peaceable and disruptive behav-
iour According to this view, pol i t ics becomes the manipulation 
of 'tension-management devices',^ seeking to balance the demands of 
'active power groups'^, which are in competition for the distribution 
of the economic goods of a society. I f pol i t ica l procedures and con-
ventions, which according to this view are really nothing more than a 
means of carrying on this bargaining, fa i l to operate l ike the safety 
valve of a steam engine to release excessive pressure on the machine, 
2 
Variations on this theme are"taken up by a number of writers. 
For example, Lorenz, Konrad, On Aggression, Marjorie K. Wilson, 
trans., (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1966); 
Ardrey, Robert, African Genesis. (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 
1951); Bettelheim, Bruno, 'Violence: A Neglected Mode of 
Behaviour', in Shalom Endelman, ed.. Violence in the Streets, 
Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968. 
3 
Nieburg, H. L., Pol i t ical Violence, (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1969), 5. Also, c f . , Moore, Barrington, The Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (Boston: The Beacon 
Press, 1967), and 'Thoughts on Violence and Democracy', in 
Robert H. Connery, ed., Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1969); Drake, St. Clair, "Urban 
Violence and Social Movements', Connery, ed. , ijbid.; Feldman, • 
Arnold S., 'Violence and V o l i t i l i t y : The Likelihood of Revolu-
t i o n ' , in Harry Eckstein, ed. , Internal War, (London: Coll ier-
Macmill.an, L td . , 1964) where the same viewpoint is put forward. 
4 
Feldman, ibid.,117. 
5 Nieburg, ibid., 126. 
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the entire social mechanism w i l l explode in violence. 
In an attempt to refine this mechanistic understanding of the 
social system, the concept of ' re lat ive deprivation' has been put 
forward to explain why dangerous pressure may build up in the social 
machine. As individuals come to feel that they are deprived of those 
things which they deserve to have, they w i l l be increasingly prone to 
violence in their attempts to obtain them. I t is this gap between 
perceived conditions and the way i t is fe l t things ought to be which 
causes the pressure on the machine to increase.^ Pol i t ical action 
becomes merely the means of redressing a distr ibut ion of 'social 
values' which is seen as inequitable. Thus, 'po l i t ica l opportunities 
refer to po l i t i ca l actions as means rather than ends . . . . ' ' ' 
Rather than relying upon a mechanistic view of society, some 
sociologists have preferred to draw on economic models. Violent ac-
tions are, according to this understanding, a manifestation of con-
f l i c t i n g value patterns or a 'disequil ibriated social system'. I f 
the value patterns of various social groups are in conf l ic t with one 
another, then the pol i ty w i l l be unstable. Violence is l ike ly to 
" . . . arise only in the dysfunctional social system, the one whose 
values do not synchronize with i ts division of labour'.^ 
For a l l their differences, these various attempts to deal with 
the phenomena of coercion and violence within a public order have a 
number of things in common. They are, f i r s t of a l l , based on peculiar 
notions of pol i t ics and pol i t ica l ac t iv i ty ; notions which are not 
^ Gurr, Ted, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton, New Jersey: The Princeton 
University Press, 1970), 25. 
^ ibid., 28. 
g 
Lipset, S. M., 'Democracy and the Social System', in Eckstein, 
ed., ibid., 267 f f . 
g 
Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown 
and Co., 1966), 58. 
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uniquely p o l i t i c a l , but which are borrowed from other disciplines. 
(This statement should perhaps exclude the case of the psychological/ 
anthropological explanations, which seem not to devote themselves 
specif ical ly to pol i t ics at a l l . ) This is part icularly revealed by 
their continued reliance upon economic terms and models in their 
discussions of coercion and violence. According to these approaches, 
po l i t i ca l act iv i ty is behaviour which can be explained in terms of 
economics because i t is fundamentally concerned with economic affairs 
and the distr ibut ion of economic goods. There is nothing which dis-
tinguishes a po l i t ica l problem from the economic problem of the pro-
duction and distr ibut ion of scarce resources or the rational division 
of labour. Violent behaviour is dist inct from pol i t ica l act iv i ty 
only in that i t is a di f ferent way of solving economic conf l icts. 
The dist inct ion between pol i t ics on the one hand and coercion and vio-
lence on the other is obscured as they come to be seen as dif ferent 
manifestations of the same economic problem of the production and 
distr ibut ion of goods and services. 
Po l i t i cs , however, is not simply the procedures by which the 
distr ibut ion of economic goods and services is determined. As we 
have seen, i t is by acting in public that men establish and aff irm 
their ident i ty in the world. Through pol i t ical act iv i ty men come 
together to discuss the character of .their collective identity and 
the arrangement of their common l ives. Participation in the determ-
ination of these a f fa i rs , over what is public amongst men, is what 
i t means for men to be p o l i t i c a l ; to be citizens in a c i v i l society. 
The debate that is carried on within pol i t ica l l i f e may be concerned 
with economic issues, but those who participate are not engaged in 
economic act iv i ty . They ar*e not producing'anything iri" any economic 
sense, nor can their actions be reduced to economics. Whether or not 
capital punishment is in keeping with the character of Bri t ish society 
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cannot be resolved into a'purely economic problem. To see coercion 
and violence as tactics in economic bargaining, on a par with po l i t -
ical act iv i ty as another tact ic in the same process, does not t e l l 
» 
us very much about the relationship between coercion, violence and 
po l i t ica l l i f e , and presents us instead with a simplistic view of 
what is going on within po l i t i cs . 
Secondly, the attempts to explain violence which have been br ief ly 
touched upon here seem to have defined the problem in a peculiar way. 
The assumption is that while some v i o l e n t behaviour is to be expected 
or even accepted (as in the act iv i t ies of a police force), other v io l -
ent behaviour is alarming and should be rejected (as in the outbreaks 
of urban r io ts ) . The f i r s t is in no need, apparently, of any explan-
at ion, being somehow normal, while the second does require an explan-
at ion, being in some sense abnormal. Something must be wrong with a 
society when r iots break out, we are to ld, and the impl ic i t assumption 
is that there is nothing wrong with a society where the coercive power 
of the police is necessary. What we have, in fact , is a pathology 
(or attempted pathology) of violence, without any c lar i f icat ion of 
what makes one incident 'normal' and another 'pathological'. These 
examinations immediately concern themselves with various explanations 
which might be put forward for what has, in accordance with some un-
known c r i t e r ia , been designated as pathological and therefore in need 
of explanation. Whatever their other deficiencies, these attempts f a i l 
not simply because they misunderstand the nature of pol i t ica l ac t iv i ty , 
but also because they inadequately explore and c lar i fy the significance 
of the behaviour they attempt to explain. They fa i l to distinguish 
between coercion and violence - the term 'violence' is seldom defined 
and is assumed to cover almost everything - and in doing so, they ob-
scure the relationship between coercion, violence and public order. 
Coercion is instrumental; i t is a means to an e:nd. Oriented toward 
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the achievement of a goal in the future, i t has a strategy of how to 
achieve that goal. I t requires both a programme and a plan. The 
programme may be specific (for example, the destruction of new mach-
inery by Luddites in order to protect craftsmen and journeymen from 
the threat of industr ia l izat ion), or i t may be vague (for example, 
some of the mil lenial movements in the Middle Ages). But however 
specific or vague i t i s , i t is a vision of the future which is capable 
of being art iculated. New recruits may be persuaded by this vision 
and opponents may be alarmed by i t , but i t is capable of being dis-
cussed and debated. The plan by which this future state is to be 
achieved may be wise or foo l ish, effective or f u t i l e , but the use of 
coercion in i t s achievement is not chaotic or directionless. There 
is a purpose for which coercion is used, and there is always at least 
the potential for a leader to appear and assert his control by offering 
a superior plan in directing the use of coercion to the fulf i lment of 
that purpose. 
Once coercion is employed, discussion and deliberation are pre-
cluded. Coercion does not seek agreement or thoughtful consideration 
but obedience. The goal which coercion sets out to achieve is to be 
secured through the use of force, whether or not men agree. Were men 
in agreement as to the desirabi l i ty of the goal, there would be.no need 
to coerce them. In the absence of agreement or any means of arriving 
at agreement, coercion may be employed as an alternative. The changes 
i t brings about are forced upon the world, and the result is that in -
sofar as i t is successful, men are faced with a f a i t accompli. 
Public order i s , at least in part, dependent upon the use of co-
" . . . * • • '• 
ercion, or the threat of i t . However disruptive i t may ultimately 
prove to be to the established order, coercion is not alien to public 
order. I t is the state which is authorized by pol i t ica l inst i tut ions 
to employ coercion to achieve-a specific goal. That goal is the ad-
10 
herence by i t s subjects to the conditions of membership which have 
been determined within the relevant pol i t ica l inst i tut ions. The 
state alone enjoys this (Commission, and coercion is the ultimate 
sanction which i t has at i t s disposal for ensuring compliance with 
the law. Once this has been achieved, once a criminal is appre-
hended and his violat ion of the law halted, the coercive power of 
the state becomes inoperative, and i t s administrative role comes to 
the fore. The state, therefore, is not always or entirely concerned 
with the employment of coercion to enforce obedience from the 
recalcitrant. 
As long as the state commands the allegiance of i t s instruments 
of coercion (the police force, the army, e t c . ) , i t s t i l l has a claim 
to being a state. When i ts instruments of coercion waver or desert 
the state, however, i t has lost i ts claim to sovereignty. I t can no 
longer claim to be in a position to execute the commission given to 
i t by the po l i t i ca l inst i tut ions because i t no longer enjoys a posi-
tion of superiority relative to other pol i t ica l organizations. I f 
i t is to retain i t s claim to sovereignty, the state can allow no 
successful challenge to i t s capacity to carry out the enforcement of 
the decisions and actions which have been authorized by the pol i t ica l 
inst i tut ions of that society. 
To say that coercion is the ultimate sanction upon which the 
state may rely in order to ensure conformity to the structure of the 
public order, is not to imply that i t is the key factor or the only 
factor in the maintenance of public order. Men act in conformity to 
the conditions of membership in the public order for many reasons. 
Compliance with the law is not necessarily the result of their fear 
of the coercive powers of the state. 
The use of coercion by the state, however, may be seen by those 
who are subject to i t as radically disruptive to the established 
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character of the public order as i t has come to be recognized over 
time. That i s , the state may be authorized to bring about changes in 
the public order which w i l l be resisted by the members of that order. 
Coercion on a wide scale may then be necessary. The opposition of 
the kulaks to Stal in's col lect iv izat ion drive of the 1930s, for 
example, was an attempt to preserve the structure of economic and 
social relationships which had been encouraged by the earl ier New 
Economic Policy. Coercion was employed by the state on a massive 
scale to bring about the changes which had been authorized by Stalin 
and which were very much resisted by those affected. 
The coercive powers of the state may be met by force from those 
who wish to use coercion in opposition to the state and the.pol i t ical 
inst i tut ions in order to bring about changes in the character of the 
public order. Such opposition comes from 'outside' the pol i t ica l 
system in the sense that the coercion employed is not authorized by 
po l i t i ca l inst i tu t ions. I t is employed by those who reject the auth-
or i ty of those inst i tut ions as well as the conventions and procedures 
which govern the exercise of their authority. The changes which such 
coercion from outside the pol i t ica l system attempts to bring about may 
be more or less sweeping in their demands. Revolutionary coercion is 
concerned with the complete destruction of the present structure of 
the society. A revolution is only in part a pol i t ica l act. I t seeks 
the reordering of a l l social relationships and w i l l not be content 
with concessions or reforms which stop far short of the vision of a 
new society. To the revolutionary, coercion is only one part of his 
plan. I t is an instrument whose use is to be guided by considerations 
of strategy and by the ultimate goal of the revolutionary party. Terro-
rism, assassination, insurgency are a l l means to the end of the establ-
Raymond, Ellseworth, The Soviet State, (London: Coll ier-
Macmillan, 1968), lOO'^ ^^ T^ 
ishment of a new society in the future. 
Although non-revolutionary coercion directed against the state is 
without this vision of a completely new order, i t , too, employs co-
ercive force to achieve a particular goal in the future. 
The classical mob did not merely r i o t as protest, 
but because ifexiDected to achieve something by 
i t s r i o t . Ifassumed that the authorities would 
be sensitive to i t s movements, and probably also 
that they would make some sort of immediate con-
cession; for the mob was not simply a collection 
of people united for some ad hoc purpose, but in 
a recognized sense a permanent unity, even though 
not permanently organized as such.' ' 
As an instrument for the expression of dissatisfaction and the desire 
for change, the coercive force of the mob and of r iots achieved a 
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tac i t l y acknowledged and accepted status in the past. Operating 
without the authority of the pol i t ica l inst i tut ions, this kind of co-
ercion was bound to clash with the coercive forces of the state, 
attempting to bring changes where the state was commissioned to main-
tain order. 
What is remarkable is the way in which the coercion employed by 
mobs to achieve particular and limited goals was so discriminating in 
i t s use. The French 'taxation populaire' lowered the price of bread, 
but did relat ively l i t t l e damage to the shops or to those who had been 
hoarding grain. The systematic destruction of the customs posts ring-
ing Paris in 1789 is another example of limited coercion being employed 
against the state to achieve a specific goal. Where damage was exten-
•sive, part icularly with regard to loss of l i f e , i t was more frequently 
1 
the result of the coercive measures employed by the state. 
Hobsbawm, E.J., Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of 
Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries, (Manchester: 
Ihe Manchester University Press, 1959), 111. 
ibid., 111-116. 
13 
Rud^, George, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Distur-
bances in France and England. 1730-1848, (London: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1964), 23-31, 99. 
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I t is obvious that coercion is l ikely to be effective to the 
extent that i t is organized. The state cannot hope to execute success-
fu l l y the acts authorized by po l i t ica l institutions unless i t is organ-
ized, binding men together in formalized organizations with a l l the 
attributes which have been discussed. A lack of organization diminishes 
i t s ab i l i t y to employ coercion to achieve adherence to the law. Simil-
ar ly , coercion which is employed by those who are 'outside' the pol i t -
ical system and who do not enjoy the commission of the pol i t ica l i ns t i -
tut ions, must be highly organized i f i t hopes to overcome the superior-
i t y of the state in bringing about changes in the character of the 
public order. Random acts of terrorism and assassination are no subs-
t i t u te for carefully coordinated and controlled action, as the point-
less and ineffective bomb-wielding anarchists demonstrated at the end 
of the 19th century. The ab i l i t y to u t i l i ze coercion, either by the 
state or against the state, is a function of the extent and strength of 
organization. 
Coercion, revolutionary or not, which is directed against the state 
and is po l i t ica l in i t s purpose (that i s , addresses i t se l f to problems 
of the public order rather than merely private concerns) is l ikely to be 
the response of those who have been denied the f u l l rights of membership 
in the public order. I t is l ike ly to be resorted to by those who have 
been denied the possibi l i ty of asserting control over the arrangement 
of common af fa i rs and turn instead to coercion to enforce their views 
upon the public order. I t erupts when some do not enjoy the rights of 
citizenship and when meaningful action in pol i t ics is withheld from 
them. I t is an attempt to take the public world into their own' hands 
and to imprint their w i l l upon i t , creating the possibi l i ty of an.iden-
t i t y which has previously been denied. This is the only instrument of 
those who, having no pol i t ica l r ights, had no other means of redress 
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of grievances than resort to the tradit ional r io t ' . " ' ^ Those who 
employ coercion against the state are not simply seeking a more 
equitable distr ibut ion of economic goods (although that may be one 
part of their demands), but are insisting that they be recognized 
and heard by those in power, and that the shape of the future bear 
the mark of thei r demands.Arab terrorists who hijack commercial 
a i rcraf t do not ask simply for money. They cannot be bought of f 
through a dif ferent distr ibut ion of economic goods. They are 
attempting to draw the attention of the world to the plight of Pale-
stinian refugees, and to demand that the wishes of these people be 
taken into consideration in the shaping of the structure of the 
Middle East. 
Coercion gives the individual a new ident i ty. He is in i t ia t ing 
action, rather than merely reacting to the actions of others. The 
use of coercive force gives him a new l iberty to act and thus gives 
a new significance to his l i f e . He now has control when he had none 
before; his w i l l is of importance now, when i t was irrelevant before; 
his demands must be taken into account now, when they were ignored 
before. Even eventual fa i lure does not rob him of th is . Powerless 
before, he is now acting to*impress his w i l l upon t'he character of 
the future. Even the most f u t i l e of acts w i l l impart some sense of 
power and new significance to him. 
And, yet , out of i t a l l , over and above what had 
happened, impalpable but rea l , there remained to 
him a queer :Sens.e of power. He;had done th is . 
He had brought a l l this about. In a l l his l i f e 
tfiese two murders were the most meaningful things 
that had ever happened to him. He was l i v ing , 
t ru ly and deeply, no matter what others might 
14 
ibid., 34. 
The same point is made in Critchley, T. A., The Conquest of 
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think with their blind eyes.^^ 
I f he is a revolutionary, the actions of such a man w i l l ( in his own 
eyes at least) achieve an historical significance which was denied to 
him previously. The use of coercion to achieve a goal becomes part of 
the course of history. In a colonial si tuat ion, for example, i t 
' . . . frees the native from his in fe r io r i t y complex and from his des-
pair and inaction; i t makes him fearless and restores his self-respect'.^^ 
This sense of control over one's l i f e , after a l i fet ime of helplessness, 
is potent, and the act which brings i t about is seen as a turning point 
in the individual 's own l i f e , i f not in history i t se l f . The enthusiasm 
of revolutionary pamphlets in France in 1789 and 1848 is boundless, and 
the popular conviction that the act of revolution had in i t iated a com-
pletely new order where men could enjoy a new kind of identity was near-
18 
ly universal. Thus the storming of the Bast i l le, undertaken for stra-
tegic reasons, comes to assume a popular historical significance after 
the act.^^ 
From coercion, and the necessity of proper organization i f success 
is to fol low, comes a feeling of un i ty and sol idar i ty; a feeling of a 
common identi ty which is in the making. The solidarity of those who 
^ Wright, Richard, Native Son, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 
224-25. The same theme is pursued in Malcolm X, The Autobio-
graphy of Malcolm X, (New York: Grbve Press, Inc., 1965); 
Cleaver, Eldridge, Soul on Ice, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 
1968); Lei f , Harold L., 'Contemporary Forms of Violence', in 
Endelman, ± * * * . ^ . c/r. . • 
Fanon, Franz, The Wreitched of the Earth', Constance Fafrington, 
t rans. , (New York: Grove Press, inc. , 1968), 94. 
18 
de Tocqueville, Alexis, The Ancien Regime and the French Revo-
lu t ion . Stuart Gilbert, t rans. , (London: Fontana Library, 1966), 
IT. ^Iso, Postgate, R. W., ed.. Revolution from 1789 to 1905, 
(London: Grant Richards, L td . , 1920), 148, 187, 211-12. 
19 
Miliband, Ralph, Popular Thought in the French Revolution, 1789-
12M, (unpublisheTPh.D. thesis presented to the University of 
London, 1956), 90. 
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were on the Long March in China in 1934-35, for example, stems less from 
shared adversity, although that has a unifying ef fect , than from an aware-
ness of a new identi ty which is being forcefully created; from making 
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one's mark upon the world. 
Criminal coercion is to be distinguished from po l i t i ca l coercion. 
Criminal act iv i ty is unconcerned with the structure of the public order 
and the character of the society. I t is not interested in bringing about 
reforms or a revolution, and does not address i t se l f to the problem of 
creating a new identi ty or participating in po l i t ica l l i f e . Criminals 
are less than reformers or revolutionaries - which is why i t is a common 
tact ic to attempt to denigrate revolutionary forces as mere outlaws or 
bandit hordes. Criminals are individuals concerned with private gain. 
The coercion which is employed by a criminal is u t i l ized to acquire 
material possession, and i t is motivated by a vision of personal a f f l u -
ence or prestige rather than by a vision of a reformed or restructured 
public order. 
Criminal coercion, unlike the coercion motivated by pol i t ica l con-
cerns must be constantly recurring. Like food, the material acquisitions 
which result from crime are consumed and must be replaced. The criminal 
can never look forward to the time when i t w i l l be possible for him to 
satisfy his appetites without recourse to coercion or the threat of i t , 
unless he is able to acquire enough to ret i re from his profession. Pol i -
t i c s , in contrast, is not something which is consumed, and the character 
of a public order is not something which is.used up. Those who employ 
coercion for po l i t ica l purposes can hope for a time when i t w i l l no longer 
be required. I t is merely a temporary expediency or necessity of the 
moment, and looks forward to a future when i t w i l l not be necessary. 
20 
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Armed revolution may be the only way to transform the existing order, 
but once the new society is established, i t w i l l no longer be jus t i f i ed . 
While i t is not po l i t i ca l in i t s intention, crime does have pol i t -
ical implications. First of a l l , although he is antagonistic to the 
state's coercive powers, the criminal is at the same time dependent upon 
the order which the state is able to enforce. The only advantage in 
being a criminal l ies in violat ing the conditions of membership without 
bringing the entire structure of order down in chaos. Where these con-
ditions are universally violated, not only is there no advantage in be-
ing a criminal, i t is debatable whether the notion of crime has any 
meaning. The bankrobber must be confident that the bank he is robbing 
is not counterfeiting money. 
Secondly, those who perpetrate crime wi l l be brought into conf l ict 
with the state, and the capacity of the state to deal effectively with 
such men w i l l have po l i t ica l consequences. When the state is ineffective 
and disorder becomes common, the structure of the society is in decay and 
the future w i l l appear increasingly uncertain. In such circumstances, 
who knows who is l ike ly to be attacked i f they go out after dark or walk 
through a deserted section of a c i ty park? In a situation where the state 
is so ineffective as to hardly have any claim to being a sovereign organ-
izat ion, criminals may well assume a quasi-state role and establish an 
order which is advantageous to them, as the Mafia did fn Sici ly in the 
21 
late 19th century. In this case, criminal act iv i ty becomes not simply 
a challenge to the present structure of public order, but an effective 
alternative to i t , thereby achieving a pol i t ica l significance beyond that 
of normal criminal act iv i ty . 
Other forceful disruptions of public order may, l ike crime, be non-
po l i t i ca l in their intentions but of significance to pol i t ica l act iv i ty 
21 Hobsbawm, ibid., 30-56. 
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nonetheless. A war between r ival street gangs, for example, over 
domination of a te r r i to ry ut i l izes coercion to sett le the dispute. Each 
gang w i l l have goals which can be art iculated, leaders who guide the 
course of action, and strategies which wi l l determine how ef for t should 
be organized. There is,.however, no conscious e f fo r t to bring about a 
new society or to modify the'existing structure •of the' public order. 
Access to pol i t ics is not an issue. Similarly, football enthusiasts, 
brawling with the supporters of an opposing team, may be genuinely 
surprised to f ind themselves being arrested for disturbing the peace. 
So unconcerned were they with the public order that they were not fu l l y 
aware of violating i t s conditions of membership. The non-political 
intentions of such behaviour, however, does not mean that their employ-
ment of coercion does not threaten public order and become a concern of 
the state. Where the state is unable to enforce the conditions of 
membership, the character of the society has been modified, whatever the 
original intentions of the street gang or of the football fans. 
Coercion, then is the use of violent actions to achieve a goal. I t 
is instrumental, a means to the realization of some state in the future., 
and w i l l have a strategy and, at least potential ly, a leader. Depending 
. on the scope and complexity of the goals and the strength of the oppo-
s i t i on , i t w i l l demand organization rather than random and undirected 
actions. I t may be employed by the state to ensure conformity to the 
conditions of acting in public. . Or i t may be used to resist the state 
and to reject the conditions of acting in public as they are defined by 
law. The distr ibut ion of economic goods may be part of the programme 
which coercion attempts to implement, but i ts relationship to pol i t ics 
cannot be resolved into economic arguments nor explained by use of eco-
nomic analogies. The po l i t ica l nature of coercion lies in i ts ef fect, 
intentional or not, on the character of the society and conditions gover-
ning access to and participation in pol i t ica l l i f e . Coercion which is 
119 
non-political in i ts intentions is not without pol i t ical significance, 
affecting the nature and scope of the act iv i t ies of the state and the 
character of the society despite the fact that the goals which are en-
visioned are not concerned with the structure of the public order. 
Because i t is not concerned with argument or reasoning, but with 
the performance of an actidn, coercion stands in contrast to po l i t i cs , 
which involves the exchange of diverse perspectives on the character of 
the public order. The only force which may properly be admitted to 
pol i t ics is the persuasive force of reasoned argument, which seeks to 
convert rather than constrain. Coercion also stands in contrast to the 
operation of po l i t i ca l conventions, which seek to arbitrate between men 
and build some platform of agreement so that coordinated action may be 
in i t ia ted . The po l i t ica l talk which constitutes pol i t ica l ac t i v i t y , 
the deliberations of po l i t ica l inst i tu t ions, and the operation of po l i -
t ica l conventions and procedures are a l l alien to coercion. Yet they 
must depend upon the coercive powers of the state to enforce the con-
ditions of membership in the public order and help ensure i ts continuity. 
Like the relationship between po l i t ica l insti tut ions and pol i t ica l organ-
izations, the relationship between pol i t ical act iv i ty and coercion is an 
uneasy one. This is not to say that the two cannot survive together 
within the same society, but there is a tension between them. The poss-
i b i l i t y is always present that coercion may be employed to make pol i t ica l 
act iv i ty either impossible or irrelevant. 
I f the threat of coercion is used in pol i t ics to intimidate, po l i -
t i ca l l i f e is corrupted. I f i t is actually employed, then pol i t ica l l i f e 
has collapsed ent irely. The occupation of Parliament by the mil i tary 
forces of the state, even i f only to keep order amongst i t s Members, sig-
nals the rapid disintegration of po l i t i ca l l i f e and the decline of the 
po l i t i ca l inst i tut ions. • Where po l i t ica l l i f e has broken down entirely 
and there is no further point in ta lk ing, only action can bring about the 
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vision one has of the public order. This signals the suspension of 
po l i t ica l l i f e as men give up trying to convince and persuade one an-
other and turn to coercion to achieve their goals. 
Paradoxically, the pervasive presence of coercion endangers the 
very structure of the state i t s e l f , making i t impossible to organize 
i t se l f to coordinate action effect ively. One of the themes of Solzhen-
itsyn's The First Circle, for example, is the decay of order during the 
last years of Stal in's rule. No-one, least of a l l Stalin himself, was 
free from the threat of coercion. The coercive powers of the state, and 
the threat of force from quasi-state power groups, became capricious and 
the bureaucracy, paralysed by fear, stumbled from one uncertainty to 
another. Trust and confidence amongst men was destroyed, information 
became unreliable and the ab i l i t y of men to act together, coordinating 
their actions, became more and more impossible. The ever-present threat 
of coercion brought about a state of affairs where the very instruments 
22 
of coercion were uncertain and unreliable. 
Violence, as dist inct from coercion, is not instrumental and is 
to ta l ly inimical to , rather than merely ambivalent wi th, po l i t ica l ac t i -
v i ty . I t is neither concerned with any vision of the future, however 
vague, nor with the means of achieving any goal. I t has neither pro-
gramme nor plan, but is undertaken in and for i t se l f . Because i t has no 
goal or direct ion, violence has no negd of strategies or leaders. The 
course of violence is completely unpredictable because those who par t i -
cipate in i t are going anywhere and nowhere. 
The significance of violence, i t s headiness, l ies in i t s timeless-
ness. The moment is the ever-present which becomes detached from the 
past and the future, surviving in isolation and blott ing out everything 
22 
f^ I^c^" ' / f^" i ^^exander, The First-Circ le. Michael Guybon, 
t rans. , (London: Fontana Books, 1968")" 
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else. Locative references to class, occupation, education, dress or 
accent become irrelevant. Individual ident i ty , derived from the past, 
and individual intent ion, orientated toward the future, are swallowed 
up in the drama of the all-consuming present. Unlike coercion, those 
who participate in violence have in common only their loss of identity 
and not the creation of any new ident i ty. One member of a mob is indis-
tinguishable from any other. Action becomes unreal because i t has no 
consequences in the futurfe. Consequences are irrelevant to the moment 
which does not l ive beyond the immediate present. This disregard for 
future consequences may str ike the observer as madness. 
At the height of the Harlem r iots of 1964, a young 
Negro could be hefird to say, " I f i don't get k i l led 
to-night, I ' l l ; come, back tomorrow.There: is...evi-
dence these outbreaks are suicidal, reflecting the 
ultimate self-negation, sel f-reject ion, and hope-
lessness, 
one commentator has remarked.^ But suicide and hopelessness can only 
occur when men have some vision of the future; where what is to come is 
seen clear ly, even i f i t is at the same time seen as dismal. Where there 
is no future, actions become dream-like. They become, in a very l i t e ra l 
sense, fantastic. 
The objects of violence are symbolic rather than strategic. The 
orgies on the altars of Parisian churches during the French Revolution, 
the occupation of the Tui l ler ies in 1848, the ravaging of the Winter 
Palace in 1917 are a l l examples of the explosion of violence directed 
against objects which held l i t t l e or no value in terms of tact ics, strate-
gies or goals. Sacrilegious acts in Paris in 1789 were not a part of any 
strategy for the achievement of a new order. Rather i t was the symbolic 
potency of sacrilege i t s e l f , the violat ion of hitherto sacred precincts, 
23 
Clark, Kenneth B., 'The Wonder is That There Have Been so Few 
Riots ' , in Endelman, , 288. 
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•For an account of similar reactions in warfare, cf. Gray, J. 
Glenn, The Warriors, (New York; Harper Torchbacks, 1959). 
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which gave f i re to the occasion. There was no object beyond the immed-
iacy of the moment; no goal beyond desecration i t se l f . 
Violence attacks objects which are symbolic of a world which has 
always been al ien; a world which has always excluded. Those who engage 
in violence do not destroy a world which is their home, but a world of 
which they have never been a part. The only time they enter that world 
and come into possession of i t is to wreak havoc upon i t and not to pre-
serve i t or change i t into something better. They are not concern'ed 
with safeguarding the treasures of the society so that future genera-
tions may enjoy them, or with making those treasures accessible to a l l , 
but with smashing them. There is nothing they seek beyond that imme-
diate destruction. 
The attack of violence on symbolic objects is the destruction of 
l imi ts . I t is the transgression of what has always been forbidden or 
taboo; or restrict ions which have been imposed from outside or above, 
making the world a place of alien l imi ts . The common people enter the 
private apartments of the king or the mysterious precincts of the priest. 
Once this symbolic barrier is broken, a l l barriers are broken and there 
is nothing which is disallowed. The stone which shatters the f i r s t pane 
of glass, shatters a l l restraint at the same time.^^ 'The screaming of 
Kerr, Wilfred B., The Reign of Terror 1793-94, (Toronto: The 
University of Toronto Press, 1927), 261. 
This leads to the speculation of whether i t is simply the con-
centration of population that makes violence almost exclusively 
an urban phenomenon. The ci ty places the individual in an 
environment which is both impersonal and al ien; an environment 
where symbolic targets. Such as palaces, cathedrals, ministries, 
gaols, are both more readily to hand and more prominent. A pal-
ace is not merely the residence of the king. I t is also symbolic 
of the majesty of his estate. Destruction of the palace symbo-
lizes the destruction of the oppressive regime; of the alien and 
remote order which has been imposed upon the people. 
27 
This aspect of crowd psychology is discussed in Canetti, Elias, 
Crowds and Power, Carol Stewart, trans., (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1963), esp. 17 f f . 
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sirens, the sound of pistol shots, and the cracking of glass created in 
many a need for destruction. Rubbish, flower pots, or any object at hand 
28 
was tossed from windows.' The sense of mastery and control over the 
world which is an aspect of the use of coercion becomes in violence the 
sense of freedom resulting from the destruction of a l l barriers; an 
i l lus ion of the ab i l i t y to obliterate a l l order in the world. However, i t 
is without the intention of creating a new order to take the place of the 
old. The sense of mastery goes no further than the headiness that comes 
of destruction. This i l lus ion of control over the world can be so comp-
lete and so powerful that even those who are sent to reimpose order be-
2Q 
come engulfed in the chaos of the moment and lose al l sense of l imi ts . 
But this sense of complete domination is i l lusory because i t cannot 
be sustained, and i t is not going anywhere. Because there is no direc-
tion to violence, there is nothing to go on to; nothing to accomplish; no 
vision of an order to be created once the present order has been over-
turned. The moment consumes i t se l f and vanishes. An imperfect world, 
where identi t ies are derived from the past and consequences l i e in the 
future, reasserts i t se l f . When the last treasure has been smashed, the 
mob looks about i t se l f in a daze, uncertain as to what to do with them-
selves next. A contemporary English travel ler described Paris in 1848 
' . . . awakening as from a dream . . . ' following three days of r iot ing and 
violence, and the transformation of the euphoria of destruction into de-
pression, suspicion and alarm as men returned to a sense of the future and 
attempted to gauge the consequences of their actions. 
o o 
The Report of Mayor LaGuardi>'s Com^  on the Harlem. Riot ' 
of March 19, 1935, (New" York: The Arno Press and The New York 
Times, 1935), 12-13. 
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There are reports, for example, of American police losing con-
t ro l during the 1967 Detroit r iots and shooting, indiscriminately 
at buildings, looters and each other. Hersey, John, The Algiers 
Motel Incident, (London: Hamish Hamilton,.1968), 68^75, 112-17, 
159-61 , 163-64. . - ' 
30 
Simpson, J. Palgrave, Pictures from Revolutionary Paris, 2 vols 
(London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1849), vol. 1, 104 f f . " 
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The symbolic targets of violence and i ts timelessness make i t dra-
matic. I t is revealing that in Reflections on Violence, Sore! constantly 
refers to the 'drama' of the general str ike where speech is inadequate 
and only action is appropriate. I t is this dramatic quality which sets 
violence apart from everyday l i f e , with i ts significance lying not in 
what i t portends for the future, but in i t s complete isolation from both 
past and future and i ts separation from the everyday world. The complete 
submersion in the intensity of the present seems to be the basis for much 
of Sorel's enthusiasm for violence. 
I f the relationship between pol i t ics and coercion is an uneasy and 
ambivalent one, the relationship between pol i t ics and violence is ant i -
thet ica l . The use of coercion can destroy pol i t ical l i f e and public 
order, but i t can also be used to preserve public order and maintain i t 
over time. While i t is a potential ly dangerous al ly of pol i t ica l l i f e , 
i t is an a l ly nonetheless. "Violence, however, is. not concerned with the 
preservation of public order or the continuity between past and present. 
Nor is i t concerned with the realization of some plan in the future. I t 
is concerned only with the obl i terat ion of a l l l imi ts and seeks the 
impossible state of complete immersion in the present. I t is neither 
reasoning nor reasonable, and has as perhaps i ts only merit the fact that 
i t is doomed to be impermanent. 
' u ^ ^ ° ' ' ^ ® ' Reflections on Violence, T. E. Hulme and 
100 ^ r^^^- JlLondon: CoTlier-Macmi 1 Ian, L td . , 1970) . 
123, 134, 144, 148, 2 1 1 , inter alia. ' 
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Chapter 7 • 
POLITICAL TALK 
The modifications of public order which are authorized by pol i t ical 
inst i tut ions and enforced by the state are l ikely to be the result of pro-
longed debate. Seldom w i l l there by any changes on which al l members of a 
po l i t i ca l assembly w i l l unanimously agree, and the eventual judgement of 
the inst i tu t ion w i l l be preceded by a great deal of ta lk , both inside and 
outside the assembly. Like other kinds of ta lk , this pol i t ica l talk is 
the expression of a view of the world. I t i s , however, dist inct from other 
kinds of talk in that i t is public ta lk . I t is not a private conversation 
between two people, but is accessible to a l l cit izens. I t is open to the 
scrutiny of a public whose participation may extend no further than direc-
ting i t s attention to the speaker, but whose participation even to this 
l imited extent is v i t a l . To this public the speaker offers a perspective 
on the present. He attempts to highlight some aspect of the present charac-
ter of the public order, suggesting in what way that aspect is signif icant, 
in the hope that those around him may be persuaded that a particular action 
is desirable. In po l i t ica l ta lk , then, a speaker offers a perspective and 
his public provides the occasion for the expression of his views. 
A speaker must be sensitive to the occasion i f he is to retain the 
attention of his audience. Any art iculat ion of a perspective must, f i r s t 
of a l l , be within the commonly understood framework. At the most basic 
level this means nothing more than the speaker must speak the same language 
as his audience. More part icular ly, when dealing with pol i t ica l issues, he 
must act within the prevailing notions of public order. He may seek to 
al ter these notions, but he cannot ignore the fact that i t is never possible 
to begin any discussion from scratch. In any,state and pol i t ica l party 
there are some statements which are generally accepted as being beyond ques-
t ion, and of which no explanations are to be demanded.'^  These princ-
iples ^el" the boundaries within which pol i t ica l talk takes place. I f any 
remark is to receive attention, i t must manifest an appreciation of the 
established context within which i t is delivered. I t is the audience, 
not the speaker, which provides this context and which determines what is 
meaningful and relevant on a given occasio^n. 
I t is not an adverse cr i t ic ism of an ar t is t to say 
that he was too far ahead of his time to be apprec-
iated by his contemporaries. Statesmen on the other 
hand are doomed to fa i lure unless at least a consi-
derable number of their contemporaries appreciate 
what they are trying to do. Prophets and visionaries 
may have great influence for good or bad, but the 
difference between them and statesmen needs no 
emphasis.2 
This common framework of order is established and maintained over 
time and provides the general occasion for a l l pol i t ica l talk. In addi-
t ion , when addressing a particular audience, a man who wishes to be heard 
w i l l t a i l o r his remarks to that specific occasion at one point in time. 
I t is for this reason that the Chancellor of the Exchequer w i l l defend 
the Government's economic policy at a meeting of the Confederation of 
Br i t ish Industries while confining himself to platitudes and general state-
ments of goodwill i f he is called upon to open a charity bazaar. Judging 
the specific occasion - that i s , deciding what is appropriate to the . 
moment - is a sk i l l no pol i t ic ian can be without. Poor judgement Will 
make a man's remarks irrelevant and obtuse, no matter how profound they 
may be, and i f he is insensitive to his mistake, public attention w i l l be 
withdrawn. He w i l l f ind himself a man without an audience, speaking in a 
vacuum. 
The appropriate language is never s ta t ic , however, and to speak appro-
^ Weldon, T. D.', 'Po l i t ica l Principles' , in Peter Laslett, ed.. 
Philosophy, Poli t ics and Society, 1st series, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1963). 30. 
2 Weldon, T. D., The Vocabulary of Pol i t ics , (London: Penguin 
Books, 1953), 169. . 
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priately does not preclude the possibi l i ty of modification and innovation. 
In giving a speech, a pol i t ic ian may try to alter the prevailing notions 
of what is appropriate to the established framework of discourse. His 
purpose may be to educate his audience, to point to new elements which 
demand changes, or to suggest alternatives to what is currently accepted. . 
And, of course, changes do occur as pol i t ica l act iv i ty is carried on over 
time. In Mein Kampf, for example, Hi t ler spoke of the need to alert the 
German nation to the dangers of an international Jewish conspiracy which 
had not previously been ident i f ied. His success added a new dimension 
to German pol i t ics and altered the established framework of discourse. 
However, had he not at the same time spoken to the specific condition of 
a large number of men in Weimar Germany, his pol i t ica l ta lk , however true 
or false, would have been irrelevant. Like any number of radical fringe 
groups who have misjudged the occasion of their ta lk , his would have been 
an unheeded voice. In short, judging the occasion in pol i t ica l talk is a 
matter of judging one's audience and using a general framework of under-
standing established over time to speak to their specific condition in 
time. 
What does i t mean, then, to have a perspective on a particular 
occasion? The perspectives offered by pol i t ica l talk are largely concerned 
with the problem of common ident i ty. They centre around the question 'What 
sort of people are we?' A man who offers a perspective in pol i t ica l issues 
attempts to establish the val id i ty of his understanding of what sort of 
people 'we' are. He is preoccupied with the character of the public order 
within which we l i ve . The recent debate over the methods of interrogation 
employed by the Army in Ulster centered precisely on this question. Few 
attempted to discuss how ef f ic ient the methods used may be. The issue of 
primary concern was whether or not these sorts of methods could be recon-
3 
38*}?? ^ ' ^ ° ^ ^ ' '^^"'P^' (iondon: Hurst & Blackett. L td . , 1942) 
ciled with the identity we understand ourselves to have.^ This question 
of identi ty i s , I think, what Burke alluded to when he said 'The vir tue, 
s p i r i t , and essence of the House of Commons consists in i ts being the 
express image of the feelings of the nation.' 
In offering a perspective on our identity - on what sort of people 
we are and the character of our public order - po l i t ica l talk w i l l look 
to the past and to the events which can be claimed to establish what sort 
of people we have been. A pol i t ic ian w i l l ci te times of great c r i s is , , 
moments of collective triumph, the pronouncements of revered leaders or 
the actions of national heroes to j us t i f y his perspectives of what kind 
of people we are. The Dunkirk sp i r i t w i l l be invoked to show that we 
are the kind of people who persevere in times of d i f f i cu l t y . Or the 
Spi r i t of '76 w i l l be recalled to remind us of our past and that then, as 
now, we were a freedom-loving people. Frequently the specific occasion 
of a national holiday, commemorating past events such as the 4th of Ouly 
in the United States or the 7th of November in the Soviet Union, w i l l be 
used to offer a perspective of what sort of people we are by recalling 
what sort of people we have been. I t i s , on such holidays, the relative 
continuity of the public order which is celebrated as valuable and praise-
worthy. 
The attempt to aff irm an identi ty does not consist of the mere reci-
tat ion of past events, however, but in- the interpretation of their signi-
ficance as wel l . We are not simply told that the Basti l le f e l l on the 
14th of July, 1789, or that the People's Republic of China was established 
4 
The controversy is taken up by Lord Gardiner in his minority report 
in 'Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to con-
sider authorized procedures for the interrogation of persons sus-
pected of terror ism', Cmnd. 4901, (London: HMSO, 1972), 19-22. 
Parliamentary debate also focused on th is . Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), 5th series, vol ; 826 (Session 1971-72), 215-26, 431-98. 
^ Burke, Edmund, 'Thoughts on the Present Discontent', Selected Works, 
3 vols . , E. J . Payne, ed., (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922), vol. 
1, 9. 
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on the 1st of October, 1949, but that these events destroyed a feudal 
order or demonstrated the indomitable power of the masses. What po l i t -
ical talk offers is not a chronicle of the past, but an interpretation 
of the significance of the past for the present. Reference to such past 
events may be merely the opportunity for bombastic rhetoric, reassuring 
us that our past is as glorious and admirable as we have always thought 
i t to be, or i t may constitute a complete re-interpretation of the past, 
offer ing a new answer to the question of who we are. .To Hi t ler , speaking 
to post-World War I Germany, we are not a defeated and humiliated nation, 
but a betrayed and unjustly vanquished one.^ He f e l t himself under an 
obligation to reveal the truth and to redefine the German sense of iden-
t i t y . T h i s was not merely an academic exercise, but had practical impli-
cations. Only i f Germany understood the true causes of i t s defeat in 1918 
could the nation hope to regain i t s r ightful place amongst the European 
powers. 
Pol i t ical ta lk , then, is pract ical , preoccupied with our present 
situation and future actions, however much i t may refer to the past. I t 
is not simply concerned with who we are, but also offers a perspective on 
the question of what sort of people we want to become. I t is how the pub-
l i c order can and should be in the future which is the primary focus of 
po l i t i ca l talk. Here the pol i t ic ian who is seeking support for a pro-
gramme must f ind room for dissatisfaction. I f there were no discrepancy 
between who we are now and who we wish to become, there would be no need 
for pol i t ic ians or their programmes for action. I t is the need to main-
tain what we value in the face of the threat of change, or the desire to 
achieve our aspirations - that i s , to preserve or develop an identity -
which brings pol i t ica l l i f e into existence. This common identity is never 
6 
H i t le r , ibid., 96 f f ., i n t e r a l i a . 
^ ibid., 38 f f . 
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fu l ly or f ina l ly determined. Pol i t ical talk is thus a continuous a f fa i r , 
as alternative perspectives on who we are and who we would l ike to become 
are offered and debated in public. In pointing to a discrepancy between 
who we are now and who we would l ike to become, pol i t ica l talk attempts 
to reveal an inadequacy or elucidate a predicament, and offers a plan to 
bring our present circumstances in l ine with our aspirations. Poli t ical 
pamphlets, offering various perspectives on the occasion of a national 
election, w i l l speak of 'A Better Tomorrow', claiming that at best 
we have been marking time, at worst slipping back. I t could and should 
be so much bet ter ' . Or, that i t is time " . . . to move forward towards a 
system of production which w i l l abolish riches and poverty, exploitation 
g 
and unemployment'. 
Drawing on the past, aware of the present, with an eye to the future, 
po l i t ica l talk is concerned with taking action in time. I t draws on the 
past because i t must be sensitive to the context in which i t is delivered 
i f i t is to be heard. This means that there must be an appreciation of 
the appropriate idiom as i t has come to be established through time, and 
an awareness of the character of the public order which has evolved from 
the past. I t is aware of the present because the perspective that i t 
offers draws our attention to the situation at hand, insisting that we 
confront this situation here and now. I t has an eye to the future be-
cause i t is concerned with bringing about changes in the world and estab-
lishing a more or less dif ferent kind of public order .in the future. I t 
is preoccupied with taking action in time because the plan of action i t 
proposes must be timely, addressing i t se l f to the immediate moment. There 
is no point in suggesting what might have been done yesterday had we but 
thought about i t , or what may conceivably be done in the future were we 
8 
]m^^T^ Tomorrow'. Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 
9 'The Two Classes', Labour Research Department, 1935, 21. 
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to consider i t . Pol i t ical talk is pract ical, and the proposals i t makes 
are plans for action in the present. What might have been and what may 
yet be are of no consequence unless i t can be shown that there is some 
practical implication to such speculations, affecting our intended ac-
tions in one way or another. 
Engaging in po l i t ica l talk is not the same as exchanging information. 
A pol i t ic ian who sees po l i t ica l talk simply as informing the public would, 
in t ru th , l ike to put an end to po l i t ica l talk altogether. Such a man is 
not interested in engaging in debate over conflicting perspectives, but 
in establishing the facts of the matter. The facts of the matter, unlike 
the character of the public order or the desirabil i ty of certain changes 
within that order, are determinable. Any disagreement over matters of 
fact can (at least in theory) be settled once and for a l l . The man who 
sees po l i t ica l talk in this l ight considers i t a waste of time, as Hit ler 
d id, to enter into a potentially l imit less debate with others before a 
public. Rather, he prefers to spend his time educating the people, so 
that the issues of identity and plans for the future may be f ina l ly deter-
mined. In this view,, communication is not between cit izens, but flows in 
one direction from the leader to the people.^'^ Hi t ler 's view of public 
l i f e precluded the kind of discussion and exchange of.perspectives which 
has t radi t ional ly been held to be fundamental to p o l i t i c s . T h e exchange 
of perspectives offered by po l i t ica l talk may be informative, but i t is 
never simply informative and can make no claim to having settled issues 
Hi t le r , ibid., 54, 57, 139, 194 f f ., i n t e r a l i a . The work is 
exp l ic i t in stating Hi t ler 's conviction that he must inform the 
German people of their true.predicament, rather than engage in 
debate with them as to the character of their society. 
Compare, for example, Mein Kampf with Aristot le's Pol i t ics, 
especially 12816b in Book I I I , or with Mi l l 's essay On LfFerty. 
Ar is to t le , Pol i t ics , Ernest Barker, trans., (Oxford: The Clar-
endon Press, 1968); M i l l , John Stuart, Uti1itarianism, Liberty, 
Representative Government, (London: Everyman Library, 1964). 
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once and for a l l . Time and the changes time brings can alone put an end 
to po l i t ica l talk on a specific problem by making i t irrelevant to the 
present. I t was not logic or superior information which put an end to 
the debate on whether or n o t ' i t was appropriate that the monarch, Edward 
V I I I , marry a divorcee, Mrs. Simpson. I t was not a matter of fact which 
could be determined one way or the other. Instead, time simply made any 
further discussion wasteful, and the issue became a matter of historical 
curiosity but not one of practical importance. 
I f debates about how to achieve a particular kind of public order or 
how to maintain the nature of the common identity of a people are not 
just exchanges of information, neither are they simply disputes over con-
f l i c t i n g interests. Pol i t ical act iv i ty is not simply the means by which 
competing interests struggle for control of the power of the state in 
order to achieve their own ends. When we say that someone has an inte-
rest in something, we mean more than that his attention has been drawn 
to a particular state of a f fa i rs . We mean to indicate that he has expec-
tations of enjoying some kind of benefit from the successful management 
of various ac t i v i t i es ; that he can look forward to a time in the future 
when, i f events go his way, a certain goal wi l l be achieved and he w i l l 
receive some benefit. We would not be surprised to learn that the result 
of this state of af fa i rs w i l l benefit him because i t w i l l place him in an 
advantageous position vis-a-vis those about him. In any case, although 
some of the side effects may benefit others, i t is his advantage, and not 
the i rs , which is his concern. This is why the pursuit of his own inte-
rests may bring him into conf l ic t with other seeking their interests; why 
competition between r ival interests may result. 
Debate about the common identi ty of a people can be distinguished 
from disputes over interests in a l l these ways. Identity is not something 
in which an individual may be said to have an interest, although i t is , 
l i ke ly to be something in which he is interested. An identity is not a 
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goal to be achieved in the future, but is a continuing endeavour, f i n -
ished at no single point in time except death ( in the case of the indi-
vidual) or extinction ( in the case of a society). We do not look for-
ward to receiving some advantage from the completion of an identity in 
the future, but are always in the position of reformulating and modi-
fying our identity as i t has emerged from the past. This identity is 
manifested in a l l our actions as i t evolves through a l l our actions. 
The continuing establishment of our identity does not preclude other 
men. Indeed, as we have seen, i t is dependent upon being fashioned 
within the circle of our fellows. Unlike private advantage over others, 
my identi ty does not exclude yours, nor can I hold i t apart from you 
and keep i t to it\yself. Other men do not necessarily threaten our iden-
t i t y i f they are members along with us in a particular public order, nor 
can we be said to be in competition for the same thing. Another man 
cannot compete for my identi ty any more than I can compete for his. 
Pol i t ical ac t iv i ty may in part revolve around thfe problem of com-
peting interests and the struggle for power to secure those interests. 
However, i t is not entirely a matter of such struggle and competition, 
nor can i t be resolved into that pattern. Some issues are clearly out-
side the sphere of competing interests and are not a matter of a r ivalry 
between dist inct benefits for separate individuals. Laws concerning 
homosexual relations between consenting adults or pornography may excite 
the interest of the public, but they cannot be said to be issues in which 
men have an interest. They are rather a matter of the character of the 
public order and the collective identity of a particular society. Are 
we the kind of people who feel that certain sexual conduct is a private 
rather than a public af fair? Do we feel that the unhindered sale of a l l 
printed matter is consistent with our understanding of the kind of iden-
t i t y we have? These are not questions of allocating resources or d i s t r i -
buting goods and services. Although men may disagree as to what is proper 
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with regard to a given question, i t is not simply a matter of strugg-
l ing to appropriate the larger share to oneself. A collective ident i ty, 
the character of the public order, is not something which can be appro-
priated so that the more I take for myself the less there is for you. 
I t is something we have in common and only exists to the extent that i t 
is shared. 
Other, more blatantly interest-oriented disputes also resist explan-
ation purely in terms of competing interests rather than in terms of the 
character of the public order. The limitations established by law on 
the claims for wages which can be demanded by trades unions and allowed 
by management, for example, are in part a matter of competing interests. 
The various parties concerned in the dispute have an interest in the out-
come of the controversy and may look forward to some advantage i f events 
go in their favour. They are also, however, disputes about the character 
of the public order. Is resistance to a policy which has become law a 
violat ion of the conditions of membership in the public order as we have 
come to understand them? Ought trades unions to be something more than 
merely spokesmen for the interests of their members, and should they, 
along with the government and management, assume some responsibility for 
the overall economic state of the country? Do the conditions of member-
ship in a trades union violate the conditions of membership in a c i v i l 
society? Should the demands of the workers take precedence over the 
demands of management? Whichever way a dispute over competing interests 
is settled in po l i t ica l l i f e , more than that particular dispute is re-
solved. There is at the same time something which is established about 
the character of the public order and the collective identity of the 
people. The rights and duties which members enjoy in relation to each 
other are also affected. This is not f ina l ly resolved with the set t le-
ment of the particular dispute at hand, nor is i t something which can be 
concluded once and for a l l . The identi ty of a people is modified and 
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informed by the clash of r ival interests, but i t is not defined by 
them nor is i t reducible to them. I t w i l l be modified by the manner 
in which the dispute is settled and informed by the actions of those who 
lose as well as those who win any particular clash of interests. The 
member who takes his rights and duties seriously does not cease to attend 
the debate when his personal interests are not direct ly involved. He 
recognizes that however an issue is decided, the pol i t ica l talk which 
preceded that decision is of some importance to him. I t w i l l arouse his 
interest, whether or not i t is an issue in which he has any interest. 
Pol i t ica l talk thus both preserves and modifies public order. As 
long as there is po l i t ica l t a l k j there is the communality which binds 
men together and makes performance before a public possible. As long as 
people continue to l i s ten , extending trust and credence to those who 
speak and investing significance in what occurs in po l i t i cs , the con-
t inu i ty of the order is maintained. At the same time, pol i t ica l talk 
is specif ical ly concerned with recommending change; with offering a 
perspective on who we would l ike to be, and the drawing of attention to 
the gap between the way we are now and the way we would l ike to be. 
The offering of such a perspective i s , in effect, the call for a modi-
f icat ion in the public order. 
Obviously the larger the gap between who we are and who we would 
l ike to become, the more radical wi l l .be the recommendations of the 
speaker. A revolutionary may offer a view of the past as an unending 
history of misery and exploitation, his programme amounting to the re-
jection of the common identi ty which has been established arid the promise 
of a new ident i ty. 'The proletariat have nothing to lose but their 
chains. They have a world to win. Working men of a l l countries, unite. '^^ 
12 
plli) ^V^^V^^ Engles, The Manifesto of the Communist 
Party. (Peking: Foreign Languagesl^^riisTlWa), /b. '^"^""^^^ 
But i f he is offering a perspective which he hopes w i l l be adopted by 
his audience and recommendations which he hopes w i l l be acted upon, a 
speaker cannot afford to reject completely a l l aspects of their ident-
i t y . Despite the discrepancy between who we are now and who we would 
l ike to become, i t is l i ke ly that great care w i l l be taken to assert 
that , for example, 'Despite a l l the fai lure and frustration of recent 
13 
years, Br i tain is s t i l l the. best country in the world in which to l ive. 
Or, despite their identity as exploited masses, the proletariat none-
theless have vast potential. Heretofore their history has been a dismal 
one, but even to the most revolutionary perspective, the proletariat are 
not i rretr ievably los t , but merely as yet unredeemed.^ ** 
The drawing of public attention to a discrepancy between who we are 
now and who we would l ike to become is an imaginative exercise. I t re-
quires the ab i l i t y to create a conceptual distance between our present 
situation and our vision of a possible future. 
In order to make room for one's own action, some-
thing that was there before must be removed or 
destroyed, and things as they were before are 
changed. Such change would be impossible i f we 
could not mentally remove ourselves from where we 
are physically located and imagine that things 
might be di f ferent from what they are. '^ 
In offering a perspective, po l i t ica l talk asks that we conceptually take 
a step back from the immediacy of present experience to view the past, 
taking stock, as i t were, of our identity and our present situation in 
order to envision a future we would l ike to create. 
Such an imaginative exercise considers actions and changes, but in 
i t s e l f i t does not embark upon them. I t takes time and occurs in a world 
'A Better Tomorrow', l i^l^, 6. 
""^  Mao Tse-Tung, Quotations f^'O'^ ^ '^^ '^l? '^^ .^'} Tse-Tung, (Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, lybb), ha f f . , i n t e r a l i a . 
Arendt, Hannah, 'On Lying in Po l i t i cs ' . The New York Review 
of Books. 18th November, 1971, 30. 
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where the relevant issues are assumed to be unchanging long enough to 
allow us to talk without immediately being compelled to act. To insist 
upon a discussion of an issue is to insist on the temporary suspension 
of action. In times of rapidly changing circumstances, pol i t ica l talk 
is thus a luxury which may well not be real ist ic i f action is to be 
taken in time to control the course of events or to prevent a disastrous 
outcome. I f change is too rapid, i t w i l l not be possible to create a 
distance between present experience and our view of the past, and our 
vision of the future. In such a situation a l l attempts to engage in 
po l i t ica l talk w i l l be irrelevant as those who attempt to deliberate and 
discuss w i l l simply be l e f t behind by events. 
I t has been claimed that the language used in pol i t ica l talk is a 
corrupt language. Confronted by situations that can indeed be de-
fended, but only by arguments that are too brutal for most people to 
face, and which do not square with the professed aims of pol i t ica l 
par t ies ' , pol i t icians employ a language which " . . . has to consist largely 
of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness'.^^ What is 
meant by such accusations is not that language has been perverted from 
the purity of i t s absolute meaning or essence. Rather what is suggested 
is that pol i t ica l talk can often be used to obscure the true perspective 
of a speaker or to deflect crit icisms of his actions by offering palat-
able explanations for them. I t certainly is not surprising that the-
meanings of words are altered by their use and by circumstances. As the 
established framework of discourse shif ts over time, men participating 
in the debate are able to discern the changes and are not necessarily 
deceived. Caesar Augustus issued coins bearing the inscription 'i?es 
pubiica r e s t i t u t a ' , but the fact that peace, not the republic, had been 
""^  Orwell, George, 'Pol i t ics and the English Language', Selected 
Essays, (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1961 ) , 363. ' 
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restored did not escape the notice of many.^'' 
Changes in the use and meaning of words can be called corruptions 
only when the purpose is deliberately to mislead. Compelled to take a 
position on a l l relevant issues, a pol i t ic ian is l ike ly to be vague or 
ambiguous i f he is concerned with generating as much popular support 
as possible for a perspective which he fears is not generally accepted. 
This tact ic may be successful for a limited time. The d i f f i cu l t y comes, 
however, when the disparity between what is said and what is actually 
happening becomes too great, and the gap between the two is ultimately 
revealed. An individual w i l l be discredited when this happens, and w i l l 
come to have a reputation of being unreliable, a l i a r or hypocrite. 
A public order can generally tolerate some individuals of this kind. 
While we a l l may acknowledge that not a l l men te l l the truth a l l the 
time, we are content to conduct our lives on the assumption that on the 
whole most men are rel iable in what they say. A grave danger arises, 
however, when suspicion and disbelief begin to replace trust and credence; 
when a l l po l i t ica l talk comes to be widely held to be nothing more than a 
sham. The whole val id i ty of po l i t ica l act iv i ty in the society, mani-
fested primarily in po l i t ica l ta lk , is called into question when this 
happens. I f a l l po l i t ica l talk is seen as irrelevant to the true chara-
cter of the public order and the problems which i t confronts, then atten-
tion is withdrawn. And when there is,no longer any purpose in talking 
or l istening, i t can only be time to act. The infamous 'c red ib i l i ty gap' 
which developed during the Johnson administration in the United States, 
and which has under Nixon reached yawning proportions, demonstrates the 
cr is is of confidence which can shake a pol i t ical order when a l l po l i t ica l 
talk on the part of a leading office-holder is automatically treated with 
Syme, Ronald, The Roman Revolution, (Oxford: The Oxford Univ-
ersity Press, 1966), 323 f t " ^Hso, Earl, Donald, The Moral 
and Pol i t ical Tradition of Rome, (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1970), 62-65. 
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suspicion and c y n i c i s m . C l i c h e s and cloudy vagueness may be useful 
in papering-over disagreements which do not seem to offer any easy, 
immediate or commonly accepted solution. However, i f po l i t ica l talk is 
to remain relevant to the occasion and to maintain the v i t a l i t y of pub-
l i c order, i t cannot constantly employ empty language. A total corrup-
tion of po l i t i ca l language indicates a total corruption of the order 
which i t manifests. 
Although pol i t ica l talk offers a perspective on problems rather 
than in i t i a t i ng action to deal with them, another danger arises i f the 
gap between po l i t i ca l talk and what is actually going on in the world 
becomes too great. Where deceit and evasion are deliberately practised . 
on a wide scale, po l i t i ca l act iv i ty is l ikely not only to be the object 
of cynicism and contempt, but i t is also l ikely to become so far removed 
from the demands of real i ty as to be incapable of acting effectively to 
direct and inform the public order, much less to preserve i t . The del-
iberations within po l i t ica l inst i tut ions and the judgements of those in 
authority w i l l be irrelevant i f .the debate which preceded any decision 
obscured rather than c la r i f ied the issues at stake. The systematic 
fabrication of misinformation in Vietnam and throughout South-east Asia 
during the course of the Second Indo-China War resulted in progressively 
more disastrous policies being undertaken by the United States. So bent 
on putting an acceptable public face on the unpalatable real i ty of the 
war, those responsible f e l l prey to their own false optimism. American 
policy makers found themselves ad r i f t in a never-never land of rhetoric 
which bore no relation whatsoever to the situations they had to deal with. 
Their deceit came back to haunt them as they were unable to discover what 
was real ly going on, and to act effect ively on the basis of that knowledge. 
18 
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As the war progressed, debate within the pol i t ica l inst i tut ions and 
19 the state seemed more and more remote from the real i ty of the problem. 
The lesson here is that po l i t ica l talk alone is not enough to 
maintain public order. The decisions which are reached in pol i t ics 
must be relevant to the demands of the present and be successful in 
dealing with the exigencies which threaten the relative continuity and 
s tab i l i t y of the public order. Pol i t ical talk may keep the vocabulary 
current, but i t is not enough on i t s own to ensure that public order 
and pol i t ica l l i f e do not collapse under the onslaught of unforeseen 
events. I t is a way of c lar i fy ing the issues that confront us and 
weighing the alternatives open to us, but can be no substitute for 
careful deliberations and judicious decisions. 
The significance of po l i t ica l talk lies in the fact that i t mani-
fests and reinforces public order at the same time that i t advocates 
change within that order. I t manifests public order in that pol i t ica l 
ac t iv i ty consists almost entirely of talk*, almost entirely of the ex-
change of perspectives concerning our common ident i ty. I t reinforces 
public order in that the continued engagement in talk maintains the 
currency of the common framework of understanding, ensuring that both 
the occasion and a perspective remain possibi l i t ies. I t advocates 
change within an order in that i t specif ically addresses i t se l f to the 
achievement of a dif ferent kind of public order in the future. Yet as 
long as talk is possible, the continuity of the public order is never 
entirely lost , despite the modifications which i t advocates. 
The disintegration of a common framework of understanding removes 
the possibi l i ty of the occasion for talk because i t eliminates the . 
19 
This is the main point made in a number of commentaries devoted 
to the question of what the Americans thought they were doing 
in Vietnam. Halberstram, David, The Best and the Brightest, 
(New York: Random House, 1972). ^Iso EVIsberg, Daniel, Papers 
on the War, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), especially 
'The Quagmire r^th and the Stalemate Machine'. 
audience whose communality provides the occasion. Rapidly changing 
situations make impossible the time necessary for the creation of a 
conceptual distance between the immediacy of the present and the vision 
of the future offered by po l i t ica l ta lk . The corruption of language, 
through deceit and evasion, undermines both the occasion, by corroding 
the common framework of understanding, and the perspective, by cutting 
talk of f from the real i t ies with which the public order must come to 
grips. When any of these things happen, pol i t ica l talk becomes imposs-
ible to realize, which means that pol i t ica l act iv i ty is impossible to 
achieve. Events move too quickly or are simply not understood or re-
cognized, and action, in.the form of revolution or ci.vil war, is then 
the only response to a situation where the public order has decayed 
and i t s idiom has become irrelevant. 
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Chapter 8 
POLITICAL CONVENTIONS 
Although po l i t i ca l act iv i ty is largely a matter of po l i t ica l ta lk , 
offering a perspective of the character of the public order and ways in 
which changes may be brought about within the framework of that order, 
i t cannot be confined simply to ta lk. Talk is not enough because at 
some point i t becomes necessary to act, and the reason for this is time. 
I f time were irrelevant to human a f fa i rs , action would be unnece-
ssary, and speech alone would constitute performance in public. With no 
reason to act now instead of la ter , participants would be free to debate 
endlessly the possibi l i t ies for action. The fund of information and d i -
verse opinions concerning any particular issue could be forever expanded, 
for there would be no reason to reach any decision and a l l things would 
be relevant. As long as the public order was extant - as long as the 
participants shared a commonly accepted and recognized framework of 
language - the discussion need never lag. 
There are some public orders which very nearly are of this character. 
In philosophy, for example, in i t i a t ing action to bring about change in the 
world is not relevant, and there are no f inal decisions reached on any 
question. Although he may welcome agreement, no philosopher presses his 
colleagues to hurry up and resolve a philosophic dispute so that a pro-
gramme may be undertaken as a result . Time, while a problem of philoso-
phic interest, is a practical consideration only insofar as.the philoso-
pher must be timely in his remarks i f he wishes to contribute to the de-
bate on matters of contemporary interest. That debate, however, is never 
terminated because the time has come to act. New generations of philoso-
phers can take up the exchange of views, issues can always be revived, and 
the dialogue is not compelled to resolve i t se l f one way or another. I t is 
- 143 
possible to pick up a journal of philosophy and find the discussion 
ranging over the same terrain that i t did 2500 years ago. I t is this 
timelessness o#^  philosophical argument which makes i t s t i l l , relevant to 
take up a point raised in a Platonic dialogue. To the despair of new 
in i t ia tes in the discipl ine, philosophic speculation cannot be seen 
as progressing temporally toward greater and greater certitude, 
approaching the truth asymptotically so that actions may be based upon 
a true understanding of the world. 
In po l i t i cs , however, time is a much more crucial and ever-present 
concern. While in theory i t is possible to maintain an endless debate 
about po l i t i ca l issues and the various divergent perspectives offered 
by po l i t i ca l ta l k , in practice i t is never wise to do so. A public 
order is not a natural order. I t requires maintenance and must be 
constantly repaired in the face of the changes that time brings about. 
The po l i t i ca l world is overwhelmingly concerned with time. Acting in 
time, being timely, being a man of the hour - a l l point to the fact 
that in po l i t i cs , time is of the essence. Action must be taken to pre-
serve the relative continuity and s tab i l i ty of the public order, and 
i t is important to decide precisely what should be done and whether i t 
should be done now or later. Talk alone is not enough to accomplish 
the maintenance of the public order. Decisions must be reached. 
Philosophers, as long as they remain .philosophers engaging in debate 
where resolving a dispute in order to act in time is irrelevant, can 
never be effective kings. A government which insists on ignoring the 
importance of time and the demands brought by the changing real i ty of 
the world w i l l f ind that events have passed i t by, and that i t is no 
longer relevant to the present. 
The necessity of acting in time entails the necessity of deciding 
between competing alternatives. At some point the confl ict ing claims 
and pronouncements of r iva l perspectives must be set aside and action 
14^ 1 
i n i t ia ted . Acting on his own, in isolation from the public order and 
apart from the scrutiny and assistance of others, an individual may 
reach a decision relat ively quickly. He may be able to in i t ia te action 
after only the sl ightest hesitation. The time required to establish a 
conceptual distance from the present, necessary for the consideration of 
d i f ferent alternatives, may be easily achieved. 
Action in public, however, and particularly action which is intended 
to preserve and maintain the public order, requires public participation. 
In order that i t may be effected, common recognition and acceptance of a 
decision must be achieved so that diverse efforts of various individuals 
may be coordinated. Debate between various perspectives must be termi-
nated, po l i t i ca l talk brought to a close, and action in i t iated which 
enjoys the support of those who comprise the public. I t does not matter 
i f a gathering of philosophers terminates with no acceptance of a common 
position amongst i ts members because an exchange of views and not the 
resolution of conf l ict was the purpose of their gathering. Complete 
agreement may in fact be regarded as the hallmark of an unsuccessful 
conference. The po l i t ica l assembly, on the other hand, which is unable 
to reach a decision is paralysed, and no action can be authorized by i t . 
Unless acceptance of a decision occurs within the c i v i l society (or, 
al ternat ively, unless the-tyrant can impose his decision upon a society 
by means of coercion), the government-will remain impotent. I f pol i t ica l 
ac t iv i ty appears when there are confl ict ing views as to how to act to 
maintain the character of the public order, and pol i t ica l talk is the way 
in which such disagreement is debated within the c i v i l society, pol i t ica l 
conventions are the way in which debate is terminated, disagreement re-
solved,and action in i t ia ted. 
'Convention' is commonly used to refer to act iv i t ies which are wide-
spread in a society, and this usage carries with i t the pejorative conno-
tation of something which is d u l l , commonplace or pedestrian. Used in 
14b -
this sense, a conventional practice is not distinguished from a custo-
mary or merely imitative one. Other uses of the word, however, suggest 
a di f ferent sense of convention. A convention may be, f i r s t of a l l , a 
coming together, a gathering, or an assembly which has been convened to 
accomplish some purpose. A constitutional convention, for example, is 
convened for the purpose of drafting the framework of rules for a new 
government. Secondly, a convention may be an agreement, in the sense 
of a treaty which establishes procedures, acceptable standards, or 
practices. The Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
is an example. Thirdly, a convention may be seen as a set of arbitrary 
rules or practices, based on consent, generally recognized as valid in 
a particular a r t , discipl ine or society. There is the convention that 
a poem must satisfy certain rules of length, metre, and rhyme i f i t is 
to be recognized as a sonnet, for example.'' 
In a l l these uses conventions are seen as rules which are agreed 
upon so that a common framework of order may be established and shared 
between individuals. The constitutional convention agrees upon the 
common framework of a new government which w i l l allow interaction in 
a new c i v i l society. The Geneva Convention establishes a common frame-
work of standards so that the practices of di f ferent nations can be 
standardized and common expectations of behaviour can result. Poetic 
conventions establish a common framework of practice so that poetry may 
be recognized, scrutinized and judged within a common public order. 
These accepted conventions provide a means of overcoming the barrier of 
individual differences between men so that coordinated and commonly 
understood action may be in i t ia ted. 
Conventions, therefore, are instrumental; they are means to an end.' 
They are tools which allow for action by attempting to reconcile d i f fe r -
^ These various meanings of the word 'convention' are drawn from 
The Oxford English Dictionary, J . A. Murray, et a i . , (Oxford: 
^he Oxford University Press, 1919). 
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ences between men and create the possibi l i ty of making a common decision 
and in i t i a t ing coordinated action. Pol i t ical conventions are rules 
which, in a sense, arbitrate between the competing perspectives offered 
in po l i t i cs , offering the possibi l i ty of arriving at some common ground 
despite these differences. They are not what is decided in po l i t i cs , 
but how i t is decided.' Convention is not airithmetic,'for example, but 
numbers and symbols. I t is not approval or rejection of a particular 
issue, but putting the matter to a vote. Thus convention faci l i tates 
coordinated action amongst men, contributing to the maintenance of the 
public order in the face of incessant change and the constant demands 
of l iv ing in a world where time is of the utmost significance. I t is 
one aspect of a t rad i t ion , and is demanded because of the necessity of 
reaching agreement, accepting decisions, and in i t ia t ing action in time. 
To reconcile differences in po l i t ica l ac t i v i t y , however, is not to 
resolve them in any f inal sense. The rival perspectives offered by pol-
i t i ca l talk are not extinguished by the operation of a convention. They 
are merely set aside. Pol i t ical talk is not l ike a mathematical proof. 
I t is not terminated by a conclusive display of logic which vindicates 
one perspective and annihilates i t s r iva ls . As long as the various 
confl ict ing perspectives are each in some way relevant to the question 
at hand, the decisions which are reached in pol i t ics and the actions 
which are in i t ia ted through the invocation of a convention are only pro-
visional. They may be reviewed at a later date, modified in l igh t of 
further considerations, or brought into the centre of pol i t ica l contro-
versy on another occasion. 
I t is possible, for example, to debate and discuss the way'in which 
the words of our language should be writ ten. I f we. are ever to have a 
written language, however, we must come to some sort of agreement and 
make a decision. Whatever decision we reach, i t cannot be claimed that 
we have resolved the issue for a l l time. I t is always possible to return 
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to the question, reopen the discussion, and reconsider our former de-
cision. Acceptance of the conventions of spelling makes i t possible 
for us to move from constant discussion to public action. 
Pol i t ical conventions, then, temporarily suspend the confl ict ing 
perspectives of men in po l i t ica l l i f e , enabling timely decisions to be 
made on endlessly debatable issues. As long as they are accepted, they 
help uphold the possibi l i ty of the survival of public order so that 
future proposals may be contemplated and action in i t ia ted within the pub-
l i c order. In Western societies we have come generally to accept the 
convention of voting as a means of dealing with competing plans and pro-
jects which are put forward for our consideration in pol i t ica l act iv i ty . 
Temporary termination of debate is the object of the practice so that 
po l i t i ca l l i f e can pass beyond the problems raised by this particular 
issue and can continue effect ively to confront the demands of the present. 
The relat ive continuity of the public order is thus enhanced, and po l i -
t ical l i f e is prevented from disintegrating in endless debate, or in 
coercion which attempts to substitute force for agreement. 
Truth and convention have l i t t l e to do with one another. To assert 
that 'two plus two equals four' is to make a true statement. To write 
this statement using arabic numerals is to act in accordance with a • 
particular convention. The statement is s t i l l true i f I choose to oper-
ate within another convention and u t i l i ze Chinese characters, for example, 
to assert the same proposition. There is nothing either true or false 
about either convention. They are simply means by which men in dif ferent 
parts of the world have set aside the potentially endless debate about 
how numbers may be wr i t ten, and have agreed that i t shall be done one way 
or another so that they may get on with their practical a f fa i rs . 
The conventions of spel l ing, grammar, syntax, numbers and the l ike 
are described and taught to the young. However, they cannot be explained 
except in historical terms, not being susceptible to'the elucidation of 
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necessary relationships that characterize explanations of natural 
phenomenon. I f the child were to ask why we write our words in this 
manner, the reply would be 'because this is the way we do i t , and i f 
you wish to understand us and to be understood by us, you must do i t 
this way as we l l ' . No defence of the truthfulness of the convention 
could meaningfully be demanded, and none could be given. In the same 
way, po l i t i ca l conventions which regulate speech and action in pol i t ics 
may be either described or explained in historical terms, but cannot be 
attacked or defended because of any claim to truthfulness. 
In the sense that conventions do not attempt to discover truth but 
are merely instruments for fostering agreement, they are arbitrary. 
They arbitrate between competing perspectives and views without indica-
ting which is r ight and which wrong. Conventions are not true or false, 
reasonable or unreasonable. "They are morel or less practical. The con-
version from one convention to another in the English monetary system 
v/as defended purely in terms of pract ical i ty: ease of computation; con-
formity to world convention; entry to the Common Market. The value of 
conventions l ies in their'success in allowing acceptance of a decision 
to be established, without their necessarily f ina l ly resolving the issues 
at stake. To attack conventions on the grounds that they are i r ra t iona l , 
as Bentham does in his 'Book of Fal lacies', is to misconceive the nature 
and function of conventions, and to apply an inappropriate standard of 
judgement to them. 
Being practical means that conventions must enable a clearly defined 
decision to be reached in po l i t i ca l act iv i ty . Unless i t is clear which 
perspective has, for the moment, received the approval of the relevant 
ins t i tu t ions, nothing can be said to have been decided and effective action 
2 
Bentham, Jeremy, 'The Book of Fal lacies', The Works of Jeremy 
B^ntham, John Bov^ring. ed., (London: Simpkin, MarshaITarKT^ 
C0T71843), vol . I I , 374-487, esp. 388-95, 457-61 , 474 
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cannot be undertaken. The convention of an election to decide which 
groups competing for power shall constitute the new government becomes 
valueless when a prol i ferat ion of parties results in a majority for no 
party and the clear acceptance of none of the alternative perspectives 
offered. The endless debate "over the proper policies to be implemented ' ' 
to maintain or achieve a particular kind of public order has not been 
clearly terminated. 
Conventions must also be capable of being invoked in time, allowing 
appropriate action to be in i t i a ted , i f they;iare: to be practical. I f 
they cannot be brought into operation in time, they defeat the very pur- • 
pose for which they are established, which is to enable the public order 
to act in time in the face of a changing world. I t would be impractical, 
for example, for every member of a c i v i l society embracing mill ions of 
citizens to vote on every issue. I t would be in such a case impossible 
to reach a decision soon enough to coordinate action to meet the chal l -
enges to the continuity and s tab i l i t y of the society. Instead, in the 
United Kingdom, the convention of an election is invoked every few years 
to delegate authority to office-holders who deliberate and decide on be-
half of their constituents. 
However practical a convention may be in theory, without acceptance 
of the convention i t se l f by the members of the public, i t can never be 
efficacious in practice. Acceptance of the relevant conventions forms 
part of the conditions of membership in any given public. Conventions 
form part of the idiom appropriate to a society and those who refuse to 
recognize or abide by them are a threat to the public order which is in 
part both maintained and manifested by the operation of conventions. 
Their refusal to abide by the relevant conventions raises the spectre of 
the collapse of the public order into continual disagreement and coercion. 
Like other aspects of public order, a convention may be described to the 
outsider and explained in historical terms, but i t must be accepted and 
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practised i f i t is to be relevant to any given society. 
Not a l l conf l ict ing perspectives presented in public are resolved 
by means of conventions, however. Although a court of law deals with 
divergent views, the decisions of a judge are not examples of the ope-
ration of a convention. The assistance of a court is required when a 
ci t izen of the state feels that certain conditions of membership have 
been violated. I ts duty is to examine the evidence, l isten to the argu-
ments on both sides, and attempt to arrive at the truth of the matter, 
rendering a f a i r judgement insofar as that is possible. The court sett-
les the conf l ic t not by fostering agreement between the confl ict ing 
parties but by deciding in favour of one or the other. 
The decisions of courts are governed by considerations of precedent. 
In referring to a precedent, a judge w i l l suggest in what way the s i tu-
ation at hand is analogous to a similar case in the past. The precedent 
w i l l indicate what decision should be reached. Imitation goes even further 
than precedent by identifying the present with the past rather than merely 
claiming that the present is analogous to the past. Imitation, too, w i l l 
indicate what ought to be done in present circumstances. In th is , both 
reference to precedent and imitation of the past are to be distinguished 
from the invocation of a convention. A pol i t ica l convention specifies 
how a decision may be reached in a particular debate, but does not deter-
mine what that decision shall be. It-provides the means of terminating 
the debate, without indicating what the outcome should be. When cohven-
tion is confused with either precedent or imitation - the how with the 
what - creat iv i ty and or ig inal i ty are s t i f led as the present is viewed 
almost exclusively in terms of the past. Much of later neoclassicism, 
for example, mistook the conventions of form for the to ta l i t y of a r t , and 
adherence to form alone became the primary cr i ter ion of excellence. Imi-
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tation became the order of the day. The recognition and acceptance of 
the conditions of membership,.however, does not imply that the present 
may be identi f ied with the past, nor that the present'is necessarily 
analogous with the past. Conformity to a convention is neither imita-
tion nor the following of a precedent. I t is not conventional in the 
sense of merely repet i t ive. The search fdr a precedent may occur when 
there is a dispute as to whether or not a particular convention should 
be invoked in this particular s i tuat ion; that i s , whether or not a part-
icular convention is appropriate to the present situation. However, the 
convention w i l l not determine what the outcome of the debate w i l l be. 
One way in which the pract ical i ty of any given convention is en-
hanced and i t s acceptance fac i l i ta ted is the ease with which i t can be 
made public and brought to the attention of those who comprise the pub-
l i c . Unlike other aspects of a t rad i t ion , with their subtleties of 
nuance and s ty le , conventions are capable of being art iculated. They 
may be expressed in rules, such as rules of spell ing: ' i ' before 'e ' 
except after ' c ' , etc. They may be stated in laws: there must be a 
general election in the United Kingdom at least every f ive years. Or 
they may be tac i t l y understood: we know what we mean in a general sense 
by the term 'conventional warfare' - warfare carried on within certain 
rules which establish l imi ts to the conf l ict - although these rules may 
not be discussed or formally art iculated. 
Whether or not conventions are expl ic i t , they are always capable 
of being made so. The conventions of the forms of poetry can be ex-
plained to those who are unaware of them. Those who have not learned 
the conventions of computer programming and are unable to calculate in 
the binary number system can be taught how to go about i t . Education, 
part icular ly at a primary leve l , is to an extent a matter of introducing 
^ ?'l';/r''?r?'' ftmthe Renaissance to Romanticism: 
Trends in Styles in Ar t , Literature andrnKiF-JmiT^^ 
(London: The University of Chicago Press, 196^) ^19-66. 
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the young to a series of conventions, and in contrast to other aspects 
of an idiom, these conventions can be mastered simply through memori-
zation. 
Because conventions are more expl ic i t than other elements of an 
idiom, there can be l i t t l e or no question about when a convention is 
invoked or which convention is being employed. Reference is always 
made, or always can be made, to a specific convention when i t is intro-
duced to resolve the conf l ic t between dif fer ing perspectives. The teacher 
can refer the student to the dictionary i f he asks why a word in his essay 
has been marked as mis-spelled. A vote in the House of Commons terminates 
debate on a b i l l and allows Members to decide whether or not the proposal 
w i l l become law, freeing them to move on to other issues. This is done 
openly and in accordance with certain specific rules of procedure to 
which anyone may make reference i f he is in doubt as to what is going on. 
The fact that conventions are easily made public, easily articulated 
and capable of being held up for a l l to see, means that every member of 
the public is equally free to refer to the appropriate conventions which 
form part of the conditions of membership. We are not a l l equally f ree, 
however, to invoke or create a convention. Although we may a l l consult 
a dictionary to see what the agreed spelling of a word is (assuming that 
we are famil iar with the conventions of the alphabet and alphabetical 
order), dictionaries are written by lexicographers, and not by the gene-
ral public. Although every Member of Parliament is free to inspect the 
conventions governing a c t i y i t y i n the House of Commons, only the Speaker 
may declare what is relevant in a debate and curtai l discussion in order 
that a decision may be reached. Although we may al l be familiar with 
the conventional practice of a general election, only the monarch may 
dissolve Parliament and order an election. 
The ab i l i t y to alter or invoke conventions varies according to the 
public order concerned. Language and spell ing, for example, are more 
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f lexib le than other conventions, and are more open to changes or ig i -
nating amongst the general public. Lexicographers may write diction-
aries, defining the conventional usage and spelling of words, but to a 
certain extent they follow public usage. The Academie Francaise seems 
powerless to prevent the inclusion in the French language of such ex-
pressions as ' l e weekend', ' les gangsters', or ' le drugstore' which 
have achieved wide acceptance and common use. 
Most conventions, and pol i t ica l conventions in particular, are not 
so open to popular invocation and innovation, however. Those who may 
pronounce what the convention is and who may invoke i t are few. In 
po l i t i cs , access to conventions is almost exclusively the preserve of 
those who comprise po l i t ica l inst i tut ions. I f access to the manipu-
lat ion of these conventions were not limited in this way, we would a l l 
pronounce what the convention is in accordance with our immediate de-
sires or whims. The value of convention in fostering agreement would 
then be severely diminished. We would a l l be tempted to extend debate 
on an issue unt i l we had spoken, and then terminate i t as soon as we 
had finished. As members of the general public, however, we must bow 
before the authority of convention and of the men of reputation or 
of f ice who invoke i t . The editors of The Oxford English Dictionary, 
with their reputations, are able to decide what words mean and how they 
are spelled. The Football Association decides what the correct rules 
of the game are. We have off icers who are invested with the authority 
to invoke conventions in order to obtain agreement which may be the 
basis for coordinated action. The presiding of f icer of an assembly is 
able to rule when the Standing Orders of the chamber should be brought 
to bear against a particular member. 
As members of the wider public, we are at l iberty to protest when 
a man of reputation has decided what the convention i s , or a man in 
of f ice invokes a particular convention. The defeated candidate may 
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claim that the election was rigged, and that the result is therefore not 
binding, no matter what the Returning Officer may have said. Or MP's 
may object to the decision to l im i t debate of a particular matter before 
Parliament. Such protests, however, are generally directed against a 
particular manifestation of the convention, and unless there has been 
some obvious abuse, l i t t l e is l ike ly to result from such protests. The 
defeated candidate w i l l simply look l ike a poor loser, and dissatisfied 
MP's w i l l have made their point, but debate w i l l be limited a l l the same. 
Abuse of conventions i s , of course, always possible. Elections can 
be rigged, and a government can disallow al l debate on an issue. I f this 
occurs, and part icularly i f i t occurs in more than isolated instances, 
the convention becomes debased. A continually abused convention is under-
mined as an effective instrument for fostering agreement in public. Con-
tinued abuse w i l l make i t ineffective on the occasions when i t is correc-
t l y invoked, and i t w i l l not enjoy the confidence and acceptance which 
are crucial to i t . The reputation of the man and the authority of the 
off ice w i l l s i m i l a r l y be,debased, and the possibility, of agreement w i l l be 
reduced. Where a convention is f e l t to be completely devalued, consent to 
i t s legitimacy founders, and the communality of the public order is in 
danger of disintegration. In 1956, for example, the governments of South 
Vietnam and the United StateSji fearful of being seen to f lout openly the 
convention of a popular election, evaded the d i f f i cu l t y by simply refusing 
to allow the election to take pi ace.^ By the time an attempt was made in 
1971 to resurrect this convention, the idea of a 'free election' had be-
come so discredited that the exercise was a fu t i l e attempt to reconstitute 
a decayed convention and employ i t in a disintegrating order. In the absence 
4 
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5 of a viable convention, coercion has been employed. Again, the announce-
ment that France would have a new constitution as the new foundation of 
po l i t ica l act iv i ty in the Fi f th Republic was of less importance to the 
French than the fact that Charles de Gaulle was in power. The convention 
of a constitution had, from the time of the French Revolution in 1789, be-
come so debased that i t could not be restored to i t s former position by 
the mere act of formulating yet another constitution.^ 
Where po l i t i ca l conventions have completely broken down or been re-
jected by a segment of a society, the state must intervene to maintain 
the public order, i f i t is capable of doing so. With conventions no 
longer ef fect ive, mere persuasion is unlikely to be enough to hold the 
public order together and to i n i t i a te the necessary action to maintain 
i t s structure through time. When in 1860 the thirteen southern states of 
the United States rejected the results of the presidential election, 
Lincoln embarked on a policy of coercion in order to preserve the public 
order and to maintain the relevance of the American Constitution. Despite 
the popular myth of Lincoln the Great Emancipator, the American Civi l War, 
in Lincoln's view, was more a war to preserve a particular set of conven-
tions than to abolish slavery.'' 
When the state is forced to intervene in the face of a breakdown of 
the acceptance of conventions, i t may be compelled to assume the contra-
dictory position of (hopefully temporarily) curtai l ing the rights of the 
citizens in order to protect the conventions of the c i v i l society. Br i t ish 
5 
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LXXIII, no. 39, 5-7; Starner, Frances, 'Bunker's Boy', ibid., 
vol. LXXIII, no. 40, 8 -11 ; Starner, 'Winner Takes A l l ' , i J b i d . , 
vol. LXXIII, no. 4 1 , 7-8; Rockstroh, Denni'S, 'Phantoms''' Victory' , 
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soldiers in Ulster, for example, have been compelled to violate what in 
calmer times have been regarded as inviolable c i v i l l ibert ies in order 
to locate and apprehend those who have rejected the convention of par l i -
amentary rule and have resorted to terrorism. In such a situation, 
po l i t i ca l inst i tut ions are l ike ly to authorize the state, through Special 
Powers Acts or Emergency Powers Acts, to take action which normally would 
not be in keeping with the character of the c iv i l society, to restore 
order so that conventions may once again be effective in setting aside 
the differences amongst men in po l i t ica l l i f e . 
Pol i t ica l conventions are but one element of public order; of the 
conditions governing membership in c i v i l society which have come to be 
established over time. They are manifestations of a relat ively coherent 
structure of public order, and as such, i f they are to enjoy widespread 
acceptance and thus be ef fect ive, they cannot be in conf l ic t with other 
elements of that order. The attempt to import alien conventions and 
impose them upon an existing order, where the other elements do not su-
pport and reinforce the qonventions, is doomed to failure.. The relevant 
idiom must be relat ively harmonious in i t s diverse manifestations i f the 
public order is to be sustained. Sun Yat-Sen's e f for t to hold democratic 
elections in China was an attempt to make a Western convention relevant 
to a society where no pol i t ica l 'pract ice existed to support the convention 
and to make i t effective in fostering.agreement. His vision was always 
an alien one, and i t is not surprising that he was not successful in his 
ef forts to impose i t upon a people whose values, although under stress 
from the impact of the Western world, s t i l l had a strong and deep hold on 
their l ives. The introduction of new conventions, or modification of 
^ Rose, Richard, Governing Without Consensus: An I r ish Perspective, 
(London: Faber and Faber, L td . , 19/1), 128 f f . 
^ Han Suyin, Thg Crippled Tree, (London: Panther Books, L td. , 1972), 
254-61 ; Woo, f. C , The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese 
Revolution, (London: George Allen and Unwin, L td . , 1928), 45-57, 
58-68; Sch i f f r in , Harold Z. , Sun Yat-Sen and the Origins of the 
Chinese Revolution, (Los Angeles: The University of Cainorma 
Press, 1968), 1-9. 
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the old ones, must occur within the framework of the public order and 
be consistent with the pol i t ica l practice of those concerned. The new 
cannot be completely discontinuous with the old i f the object is the 
achievement of agreement which may serve as a basis for united action. 
An appropriate po l i t i ca l convention, then, is one which is widely 
accepted within the society, pract ical , and consistent with the character 
of the society. I f the Queen were to toss a coin to decide whether the 
next government would be a Tory or Labour one, she would certainly be 
invoking a convention which is widely accepted throughout this society as 
a means of resolving disagreement and getting on with practical af fa i rs . 
I t would be, in one sense, practical. I t could render a clear-cut deci-
sion and could do so in time. I t would be expedient in saving the expense 
of a general election, and would allow Parliament to get on with i t s busi-
ness without the time-consuming disruption of a po l i t ica l campaign. How-
ever, i t would be understood by the nation as the invocation of an inappro-
priate convention; one which was perhaps in keeping with a football match 
but not with the formation of a new government. I t would be in confl ict 
with the established po l i t i ca l practice which allows a role for the 
monarch in the resolution of this sort of conf l ic t , but which does not 
give her the only place nor allow her to resolve the confl ict in such a 
manner. 
Within a framework of public order, new conventions can be established 
where old conventions are f e l t to- be inadequate or where a new problem has 
arisen with which i t is f e l t that the old conventions cannot effectively 
cope. Some pol i t ica l figures have suggested, for example, that Bri tain's 
accession to the Treaty of Rome should have been subjected to a .national 
referendum rather than merely determined by a Parliamentary debate and 
division in the House of Commons.Or, i t may be suggested that a consti-
'Labour's Programme for B r i t a i n ' , Annual Conference, 1973, 
(London: The Labour Party, 1973), 41. 
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tutional congress meet to found a new constitution; that i s , a new frame-
work for pol i t ica l act iv i ty within which pol i t ica l conventions w i l l be 
invoked to foster agreement. In this way old conventions can be altered. 
In non-revolutionary situations, however, they are altered according to 
other conventions. The results of the deliberations of a constitutional 
convention may be submitted to a national referendum or i t may require 
the ra t i f ica t ion of the groups affected by i t . A vote was taken, for 
example, in the United Nations to determine whether the approval of two-
thirds of the General Assembly or only a simple majority would be required 
for the admission of China to the body. One convention, voting, was used 
to determine the conditions under which i t would be invoked in other 
circumstances. 
While in theory i t is always possible to reopen issues which have been 
settled by convention, since no difference is ever completely resolved or 
f ina l l y laid to rest on theoretical grounds, i t is often either very d i f f i -
cult to do so or irrelevant to do so. The reason for this is the same 
reason that makes po l i t ica l conventions necessary in the f i r s t place: 
time. Issues which have been resolved in the past, and actions which have 
been taken, inform the public order, modifying i t s character and in f l u -
encing the idiom appropriate to i t . What was once a matter of disagree-
ment and a reason for the presentation of alternative perspectives, has 
now become a part of the structure of .the society. I t is no longer the 
issue of debate but has become part of the public order, providing the 
occasion for debate on other issues. Time has made what was once contro-
versial acceptable. Time also makes what was once a pressing concern of 
the present a curiosity of the past. The extension of the franchise to 
non-propertied classes is not now the subject of debate in this country. 
Time has made universal manhood suffrage a characteristic of the public 
order, and i t now forms part of the character of pol i t ica l l i f e within 
which debate about other issues takes place. Time has made further debate 
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about the repeal of the Corn Laws irrelevant to the present problems 
which confront this society, although i t may be of historical or aca-
demic interest to investigate the wisdom of such decisions. These 
issues, once resolved by conventions within pol i t ica l l i f e , are s t i l l 
debatable, but time and the demands of the present make i t unlikely 
that the attention of men in po l i t ica l l i f e w i l l long be devoted to 
them. 
In summation, then, conventions are agreements about how individ-
uals interacting with one another in public can reconcile differences, 
come to accept a decision and i n i t i a te common action. Change as well 
as continuity can result from the invocation of convention. The deci-
sions which are reached by invoking a convention are as l ike ly to i n i -
t iate modifications in the public order as they are to confirm i t s con-
t inu i ty with the past. However, by enabling men to act to overcome the 
challenges of time in the maintenance of their common world, conventions 
help to sustain public order. In pol i t ics they take on particular import-
ance where the need to act in time makes the invocation of pol i t ica l 
conventions an integral part of po l i t ica l act iv i ty . As rules, capable 
of being art iculated, resting on common consent and acceptance, they are 
a matter of practical concern and are open to common inspection and 
public debate. Over time they may be abused and debased, altered or 
abolished according to a public process consciously employed. As one 
element of the conditions of participation in pol i t ica l l i f e , pol i t ica l 
conventions form part of the roughly coherent pattern of pol i t ica l ac t i -
v i ty in a society, their effectiveness being crucial in the maintenance 
of a relat ively continuous and stable public order. 
- IbU -
Chapter 9 
TRADITION 
Like public order, a t radi t ion is manifested in action. I t is demon-
strated in the way men go about doing things; in the manner in which they 
confront practical problems and attempt to inform the world with their 
purposes. I t i s , however, not coping with practical problems in just any 
way at a l l , but in a way which is f e l t to be appropriate. That is to say, 
a t radi t ion has prescriptive force. I t indicates what is the proper way 
of doing something, directing ef forts one way rather than another. The 
man who acts within a t radi t ion i s , of course, not unconcerned with ex-
pediency. He would l ike to accomplish the task he has set himself, but 
at the same time he is conscious of adhering to a certain way of succeed-
ing in his endeavour, and w i l l riot be content with merely accomplishing 
hi's task by going about i t in just any way. Part of the achievement for 
him is the manner in which he has set about his job. I t is not only the 
result of his endeavour, but how that result was achieved that w i l l be a 
source of his satisfaction or disappointment. 
Traditional act iv i ty is therefore purposive act iv i ty . I t is not 
random but is ordered according to some understanding of what is the 
' r igh t ' vyay of dealing with a particular problem. The ' r ight ' way of 
going about things, however, cannot be formulated in a logical manner, 
building on f i r s t premises in the way that a system of proofs may be said 
to build a mathematical order, for example. Neither is i t necessarily a 
coherent order. I t cannot be examined for consistency in the way that a 
philosophic argument can be. Tradition is practical rather than theore-
t i c a l . In the diversity of practical, l i f e , where effectiveness is l ike ly 
to be of greater importance than logic or consistency, i l l og i ca l i t y and 
incoherence are easily tolerated and are more l i k e l y t o be the rule than 
the exception. 
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I f logical consistency and coherence do not provide a standard for 
evaluating act iv i ty within a t rad i t ion , what is the source of the norm-
ative force of tradition? How is i t that the man engaged in traditional 
act iv i ty judges one action to be inappropriate to his endeavour while 
another is acceptable? He does so on the basis of his awareness of the 
character of the public order within which he is acting. Bound up in 
his act iv i ty is a consciousness of not acting as an isolated individual 
confronting a particular practical problem, but of acting as a member of 
a particular public whose task is to deal with this problem in the appro-
priate manner. His command of the idiom and his understanding of what 
i t means to be a member of this public w i l l direct his actions. What is 
the ' r igh t ' way of going about his task is determined by reference to the 
standards which have come to be established in the relevant public. To 
the extent that his actions are governed by a notion of the ' r ight ' way 
of doing things, he affirms his commitment to a particular public order 
and identi f ies himself as a man acting within a t radi t ion. 
A t rad i t ion , therefore, is not individual, l ike a habit, but is 
shared. I t locates and directs the act iv i t ies not of one man alone but 
of a group of men; of a l l who would claim membership in that public order. 
I t is a common heritage which is enjoyed amongst men, and not an ind iv i -
dual possession. I t cannot be hoarded away, out of the sight of others, 
nor can i t be monopolised by a few. Some, with greater sk i l l and sensi-
t i v i t y , may establish themselves as master craftsmen within the t rad i -
t i on , their endeavours commonly regarded as classic expressions of the 
t radi t ion. But the t radi t ion is not theirs alone. I t exists to the ex-
tent that i t is common to a l l members and the exclusive privilege of 
none. Traditional act iv i ty thus invites the judgement of others, placing 
i t se l f within the public realm and thereby contributing to the l i f e and 
maintenance of the public order. 
The common understanding of what is appropriate extends amongst 
members in time and across generations through time. There could be no 
tradit ion where a public order had not been established for a consider-
able time. Tradition is historical and provides the continuity which 
links one generation to another, spanning not merely clock time but the 
more signif icant human time which is marked by the rhythm of human mort-
a l i t y . The young are introduced into membership through a process of 
apprenticeship or socialization. The more their actions are located 
within and directed by the tradit ions of their elders, the more the two 
come to occupy a common social world with shared understandings of what 
is appropriate ac t i v i t y . I f t radi t ion is severely disrupted, as, for 
example, under the impact of colonialism, this l ink is weakened. In 
such circumstances, the common world shared not simply amongst men but 
between generations threatens to disappear.^ 
A tradit ion not only indicates what has come to be understood over 
time as the appropriate way of going about a practical ac t iv i ty , i t also 
defines the l imits of that ac t i v i t y , marking i t of f from other endeavours 
and distinguishing i t from other practical undertakings. Barristers not 
only have a self-conscious way of going about their profession, they are 
also aware of the distinctions between their act iv i t ies and those of 
so l ic i tors . Butchers know how to butcher cat t le , but do not sel l vege-
tables. Selling vegetables is a di f ferent practical ac t iv i ty , with i t s 
own tradit ions and hence i t s own understandings of what is appropriate to 
i t s endeavours. 
A society w i l l have a multitude of traditions as i t has a multitude 
of practical ac t i v i t i es , with men attempting to engage in them in a charac-
1 x u - t^^'^-^ 
The -feiie^of the bright young son who goes to the ci ty to learn , 
alien ways and returns to discover that he no longer f i t s in 
back in the vi l lage is an old one. I t appears frequently in 
the l i terature of underdeveloped countries (for example, Achebe, 
Chinua, No Longer At Ease, (New York: Fawcett World Library, 
1970)) and is also prevaTent in contemporary Western l i terature 
(Wolfe, Thomas, You Can't Go Home Again, (New York: The Dell 
Publishing Co., 1960), for exampT^ 
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te r i s t i c way. A tradi t ion of one kind of act iv i ty does not encompass a l l 
aspects of a society, but only directs action in a particular area. Men 
may be fel low-cit izens, then, without understanding a l l the diverse trad-
i t ions within which the act iv i t ies of their neighbours take place. As 
members of the c i v i l society they enjoy the same rights and duties, and 
are assumed to have a roughly equal command of the appropriate idiom. In 
po l i t ica l l i f e they must act within the same tradi t ion and adhere to the 
same understanding of what is the ' r igh t ' way of going about pol i t ica l 
ac t iv i ty . As ci t izens, both the barrister and the butchers are members 
who must respect each other's rights and act in accordance with the 
conditions of membership as those conditions have been established. In 
other areas of their l ives, however, they act in l ight of d ist inct t rad i -
t ions. As members of their respective professions, the traditions within 
which each one acts is l ike ly to be obscure and irrelevant to the other. 
I t is only when their practical act iv i t ies impinge on one another - when 
the barrister wants a cut of meat and the butcher needs a lawyer - that 
they w i l l be forced to develop some kind of rudimentary appreciation of 
the tradit ional act iv i t ies of barristers and butchers. 
The significance of any specific act iv i ty is revealed by placing i t 
in the context of a t rad i t ion . . Taken in isolat ion, apart from the t rad i -
t ion , i t s meaning tends to be lost. I t is deprived of. location in a con-
tinuing pattern of act iv i ty which has been established over time and which 
provides a standard for judging i t s excellence. I t is illuminated with 
meaning only when seen in the context of a shared heritage which in part 
establishes a common world amongst men in time and through time.^ The 
exchange of g i f ts between friends takes on a whole new dimension when seen 
as an act within the tradi t ion of Western European celebrations of Christmas. 
IiIL J^ D 'J^^f^o'^e^ ^" Polanyi, Michael. Personal Knowledge. 
London: Rout edge^ and Kegan Paul, 1958), a n T O r a o t C T n ^ e l . 
Rationalism in Po l i t i es ' , Rationalism in Polit ic... (London-
Methuen and Co., L td . , ]967T. ~ ^ ^i-onaon. 
164 -
The significance of the g i f t and whether or not what is given is appro-
priate can only be determined by understanding the ' r igh t ' way of doing 
things which has emerged over time. 
The value of a t radi t ion l i e s , therefore, in i t s ab i l i t y to orientate 
our actions in what would otherwise be a world confined to the present. 
The relative continuity of a t rad i t ion, helping to maintain a framework of 
public order through time, allows us to create an identi ty which endures 
and does not s l ip irrevocably into the past, buried beneath the constant 
newness of the present. I f not history, tradit ion helps make histor ic i ty 
possible; the awareness of a past which shapes and has practical s ign i f i -
cance for the present. 
...Without t radi t ion - which selects and names, which 
hands down and preserves, which indicates where the 
treasures are and what their worth is - there seems 
to be no wil led continuity in time and hence, humanly 
speaking, neither past nor future, only sempiternal 
change of the world and the biological cycle of 
l iv ing creatures in i t . 3 
To paraphrase Ar is to t le , the man who lives outside a l l t radit ion is either 
a beast or a god. In either case such a man is deprived of the continuity 
of a public order which gives his actions significance and himself an 
ident i ty. To l ive only in the present, where nothing is preserved beyond 
the immediacy of the moment, is to l ive in a world where a l l moment are 
equally valuable, and thus equally valueless. I t is to be condemned to a 
world where the significance of a l l action is lost for there is no t rad i -
tion helping to sustain the l ink between the past and the present.' There 
is nothing against which any action or identity may be measured, i ts ind i -
vidual i ty and worth assessed and i t s value appreciated. 
In turn, i t is human act iv i ty which gives l i f e to a tradit ion and 
maintains i t through time. I f there was no act iv i ty , there could be, no 
t rad i t ion , and a tradit ion dies when the practical act iv i ty which sustains 
^ n.'^ .T^ '^.L^T^L^.^^^^^" ^^'^ C^ew York: Meridian Books, The World Publishing Co., 1968)7 5. 
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i t ceases. When the advent of the automobile resulted in the gradual 
replacement of horse-drawn carts and wagons, for example, the traditions 
of the wheelwright slowly died out.^ Once the practical act iv i ty of 
wheelwrights ceased, that t radi t ion could no longer continue. No amount 
of scholarly investigation or learned analysis or exposition can maintain • 
a t radi t ion i f the practical ac t i v i t y , the way of l i f e of the people con-
cerned, has been transformed and the old practices have been abandoned. 
Groups promoting the resurrection of dead traditions cannot hope to meet 
with success because the world has changed and practical act iv i t ies are 
now guided by new tradi t ions. At best such endeavours w i l l create muse-
ums, and may be in the t radi t ion of museum work, but an exhibition of 
this type can never be more than an a r t i f i c i a l re l ic of the past. 
Because i t is maintained by human act iv i ty , a tradit ion is contingent. 
There is nothing necessary about i t in the way that the natural order may 
be said to be the manifestation of certain necessary relationships. The 
practical act iv i t ies of human existence which establish a tradit ion over 
time can assume any number of shapes and forms, and are far from unchang-
ing. . A t radi t ion is mutable, subject to the vicissitudes of time and 
the contingencies of history, and i t eludes any attempt to res t r ic t i t to 
a series of formulae or prescriptions. The continuity of a tradit ion is 
maintained through practical act iv i ty and is marked by the constant con-
frontation with the demands of the present. I t can only be maintained 
as long as i t successfully meets and overcomes each confrontation. In the 
process, the way in which various act iv i t ies are carried on w i l l be modi-
f ied . A description can only hope to be a more or less accurate abridge-
ment of a t rad i t ion ; a one-dimensional abstraction which merely character-
izes but does not encompass. For the man Who acts within a t rad i t ion , 
there is no book of rules to consult, nor set of explanations which point 
^ The death of this t radi t ion is traced in Sturt, George, • 
The Wheelwright Shop,:(Cambridge: The Cambridge University 
"Press, T^Ty. 
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out why his efforts achieve the results he seeks or what physical 
principles underlie his endeavours. That i t works and is suitable'to 
his task is enough for him, and i t s appropriateness cannot be demons-
trated to him by reference to any manual or handbook. 
The nature of this knowledge should be noted. I t 
was set out in no book. I t was not sc ient i f ic . I 
never met a man who professed any other than an 
empirical acquaintance with the waggon-builder's 
lore. . . . This sort of thing I know, and in vast 
detail in course of time; but I seldom know why. 
And that is how most other men knew. The lore was 
a tangled network of country prejudices 5 
I t has been common (part icularly amongst sociologists)'to identify 
t radi t ion with stat ic societies.^ The implication is that that which 
is stat ic and resistant to modernity (however one cares to define that 
term) is to be deplored. Tradition has thus come to be seen as some-
thing negative; as a conservative force holding back the wheels of pro-
gress; holding societies in ignorance and oppression. I t i s , of course, 
true that t radi t ion is conservative. I t implies standards for judging 
actions and a pattern of act iv i ty which are derived from the past, and 
i t places a premium on continuity with the past. But tradit ion is not 
the same as tradit ionalism, the slavish adherence to past practices 
simply because they are past practices. A tradit ion links the present 
with the past, providing a continuity through time, but i t does not 
irrevocably bind the present to the past. 
I t would be a mistake to equate tradit ion with stasis or with imi-
ta t ion, therefore. In i t se l f imitation cannot constitute a claim to 
authenticity; to being within a t rad i t ion. I t may be a way of i ns t i l l i ng 
a t radi t ion in the young before they are free to practise i t as adults 
(that i s , unt i l they are competent to be creative and innovative within 
5 
Sturt , ibid., 73-74. 
^ Oneclassic example of many similar approaches is Lerner 
S^"^? ' The Passing of Traditional Society. (London: Collier-
Macmillan, L td . , 1958y; 
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i t ) . But imitation amongst a l l those engaged in a particular kind of 
ac t iv i ty deadens and eventually k i l l s the t radi t ion. There is nothing 
tradit ional about the recreation of medieval banquets which presently 
take place in some English castles. The demands of practical l i f e in 
successive centuries since what we now designate as the Middle Ages have 
brought forth a di f ferent kind of order and a di f ferent tradit ion of 
dining. Scrupulous imitation of medieval banqueting practices cannot 
resurrect this medieval t radi t ion of eating, nor can i t authenticate 
these present-day banquets. • What can perhaps be said is- that these 
attempts are authentic manifestations of a tradit ion of recreation and 
amusement which, l ike 'The Good Old Days', plastic armour on the walls 
of pubs and family crests which can be purchased at Woolworth's, evince 
a nostalgia for an imagined past. 
Change is endemic to t rad i t ion , not foreign to i t . Tradition is an 
on-going pattern of ac t i v i t y , always emerging and never fu l l y formed. 
I t is always in the process of becoming and only in the retrospective 
view of the historian can i t be said to have become. Only to his back-
ward glance does i t appear at any moment in time to be a finished, com-
plete and coherent ent i ty. To those for whom i t was not the past but 
the present, i t could have had no such semblance of completion. I t 
could not have appeared akin to a work of art which stands as a finished 
creation, requiring no further action.' 
A t rad i t ion , therefore, seldom dies completely. I t does-not sur-
vive completely unmodified from one generation to the next, but neither 
does i t come to a complete and abrupt end. Even colonized people manage 
to retain vestiges of their original culture. Only complete annihilation 
can to ta l l y obliterate a tradi t ion by eliminating those who practise i t . 
Discontinuities, l ike continuit ies, are always relat ive. Traditions a l -
ways change, but never a l l at once. Modifications are piecemeal and 
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never total and all-embracing. 
No tradit ion begins ab ovo. Every tradit ion grows 
out of another tradit ion No intellectual 
t radi t ion , i f i t survives long enough to preside 
over the production of significant works, ever dies 
completely. Even where i t s content is not expli-
c i t l y refen^ed to and identified as such, i t goes 
on l iv ing through incorporation in the l i f e of 
what comes after i t . ' 
I f i t is incorrect to view tradit ion as s ta t ic , or to see i t as a 
way of going about things which can be encapsulated in a description, 
i t is also mistaken to see tradit ion as something which is either true 
or false, e f f i c i en t or i n e f f i c i e n t , favourable or antithetical to the 
use of reason. A way of going about a practical act ivi ty cannot be 
said to be true or false. I t simply i s , and although certain beliefs 
which comprise a t radi t ion may be said to entail false understanding 
about the world, the pattern of ac t iv i ty i t s e l f cannot be characterized 
in this way. I t may be quite accurate to say that the Inca could not 
have been the son of the sun and the moon, as he claimed. The fa l s i ty 
of that claim, however, does not establish the f a l s i t y of the pol i t ica l 
t radit ion within which i t was made and from which i t derived i t s signi-
ficance. Similarly, i t cannot be said that t radi t ion is necessarily 
ine f f i c ien t and a hindrance to progress. Nor can i t be claimed that • 
t radi t ion is antithetical to c r i t i c a l reasoning and the use of evidence. 
Some traditions may be inimical to our understanding of what constitutes 
evidence fo r and against an explanation of a particular phenomen. How-
ever, this is not the same thing as asserting that tradition per se is 
antithetical to science or c r i t i c a l reasoning. Scientific enquiry is 
Shi I s , Edward A. , ' Intel lectuals , Tradition and the Tradition 
of Intellectuals: Some Preliminary Considerations', Daedalus, 
vo l . 101, no. 2, (Spring, 1972), 29. 
o 
This is counter to Acton's argument, amongst others, that 
t radi t ion is somehow inimical to the use of reason and that 
i t can be shown to be false. See Acton, H. B. , 'Tradition 
and Some Other Forms of Order', Proceedings of the Aristo-
tel ian Society, 1952-53, N. S. vol . L I I I . 
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itself merely one tradition which has developed in Western culture 
and is not something which necessarily supersedes a l l other traditions, 
9 
or something which stands outside tradition altogether. The advent of 
rat ional i ty (however that elusive concept is to be defined) does not 
herald the decline of traditionJ^ 
A pol i t i ca l t radit ion is a part of the culture in which i t is em-
bedded. I t is one t rad i t ion , governing one practical ac t iv i ty , amongst 
many. Pol i t ica l ac t iv i ty is the public determination of a collective 
identi ty; of the kind of people 'we' are and the character of the pub-
l i c order within which we interact with one another. I t is a practical 
ac t iv i ty which concerns i t s e l f with the problem of maintaining a common 
public world in the face of incessant change. A pol i t ica l t radit ion is 
the manner in which men set about dealing with this practical problem; 
the way in which they publicly determine the character of the public 
order within which they fashion their individual identi t ies. I t is a 
characteristic way of engaging in pol i t ica l ac t iv i ty ; the pattern of con-
fronting and dealing with pol i t i ca l problems which is shared both amongst 
men in time and across generations through time. In po l i t i c s , as in 
every other tradit ional ac t iv i ty , there is an appropriate way of going 
about things; a r ight and wrong way of settling practical problems. 
Like other t radit ions, po l i t i ca l traditions are conservative. They 
insis t that those who participate in pol i t ica l l i f e do so with a sense 
of and regard fo r the past, as well as an appreciation of present prob-
lems and dilemmas. They are concerned with continuity with the past and 
9 
A similar view with regard to the history of science is put 
forward by Kuhn, although there is much else contained in 
his argument as wel l . Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scien-
t i f i c Revolutions, 2nd ed., (Chicago: The University of Chic-
ago Press, 1970). 
A similar view is put forward in Coleman, Samuel, ' Is There 
Reason in Tradition?' in Preston King and B. C. Parekh, eds.. 
Politics and Experience, (Cambridge: The Cambridge University 
Press, 1968) esp. 239-52. 
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and the preservation of an established manner of conducting pol i t ics . 
Pol i t ica l ac t iv i ty , by conforming to the established way of doing 
things, thus confirms and upholds a t radi t ion. I t operates from within, 
so to speak, and maintains the traditional manner of acting and the 
tradit ional standards of judging. 
At the same time, l ike any other act ivi ty within a t radi t ion, 
po l i t i ca l ac t iv i ty is instrumental in modifying the t radi t ion. While 
i t sustains a tradit ion and preserves the established way of doing 
things, i t alters the pattern and changes the way of doing things in 
i t s confrontation with the unique demands of the-present. Poli t ical 
ac t iv i ty is overwhelmingly concerned with the present. Yesterday's 
cr is is is significant only insofar as i t is relevant to today's, and 
today's cr is is is too pressing to worry about what tomorrow's may be. 
In addressing i t s e l f to .the demands of the-present, pol i t ica l act ivi ty 
is guided by the past but not bound by i t . Improvisation is both more 
common and more effective than dogmatism, and the established way of 
doing things is modified accordingly. 
Pol i t ica l ac t iv i ty within a po l i t i ca l t radi t ion , of course, is not 
the only way in which a t radi t ion is changed. Indeed, i t may on occasion 
not be the most significant way. Invasion by an alien power, coloniza-
tion or natural disaster may well bring about profound and far-reaching 
changes in the traditions of a people.- Such changes can be seen,.how-
ever, as relative disruptions in the t radi t ion, bringing about unfore-
seen and unanticipated changes which in a sense invade the tradi t ion 
from without. Pol i t ical ac t iv i ty , on the other hand, ini t iates change 
from within . I t modifies t radi t ion but does not abandon i t . In the 
very act of change i t t es t i f ies to the continuity of the tradition and is 
proof of the v i t a l i t y of i t . 
To speak of a particular po l i t i ca l tradition is to speak of the 
established way of conducting po l i t i ca l activity within a society. I t 
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is to speak of the relative continuity established through time of the 
relationship between such things as poli t ical ta lk, pol i t ical conventions, 
pol i t ica l insti tutions and organizations, and law. The authority which a 
pol i t ica l inst i tut ion enjoys, for example, the conventions i t employs, 
the kinds of decisions i t can reach and judgements i t can make - a l l are 
sustained within a t radi t ion. The continuity of the interrelationship 
of these elements of po l i t i ca l act ivi ty is of greater importance than 
their internal continuity. The continuity of the r i tual of the corona-
tion of the English monarch, for example, is less relevant than the 
relationship of the monarchy to Parliament and the gradual acceptance 
over time of the convention of popular elections with universal adult 
suffrage to determine who shall govern the country. The changing rela-
tionships of these offices and inst i tut ions, conventions and procedures, 
mark the development of the changing British pol i t ica l t radit ion. 
I t is in this sense that a pol i t ica l tradition is not any one of the 
things which have been discussed up to now, nor is i t merely the sum of 
a l l of them. Rather, a pol i t i ca l tradition is the way in which things 
l ike pol i t ica l conventions and inst i tut ions, pol i t ica l organizations and 
law are related to each other, determining the character of pol i t ica l 
ac t iv i ty ; the way in which the collective identity of a people and the 
character of a public order are consciously fashioned. The pol i t ical 
tradit ion of republican Rome, for example, lay in the relationship be-
tween the Senate, which had auctoritas, and the people, who had potestas, 
interacting with one another to determine the character of the public 
o r d e r . A s this relationship changed over time under the new and un-
precedented strains of empire, the established way of carrying on po l i -
t ica l act ivi ty and resolving pol i t ica l questions changed. The tradition 
F. E. Adcock, Roman Poli t ical Ideas and Practice, (Ann Arbor: 
The University ot Michigan .Press, 1966)-, 19-53. ,:; 
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12 was modified and the nature of the public order was altered. 
Like other tradit ions, the established way of carrying on pol i t -
ical act ivi ty and resolving pol i t ica l disputes requires that the trad-
i t i on be shared amongst men in time and through time. As the unprece-
dented demands of the present w i l l result in modifications in the trad-
i t i o n , so also radical changes in those who comprise the public w i l l 
change the established way of doing things. The inf lux of large numbers 
of aliens w i l l disrupt the traditions precisely because the communality 
of the public w i l l be destroyed and the tradition w i l l not be capable 
of being maintained. The pol i t ica l act ivi ty which sustains a t radi t ion, 
making i t a l i v ing thing rather than the dead abstraction of the histor-
ian, w i l l not be possible where there are large numbers of men who do 
not share the same sense of the past and cannot therefore be appreciative 
of the same t rad i t ion . What must follow is a rather profound change in 
what is understood to be native as the newcomers settle amongst the 
older inhabitants and change the character of the public order. 
Where men do not share a common understanding of the r ight way of 
going about po l i t i ca l ac t iv i ty , where they do not act within the same 
pol i t ica l t radi t ion , i t is unlikely that any public order can be sus-
tained through time without the use of coercion. With no common, sense of 
what is and what is not appropriate to po l i t i cs , the possibil i ty of re-
solving differences through po l i t i caTac t iv i ty w i l l be diminished. Men 
w i l l not invest authority in the same inst i tut ions, abide by the same 
conventions, understand the same pol i t i ca l talk in the same way, and w i l l 
be at a loss to know how to deal with the practical problem of holding a 
public order together. I t is for this reason that 'nation building' in 
the underdeveloped world so often disintegrates into violence. Poli t ical 
t radit ions, l ike the public order of which they are a part and which they 
^ ^ i M d . , 54-71. 
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help to sustain, cannot be created overnight. They can only emerge 
through time as men come to share a common understanding of what is 
the right way of going about po l i t i cs . 
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Chapter 10 
FREEDOM AND ORDER 
The concept of freedom which is most common in contemporary under-
standing emphasizes the unfettered exercise of individual w i l l . In this 
view a man is free insofar as he is able to act in whatever manner he 
w i l l s . To the extent that this exercise of his w i l l is l imited, his 
natural freedom is diminished. Poli t ical theorists such as Bodin, 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have begun their considerations with the indi-
vidual in isolation and focused upon the exercise of his w i l l in their 
discussion of freedom. "More recently various influehtiaT contemporary 
writers have similarly seized upon the exercise of w i l l as fundamental 
to freedom.^ 
This emphasis has been developed by the suggestion that w i l l is 
often restrained by forces which may not iatifirst.appear, to l im i t indi -
vidual freedom but which must be recognized as important restrictions on 
an individual's freedom as physical restraint and coercion. Economic 
deprivation, i t has been argued for example, makes the free exercise of 
w i l l impossible and therefore the production and distribution of econ- , 
omic goods must receive attention in any examination of freedom. Thus, 
Laski argues that 'There is in truth no real shadow of doubt that i t is 
upon the issue of property that the whole problem of l iberty hinges to-
day, as i t has always done in the past.' 
Cf. for example, Neitzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zara-
thustra, R. J. Hollingdale, trans., (London: Penguin Books, , 
1971); Camus, Albert, The Outsider, Stuart Gilbert, trans., 
(London: Penguin Books, r97l); and Ki r i l l ov ' s explanation of 
his suicide in Dostoyevsky, Fyodor, The Devils, David Magar-
shack, trans., (London: Penguin Books, 1969), esp. 122-27. 
2 
Laski, Harold, Liberty in the Modern State, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, L td . , 1948), TT. Laski seems to use the 
words ' l i be r ty ' and 'freedom' interchangeably, as does Berlin 
in his famous essay, 'Two Concepts of Liberty' . However, i t 
w i l l be argued below that there is a distinction to be made 
between these two terms. 
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I t is certainly true that in order to'exercise his w i l l a man 
must be al ive. Without the conditions to sustain l i f e , the entire 
question of being either free or unfree becomes irrelevant. No one, 
however, is completely free from biological necessity. Recognition 
that biological demands always impinge upon the w i l l of men reduces 
the concept of 'freedom from want' to a matter of relative freedom, 
with the distinction between freedom and the lack of i t largely a matter 
of individual judgement. I t is confusing, therefore, to speak of even 
relative freedom from such biological necessities as i f i t . were comp-
arable, or equatable with freedom in a pol i t ica l sense. There is cert-
ainly a relationship between freedom in a pol i t ica l sense and the free-
dom from want. The two are not to ta l ly dis t inct , but neither are they 
equivalent. Being alive to exercise w i l l is a precondition for but not 
a def ini t ion of po l i t i ca l freedom. 
Even when the biological demands which must be satisfied i f l i f e 
is to be sustained have been taken into consideration, however, the 
emphasis on mere w i l l is not enough to define freedom. The exercise of 
w i l l implies choice. I t implies that a man is able to conceive of a l t -
ernative courses of action which are open to him and choose one course 
over the others. Animals acting instinctively behave in a particular 
manner without reflecting that there may be other ways of acting. They 
are not free insofar as the possibil i ty of choosing does not present 
i t s e l f to them. Reason and judgement - the ab i l i t y t^o conceive of a l t -
ernatives as well as to act without hindrance - are thus closely linked . 
with freedom. Economic deprivation may make the exercise of w i l l impo-
ssible, physical restraint may curtai l i t by making i t too painful to be 
attempted, and limited reason and judgement may restr ict i t by narrowing 
the alternatives which are envisioned. All are important in the achieve-
3 
Berl in, Sir I . , Two Concepts of Liberty, (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1958), IFTTI 
ment of freedom. I t has been claimed, for example, that men in twen-
t ie th century capital ist society are not free because, although they 
may enjoy an economic surplus and be free from physical restraint, they 
are unable to conceive of more than a limited range of choices. To the 
extent that their view of the alternatives open to them is restricted, 
their freedom is diminished."^ 
I f freedom is the exercise of w i l l in choosing a course of action, 
liberation may be understood-as the emancipation of-men from a limited 
number of choices and the presentation of new and hitherto unrecognized 
alternatives. A revolution, for example, does not simply overthrow an 
oppressive regime but attempts to open unexplored courses of action; to 
i n i t i a t e an awareness of new alternatives. . I t is this hope of a change 
of consciousness, or a change of self consciousness (or a liberation 
from 'false-consciousness' in Marxist terms) which impels the revolu-
tionary leader to inaugurate a new calendar with a new era dating from 
the l iberat ion. Not simply a new regime, but a new order has been i n i -
tiated and, i t is implied, new choices are possible. This understanding 
of l iberation i s , I think, consistent with a history of usage which 
dates at least from the French Revolution of 1789, and is exemplified 
in the present movements for liberation from the 'Four Olds' in the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China to Women's Liberation in 
the West. A l l emphasize a new awareness of the possibili t ies presented 
to the individual and a new exploration of the hitherto unrecognized or 
rejected alternatives. 
Liberation may then be seen as a precondition of the realization 
of freedom but i t cannot be equated with freedom. Before I can.be free 
I must be capable of recognizing that there are alternatives which are 
4 
This is one of the major themes in the argument of Marcuse 
Marcuse, Herbert, One-Dimensional Man, (London: Sphere Books, 
• L td . , 1970); and An Essay on Liberation,-(London: The Penguin 
Press, 1969). 
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open to me. The more liberated I am - that i s , the more alternatives 
which I see - the greater niy capacity to act f reely. Freedom as i t is 
understood by Laski (that i s , freedom from want and economic depriva-
tion) may then also be seen as a question of l iberation; of liberation 
from the forces which res t r ic t the alternatives which are open to the 
individual. I cannot be free to choose to do X or not to do X unti l I 
am liberated from the deprivation and economic inequalities which com-
pel me to do X i f I am to survive. That i s , I cannot be free to choose 
unt i l I am presented with genuine alternatives. 
Liberation must always be a matter of degree. I can never enjoy 
absolute liberation for there is never a time when a l l restraints are 
absent and a l l alternatives are genuinely available to me. Some res-
t r ic t ions may be removed, thereby liberating me from the relatively 
narrow range of choices which I faced previously. There are, however, 
some restrictions which no one person or group of men can ever remove. 
Government action, in the form of social security benefits, may l ibe-
rate me from my poverty, but i t can never liberate me from the res t r i -
ctions of time, fo r example. There is no way in which I am free to 
choose the age in which I l ive or society into which I am born, and to 
the extent that these irremedial facts of my existence res t r ic t the a l t -
ernatives which are open to me, I f a l l short of complete liberation. 
'Freedom from' , then, is libera.tion. I t is relative liberation 
from the forces which res t r ic t the number of alternatives which are open 
to the individual or his capacity to realize just what those alternatives 
are. However, i t s e f fec t is not to make the individual free, but to make 
him capable of being free. Liberation is no guarantee of freedom, ensur-
ing that the relative absence of restraint and the opportunity to exer-
cise freedom, w i l l be acted upon. A man may be, to a certain extent, 
liberated against his w i l l . The restrictions which formerly limited his 
relative range of choices may be l i f t e d and vast new possibilit ies may 
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be opened to him. Others may have accomplished this on his behalf, 
acting in his interest to liberate him from a repressive regime, for 
example. The individual, however, cannot be made free against his 
w i l l , nor can others exercise his freedom on his behalf. Freedom is 
not a thing, a possession, which can either be given to or withheld 
from men l ike a g i f t . A man is not given freedom, nor can he be made to 
be free. Freedom, unlike l iberation, is only manifested in action. A 
man is free when he acts f reely , and only his actions, not his relative 
range of possible alternatives, enable us to say that he is free.^ 
Liberation is the concern of the state. I t is the state which acts 
to provide f u l l employment in the economy or to provide welfare for the 
needy. I t is the state which acts against those who interfere arbi-
t r a r i l y with the free movement of i t s subjects, prosecuting the th ie f , 
kidnapper or murderer. Of course, the state i t s e l f is circumscribed by 
procedures which attempt to guard against the possibil i ty of i t s acting 
capriciously. One branch of the state can take action against another. 
The police can be investigated and prosecuted, Ministers of the Crown 
and c i v i l servants can be brought before the courts, writs of habeas 
corpus can be demanded. The actions ini t ia ted by the state do not en-
sure that the individual w i l l in fact exercise his capacity to be free 
within the public order. They merely liberate the individual from the 
restraints which would otherwise make-it impossible for him to act 
freely. 
5 
This immediately leads to a number of problems. How can we 
t e l l whether or not a man is ' t r u l y ' free? Perhaps he is in 
the grip of some psychic or emotional force which makes the 
exercise of w i l l informed by reason impossible. The insane, 
for example, are not regarded as free. Freedom is not f e l t 
to be meaningful when we are considering infants who are not 
considered to be mature enough to show good judgement. The 
d i f f i c u l t y seems to centre on how legitimate i t is to infer 
states of mind from actions; whether we can infer that a man 
acts freely i f he seems to do so. This, however, is not 
central to our considerations here, and must be put to one 
side as an interesting but tangential problem. 
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Once liberated, however, i t is immediately obvious that men, as 
opposed to an abstract individual man, cannot exist together in a 
state of absolute freedom. I f any sort of orderly relationship between 
men is to be sustained, absolute or 'natural freedom', understood only 
as the unhindered exercise of w i l l , must be restrained in some way. I t 
is for this reason that a number of poli t ical philosophers, focusing 
simply on the exercise of w i l l , have contrasted the absolute freedom of 
man in a state of nature with the limited and restricted freedom of men 
in a po l i t i ca l society.^ The problem of pol i t ica l theory then seems to 
become one of reconciling as far as possible absolute freedom with the 
demands of public order. How much of his absolute and natural freedom 
may a man legitimately give up in order to achieve and sustain a public 
order? Which aspects of his freedom must he divest himself of i f any 
kind of public order is to exist at all? Freedom is posed at one end of 
the continuum and public order at the other. Pol i t ical philosophers 
then attempt to discover rational and defensible cr i ter ia for selecting 
one point on the continuum rather than another as the best possible and 
most rational reconciliation of two antithetical values. Underlying 
such arguments is the notion that freedom and order are inherently con-
tradictory; that more freedom means less order, just as more order means 
less freedom. I t is in these terms that the majority of the debate over 
freedom and order has taken place within the Western tradition of po l i -
t ica l philosophy. 
What is suggested here is that the issue is not quite so simple that 
we can see freedom as contradictory to public order. The mistake, I think, 
is the assumption that freedom is fundamentally nothing more or less than 
Bodin, Jean, Six Books of the Commonwealth, M. 0. Tooley, ed. 
and trans., (Oxford: Basfl Blackwell, 1957); Hobbes, Thomas, 
Leviathan. Michael Oakeshott, ed., (New York: Collier Books, 
1962); LockQ John, Two Treatises on Government, Peter Laslett, 
ed., (London: The New English Library, 19^3) are a l l examples 
of this kind of viewpoint. 
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the unfettered exercise of w i l l informed by reason and judgement. To 
such a view freedom is simply freedom, the same in a hypothetical 
state of nature as in a society, albeit perhaps necessarily limited in 
society. In contrast, i t is suggested here that freedom in a public 
order is completely dis t inct from this abstract notion of freedom as 
the unfettered exercise of w i l l . The contention is that far from be-
ing in conf l ic t with public order, freedom is dependent upon public 
order as a precondition for i t s appearance.'' 
Liberal theorists who see freedom as inimical to public order are 
concerned with creating an area of autonomy within which men w i l l be 
free to act without hindrance from others. For example, 
Mi l l believes in l ibe r ty , that i s , the r ig id 
l imitat ion of the r ight to coerce, because he 
is sure that men cannot develop and flourish 
and become f u l l y human unless they are l e f t 
free from interference by other;men within a ; 
certain minimum area of their lives ° 
Freedom within this minimum area makes me my own man, a self-determined 
individual who is not subject to the w i l l of another. My actions are my 
own, and I am free to be myself. That iSj within this area of autonomy, 
I preserve an individual- identi ty. 
Mil l was unsuccessful in his attempt to delineate this minimum 
area of autonomy in terms of self-regarding and other-regarding actions. 
(What ac t iv i ty , fo r example, is primarily"and unequivocally self-
regarding?) His fa i lu re is not his alone, however, but is shared with 
him by a l l theorists (and not jus t the liberals) who see identity as an 
individual possession which only flourishes in an area of autonomy and 
isolation where I can 'be myself . Mi l l f a i l s in his attempt to guard 
the sanctity of individual identity against the world because, as we have 
A similar point is made in Winch, Peter, 'Authority ' , in 
Anthony Quinton, ed.. Pol i t ical Philosophy, (Oxford: The 
Oxford University PressTTSFTyTTO?: 
Q 
Berl in, Sir I . , Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: The Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 190. ~ 
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seen, identity is not an individual possession to be secreted away 
from the world or defended against the world, but is created in the 
world, amongst our fellow-men. We l ive in a common social world and 
i t is this world which gives significance to our actions. The freedom 
we have to establish our individual identity is a freedom to act within 
this common world. I t is a. freedom which cannot, therefore, be mani-
fested by just any action but only by action which is comprehensible 
and comprehended. I t can show i t s e l f only in action which is understood 
within the context of public order; action which manifests an appreci-
ation of the appropriate idiom. Such action, as we have seen, may 
modify a public order but i t does not constitute a rejection of public 
order. 
Far from being some natural r ight or capacity which we hold apart 
from one another, freedom, l ike individual identi ty, depends on the 
sharing of a common framework of order; on the appreciation of a common 
idiom. Will informed by reason and judgement is not enough to achieve 
this freedom. Robinson Crusoe on his desert island, for example, 
builds himself a shelter and gathers a plent i ful supply of food. He 
satisfies the conditions necessary for l i f e and is relatively free from 
economic deprivation. He can be said to be at l iberty and is thus in a 
position to exercise freedom. Subject to no man, and neither madman 
nor chi ld , he enjoys complete 'natural freedom'. But as long as he 
remains in isolat ion, he has no identity and cannot be said to enjoy 
freedom which has any significance. The freedom which he enjoys in 
this state of nature establishes nothing and leaves behind no trace of 
i t s ever having been. I t is completely momentary and ephemeral, cons-
tantly slipping into the past with no instant more significant than any 
other. Freedom within a public order, in contrast, is not a limited or 
constrained form of this natural or absolute freedom; not something of 
a milder version' toned down to suit men l iving in society. The difference 
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between these two understandings of freedom is a difference of kind 
and not a difference of degree. Incorporating w i l l and judgement, 
this second notion of freedom goes beyond these to the recognition of 
the public order within which i t appears. The exercise of freedom 
within a public order saves action from obliteration by the present. 
Only within a public order does action achieve distinction and remem-
brance. I t is preserved beyond the moment of i t s appearance by being 
performed within a circle of members who are in a position to appreciate 
"its significance. Only then does the exercise of freedom serve to 
af f i rm the identity of the individual. 
To speak of freedom simply in terms of individual autonomy is to 
speak of an intellectual abstraction which reveals l i t t l e to us, and to 
pose an intellectual problem which has l i t t l e relevance to us. No one 
is ever born in a state of natural freedom, and even i f we could recon-
c i le natural freedom with public order i t would not guarantee that the 
enjoyment of i t would be significant to us.. I f we begin with a notion 
of abstract absolute freedom, we both overlook the v i t a l public element 
of freedom, which gives meaning and significance to our actions, and we 
are led down a false path of attempting to reconcile this abstraction 
with public order. In contrast to abstract 'natural freedom', the 
American 'Founding Fathers' . 
. . . used the term freedom with a new, hitherto a l -
most unknown emphasis on public freedom, an indic-
ation that they understood by freedom something 
very d i f ferent from the free wi l l or free thought 
that philosophers had known and discussed since 
Augustine. This public freedom was not an inner 
9 
I t is the lack of identity which is striking about existen-
t i a l characters of modern l i tera ture ; men who never quite 
lose their air of strangeness and appear to us as ind iv i -
duals who are at home nowhere. Camus' protagonist in The 
Outsider, or Sartre's in Nausea are examples. Their burden 
seems not to be freedom which they cannot decide how to 
exercise, but isolation which makes their freedom insigni-
f icant and renders a l l their actions equally valuable, and 
thus equally valueless. Camus, ibid.; Sartre, Jean-Paul, 
Nausea, Robert Baldick, trans., (London: Penguin Books, 
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realm into which men might escape from the 
pressures of the world, nor was i t the 
liberum arbitrium Which makes the w i l l choose • 
between alternatives. Freedom for them could 
only exist in public; i t was a tangible 
worldly g i f t or capacity; i t was the man-made 
public space or market place which antiquity 
had known as the area where freedom appears 
and becomes visible to all .10 
An individual can be liberated in isolation. Apart from others he can 
ref lect upon the possibil i t ies his situation presents to him, and using 
reason and judgement, he can explore the implications of new and prev-
iously unseen alternatives. But he can only be free within a public 
order. 
This freedom is manifested by the reinterpretation and creative 
re-arrangement of elements which constitute a public order. In this 
sense, the exercise of freedom is a variation on the theme of order. 
Not r ig id ly confined to the monotonous repetition of prescribed actions, 
• i t is the play of w i l l , reason and judgement within the established 
framework of public order. Freedom ' . . . lives in a context of order; 
and order, beneficial to l iber ty /"or freedom, as the term is being 
used here7» is maintained by traditions of many sorts, some of them quite 
i l l i b e r a l in their c o n t e n t ' . T r a d i t i o n s maintain their v i t a l i t y to the 
extent that men are free to employ them creatively, always acting within 
the tradit ion but never merely imitating the past. Conversely, i t is 
within the order maintained by the v i t a l i t y of tradit ion that individual 
freedom flourishes. 
The outcome of free actions amongst men is not predictable, for who 
knows how one man w i l l exercise his freedom, but neither is i t incompre-
hensible. I t is this exercise of freedom within a framework of order 
Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution, (London: Faber and Faber, 
1953), 120. 
Shils, Edward A. , 'Tradition and Liberty: Antimony and 
Independence', Ethics, vol . LXVIII, no. 3, (Apr i l , 1958), 
154. The same point is also made in Cassirer, Ernst, The 
Logic of the Humanities, (London: The Yale University 
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which makes an action uniquely mine and at the same time makes i t com-
prehensible to those about me. It makes an act mine in the way that 
each sentence I speak is my creation, establishing something about me, 
but is at the same time public and understood by those around me be-
cause i t is within the framework of the accepted language. 
Creativity is forever in conflict with tradition. 
But here . . . i t is wrong to paint the conflict in 
black and white - as i f one side had a complete 
monopoly on values and the other side a total ab-
sence of values. Tendencies toward preservation 
are no less significant and just as indispensable 
as those which seek renewal; for renewal can only 
come to flower through being preserved, and pre-
servation is possible only through self-renewal.''^ 
The tension that exists between freedom and order is inevitable, but 
i t is not pernicious. The two are dependent on one another i f men are 
both to act together and to establish their individual identities in 
13 
the world. 
As freedom and order are not contradictory but rather are inter-
dependent, so also i t is with freedom and authority. It is the strength 
of authority, arising out of and reinforcing public order, which makes 
political freedom possible. This is not to say that any particular 
action taken by an authority may not curtail the scope of freedom, but 
that there is no inherent cdntradiction b!etween them. 'Authority im-
plies obedience where men retain their freedom ....'"^^ Do away with 
authority entirely and political l i fe can only be held together by 
persuasion or public order maintained by coercion, and both are always 
liable to disintegrate in violence. 
12 
Cassirer, ibid., 197. 
13 
The same point is made by Whitehead in- his discussion of what 
he calls spontaneity in Whitehead, A. N., 'Aspects of Freedom' 
in Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed.. Freedom: Its Meaning, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1942), 42-67. 
14 
Arendt, Hannah, Between Past and Future. (New York: Meridian 
Books, The World Publishing Co., 1968), 106. 
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If we look at the conflicting statements of 
conservatives /That authority is erode_^ and 
liberals /That freedom is receding7 with im-
partial eyes, we can easily see that the 
truth is equally distributed between them, and 
that we are in fact confronted with a simult-
aneous recession of both freedom and authority 
in the modern world. 
Violence, far from being the full realization of freedom, is a 
threat to i t . It is a threat not because it violates the natural 
rights of any one individual or even because i t is the manifestation of 
an abdication of reason; an emotional orgy where the less exalted ele-
ments of a man's nature take command of his actions, although i t may 
well be this. Violence, as we have seen, is the destruction of all 
limits. I t is this very destructiveness which threatens freedom be-
cause i t threatens the public order within which freedom makes its 
appearance. Violence destroys the very limits which create the public 
order and bind men together, and is thus inimical to the exercise of 
freedom. Violence may liberate men but it cannot make them free. This 
is why i t is to be resisted by any who wish to preserve the potential 
for freedom. 
Freedom is also inimical to the immutable cycle of routine tasks 
which allows for no room for variation and thus no exercise of freedom.^ ^ 
A factory worker on an essembly line performing the same task countless 
times is no more than an extension of his machine. Confined to this 
repetitive job and classified in terms of his functional contribution 
to production he has, as Marx appreciated, no human identity."'^ • 
15 
Arendt, Hannah, 'Authority in the Twentieth Century', 
Review of Politics, 18: 403-17, (October, 1956), 414. 
This contrast between political l i fe and productive activity 
is one of the major themes of Hannah Arendt's work. The 
Human Condition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958), esp. 22-78. 
''^  Marx, Karl, Early Writings, T. B. Bottomore, trans, and 
ed., (London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), 59-70. 
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The formalized safeguards which are designed in a given society 
to protect the capacity of the individual to exercise his freedom may 
be understood as protecting the possibility of creative activity within 
the framework of the public order rather than any natural rights held 
prior to society. Freedom of'speech, of assembly, of the press, of 
"religious persuasion may all be guaranteed. But these are freedoms 
which operate within the framework of public order. What is not guar-
anteed is the right of overthrowing the entire public order. The guar-
antees of the rights of the individual do not extend to the complete 
dissolution of the public order itself , which perhaps would be liber-
ating, but which would, at least for a time, destroy the very precon-
ditions of freedom. 
The exercise of freedom in the determination of the character of 
the public order, and thus the kind of identity which will be possible 
in a society, is the realm of political l ife. It is in political acti-
vity that men exercise their freedom as citizens to put forward various 
perspectives as to what should be preserved and what should be altered. 
Here they will exercise their rights in an attempt to inform the public 
order with their views. They will engage in political talk, support 
political organizations,.stand for office, and exercise their judgement 
within political institutions as to what is in keeping with the tradi-
tions of their society. What is required in political l i fe is the crea-
tive exercise of wi l l , judgement and reason in deciding how the demands 
of the present shall be met and the character of the society preserved 
through time. 
There is nothing inevitable or necessary about the exercise of 
freedom in political activity. Where men choose not to exercise their 
freedom, by withdrawing their attention from politics or ceasing to value 
their rights as citizens,-political l i fe declines and the possibility, as 
well as the significance of political freedom is diminished. Order may 
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be preserved in such a case, but i t becomes more and more an imposition 
and less and less the creation of free men. 
If freedom must be exercised within a public order to be of signi-
ficance and to establish an individual identity, the character of free-
dom will depend upon the charcter of the public order in any given soci-
ety. What i t means to be free in this particular society, and the possi-
bilities for creative re-arrangement and re-interpretation of the public 
order which are open to any given individual will be determined by the 
conditions of membership as they have come to be established through time. 
There are, therefore, no inherent universal freedoms which exist as a 
priori rights, outside of the specific order within which the individual 
becomes himself and establishes who he i s . When we move from a discussion 
of the abstract notion of freedom to an attempt to l i s t specific freedoms, 
we must also move from the abstract notion of public order to a specific 
order within which specific freedoms are exercised. There is no reason to 
suppose that the possibilities of being free will be the same in their spe-
c i f ic content in all public orders, or even that they should be the same. 
Nor is i t a rejection of the value of freedom to say that its specific 
manifestation in one society may be quite different from its specific mani-
festation in another, and that there is no one manifestation which ought 
to be common to a l l . 
So far we have seen that freedom cannot be understood merely as the 
exercise of will informed by reason and judgement. It must be exercised 
within a public order and becomes the means by which an identity is ex-
pressed through the creative interpretation and re-arrangement of the ele-
ments of that order, making i t 'mine', and not something which has been 
imposed upon me from outside, at the same time that i t is public and shared 
amongst my fellows. There i s , however, a further implication of the recog-
nition that freedom, as opposed to liberation, is exercised within a public 
order. 
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In Montesquieu's The Persian Letters we are presented with a Persian 
Sultan who is supposedly writing of his impressions of eighteenth century 
18 
Paris. I f any man can be expected to enjoy the fullest possible extent 
of liberation, surely i t is one such as he. He is free from economic 
deprivation, and enjoys a lavish scale of living which apparently leaves 
him with no want or desire unsatisfied. As absolute lord and master over 
his subjects, he is able to exercise his will freely. There are (relat-
ively speaking) no hindrances which limit him. In his ability to command 
the complete obedience of his subjects, his will is extended beyond the 
confines of his own person. He has slaves who are nothing more than an 
extension of himself, instruments of his will. Not only does he operate 
within a public order, he is the personification of that order. I t derives 
its structure and character from him and he alone is in a position to alter 
i t . 
I t is obvious that i f his slaves are to be free, they must be liberated 
from the domination of the Sultan. Clearly their, freedom can only become 
possible, in a public order where none dominate and all are free. They will 
be capable of realizing their freedom only when they are liberated from 
their subjugation to their former master and are equal with him. That i s , 
they will be capable of b.eing .free when all.are equaljy liberated from the 
will of any other who might aribtrarily restrict the alternatives avail-
able to them, and when all are equally at liberty to create an identity in 
public. The ascendancy of any one man over the others disrupts this 
equality, allowing him to sijpplant their own will with his own, and to 
diminish their identity in doing so. Freedom amongst men, therefore, im-
plies an equality amongst them; the equal enjoyment of the rights and 
duties of membership. It is not surprising to conclude that the despotism 
18 Montesquieu, Charles De, The Persian Letters, C. J . Betts 
trans., (London: the PenguTrTPress, 19/3). " 
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of the Sultan must be overthrown i f his slaves are to be liberated and 
to enjoy the possibility of being free. 
Montesquieu goes further than this, however, and tells us that 
1 g 
despite his being liberated, the Sultan himself is not a free man. 
Despite the unfettered exercise of his wil l , not only within a public 
order but in the creation and formation of public order, he comes to feel 
a deficiency in his l i fe . Significantly he comes to recognize this defi-
ciency most clearly when he is faced with a rebellion in his palace; that 
i s , within the very order which he has created. His despotical power is 
overthrown. We should expect this to reduce his ability to act freely. 
I t i s , however, the very success of this rebellion which makes him a 
truly free man, correcting the deficiency of his former state of rela-
tive liberation. 
The defiency is one of being liberated but living in a world of 
things rather than being free and living in a world with other men. The 
Sultan enjoys the furthest possible extent of liberation but is s t i l l not 
free because there is no public order composed of equals before whom he 
may perform; no circle of fellow-men who will attend to his action and be 
appreciative of his efforts. Surrounded by slaves who are l i t t le more 
than an extension of his wi l l , he is deprived of the society of equals 
which gives significance to his actions and meaning to his freedom. 
Freedom is not the possession of one man to be exercised over others. 
This is domination and may result in liberation, but i t does not lead to 
freedom. Freedom is exercised amongst men, not objects, and the freedom 
of any one man depends on the freedom of other men, and therefore on their 
equality. As Montesquieu recognized, the freedom of the master depends 
upon the liberation of the slave. Not only is a slave a mere thing con-
19 
This interpretation of Montesquieu's work was f irst suggested 
by the treatment given Montesquieu in Berman, Marshall, The 
MLtJcs of Authenticity, (London: George Allen and Unwi~ 
Lza,, I y / L ) j , 3 - 5 6 . 
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fined to a function, but so also is a master. Neither enjoy the equality 
which is necessary to the public order and the exercise of freedom within 
a circle of fellows. Master and slave remain things to each other; out-
20 
side forces but not men with individual identities. 
Membership in a civi l society, then, affords men the opportunity of 
being men, not things, amongst equals in a public order which they have 
helped to create. Their adherence to the conditions of membership main-
tains the order in which their identity is fashioned and their freedom 
attained. The laws of a society, the authority of its institutions and 
power of its organizations, create the breathing space within which free-
dom in political activity can be exercised. In this way the public order 
is sustained long enough in the face of change so that men may come to-
gether to debate, deliberate and decide how best to act in the face of 
the present situation. The maintenance over time of a relatively contin-
uous public order is to be. valued because only then i t is possible for 
men to be free. 
Hegel, arguing from different premises and for a different 
purpose, makes the same point in his Phenomenology of Mind 
in his chapter on 'Lordship and Bondage'. "Hegel, G. W. F . , 
The Phenomenology of Mind., J . B. Baillie, trans., (New York: 
Harper and Row, 196/), 22'8-40. The same argument is taken 
up in the Philosophy of History, especially in the 'Intro-
duction'. Hegel, G. W. F . . TFie Philosophy of History, 
J . Sibree, trans., (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. , 1956) 
18-19, 50, 70-71, 104-05. 
CONCLUSION 
Because we live in a world of time, limits are imposed upon the 
extent of all our activities. Any contribution to public debate or 
conversation must eventually come to a close. But in philosophy 
finding a place to stop a'discussion is 9s :difficult as finding a place 
to begin because to the philosopher all aspects of experience are of 
potential interest. Although his exploration of experience must strive 
to be complete, therefore, i t is difficult to regard any philosophical 
enquiry as ever complete. Wherever the philosopher begins he must 
assume and wherever he stops he must omit, in spite of the fact that 
assumption and omission are failings in a philosophic work. Stopping 
places, then, like starting places, are in a certain sense arbitrary in 
any given philosophic analysis. There is always more that could be 
said; more distinctions that could be made, relationships which could 
be traced, and conclusions which could be drawn. 
I t is possible, for example, that having explored the relationship 
between political activity and p.ublic order, this discussion could con-
tinue to elaborate the ways in which politics may be distinguished from 
religious vocations or economic enterprises. These are two distinct 
human activities with which political l ife has been or is frequently 
identified. Much fruitful discussion.may result from an attempt to show 
how such understandings of politics may be said to distort or misrepresent 
the character of political l i fe as i t has emerged in modern Western lib--
eral democratic socities. Issue could be taken with such views, the 
conclusions of other works disputed, and the distinctions between polit-
ical l i fe and other kinds of activity further explored. 
However, the aim of this essay has been to characterize the way in 
which political activity has come to be carried on in a particular kind 
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of society. To the extent that the character of this political life 
has been illuminated, its purpose has been indicated rather than accom-
plished. More could always be said. Nevertheless, i t is hoped that 
this analysis has revealed distinctive features of political l i fe in 
civil society and helped to discern the ways in which distinct aspects 
of political activity, taken together, serve at once to maintain and to 
modify this public order. 
What has been attempted here is an illumination of the way in which 
public order is fundamental in the establishment of human identity in a 
world of time and change. To the extent that this order endures through 
time the likelihood that the"significance of individual political actions 
will be appreciated is enhanced, and the possibility of creating a new 
order is increased.. Such an order, however, cannot be said to be perfect. 
I t is not established once and for all bu-t. is a temporal order which must 
continually be adapted ;to the needs of the present i f - i t is to survive. 
Such adaptation does not constitute complete and total change. In a 
public order things do change but they do not change all at once. Poli-
tical changes are developmental and political modifications gradual. 
There is always some link with the way things used to be; some continuity 
with the past. 
The successful outcome of political activity is the preservation of 
this continuity. That is to say that the successful outcome of political 
activity is the possibility of further political activity. Unlike a 
philosophic work, politics does not simply fai l to exhaust its subject 
matter. It does not seek to conclude. Its subject matter is not a given 
experience. Rather i t is experience in the making; an experience both 
public and incomplete. One cannot imagine, for example, any public fig-
ure retiring from political l i fe on the grounds that all that needed to 
be done has now been accomplished and there is no further need to concern 
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ourselves with political questions. The goal of political activity is 
not a Utopia. I t is the maintenance and modification of public order. 
Within this public order, largely maintained through political 
activity, other activity flourishes. Only in a public order can men 
have some reasonable assurance of where they stand with one another. 
Without such confidence, i t would be impossible for men to coordinate 
their activities in imposing their plans and projects upon the world 
and bending events to their purpose. 
Such an order cannot be sustained by any single element of poli-
tical l i fe which has been discussed in this essay. Laws create oblig-
ations amongst men, but no system of law can meet every future contin-
gency or deal adequately with all the complexities and intricacies of 
human l i fe . Inevitably significant areas of the lives of men will 
elude the obligations imposed by a system of law, and the order which is 
sustained through time cannot be traced to law alone. Political organ-
izations may recruit men for the purpose of achieving a political pro-
gramme and establishing a public order of a particular character. The 
state may be commissioned to enforce the obligations which have been 
stipulated in law and to protect the rights guaranteed by law. However, 
although men may admire the power of a political party and fear the 
coercive power of a police force, power and coercion alone are not 
sufficient to maintain public order through time. Some societies may 
employ coercion more than others, but none can rely with any certainty 
on coercion alone to create and maintain the common world within which 
men interact. Political talk may make men conscious of the character 
of the society within which they fashion their identities, but political 
talk, because i t is talk, is not enough to sustain public order. I t may 
reinforce the public order by maintaining the currency of its terms and 
by reminding men of the problems which they must confront i f their 
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society is to survive. However, the perspectives offered in political 
talk are not enough to ensure that decisions will be reached and acted 
upon to meet the challenges of change. 
Taken on their own, law, political organizations and political 
talk are incapable of maintaining public order. These aspects of poli-
tical l i fe would be ineffectual without the exercise of authority, 
Authority is crucial in making the voice of political figures heard, 
political conventions followed^ and legal obligations complied with. 
Men in office have the last word in political talk. They are able to 
resolve the debate in favour of one perspective or another only where 
men recognize the legitimacy of their pre-eminence and defer to their 
judgement. The political conventions which they invoke to bring an end 
to political talk and to authorize action will be efficacious only 
where they are acknowledged by men. The rights and duties of membership 
in c ivi l society which are specified in law will meet with compliance 
only where men acknowledge as authoritative the procedures by which *+»ej(^  
they were formulated and the institutions by which they were approved. 
I t is the exercise of authority in making and executing final decisions 
on behalf of all members of a society which makes political activity of 
such great interest to those concerned with the character of the public 
order. I t is for this reason that access to positions of political 
authority is the primary aim of competing political organizations. 
I f political activity is concerned with the maintenance of public 
order, and i f the exercise of authority is crucial to political activity, 
both are, in turn, dependent upon public order. Were there no public 
order, political activity amongst men would be impossible. Only where 
men share a common understanding of the rights and duties incumbent upon 
them as members of a public order and a common appreciation of the signi-
ficance of membership are they in a position to engage in debate as to 
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what modifications would be.appropriate. Any form of political organ-
ization is possible only where men already enjoy the communality of a 
society within which they are able to communicate with one another and 
to subordinate their activities to the achievement of a goal. The 
perspectives offered in political talk are possible only where there is 
already a public order providing the occasion for i t . The acknowledge-
ment of the authority of political institutions, political conventions 
and the obligations imposed by law does not arise ex nihiio but i$ 
possible only within an existing public order. Authority is carried 
forward into the present from the past - a past which is significant 
because i t is a common past. Authority cannot, therefore, exist apart 
from the public order within which i t appears, and i t must always remain 
dependent on that order. 
What has been examined in this essay, then, is the way in which 
authority, public order and political activity are interrelated and 
interdependent. Although they are distinct from one another, none can 
exist apart from the others. Public order could not exist through time 
without politics both maintaining and modifying the character of the 
society through the exercise of authority. Were authority to evaporate 
and public order to disintegrate, on the other hand, politics would be 
an impossible achievement. At the same time authority can only appear 
where men know themselves to be members of a public order and agree to 
accept the political conventions and political procedures according to 
which men come to occupy political office. 
From these observations a paradox seems to emerge. Rather than 
clarifying the relationship between public order ,and political activity, 
our analysis seems to present us with a puzzle. Political activity and 
the exercise of authority, which are crucial in the maintenance of public 
order, presuppose the public order which they sustain. Although they are 
concerned with preserving the continuity of-public order over time, 
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neither political activity nor the exercise of authority would be 
possible apart from an on-going public order. Order, we are led to 
conclude, is the basis for the preservation of order. 
The recognition that order is the basis for the preservation of 
order is one reason why deception is so crucial to Machiavelli's Prince. 
The Prince must always appear to be in command of events and successful 
in maintaining his power. Only by seeming to be the master of events 
can he persuade his potential subjects that order exists before i t does 
in fact exist. Convincing his subjects that order does exist is nece-
ssary i f he is to be in a position to establish order. In the same way 
Hobbes's social contract must presuppose some kind of order so that the 
sovereign may be instituted and public order established. Although his 
notion of a contract securing the transition from a state of nature to 
civil society has often been attacked as self-contradictory, it is a 
legal fiction which implicitly acknowledges the fact that i t is only 
out of order and not out of chaos that order can be created. Similarly 
the 19th century historical school of jurisprudence saw Western Euro-
pean civi l society as the culmination of a long process of evolution. 
To this view the present order was a state of social and political deve-
lopment which could only have been reached through the gradual modifi-
cation of previous orders and not one which could have been instituted 
at one moment in time. 
Another paradox appears when we consider any given aspect of poli-
tical activity. Although we may speak of an order in abstract terms, 
i t is only in concrete actions amongst men that we have evidence for i t ; 
only in specific instances, such as the invocation of a convention or 
the enforcement of a law, that we can say it has been manifested. When 
we look around us seeking evidence for the existence of a public order 
we can only point to various actions of men. Yet at the same time these 
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specific actions achieve their significance by being placed in the 
context of a public order. Only by locating i t within an established 
common world are we able to identify i t as the invocation of a conven-
tion of the enforcement of a law. On the one hand, order is only mani-
fested in distinct actions. On the other hand, such action can only be 
seen to be significant and meaningful in the context of order. 
These paradoxes, however, are ones which arise only in the course 
of discussion. That is to say, they emerge from philosophic analysis 
and not from practical activity. They are paradoxes which disappear 
when we remind ourselves that unlike philosophic analysis, a public order 
does not begin with one point and proceed in a logical or reasonable 
manner to the next. The chicken-or-the-egg dilemma does not present 
i tself here because, unlike either chickens or eggs, a public order does 
not begin, giving rise to political talk, political conventions, etc., 
nor is i t produced by them. On the contrary, i t is a continuing prac-
tice which is under no compulsion to begin anywhere. Only explanations 
and analyses have to begin at one point and move on to the next. Because 
our attention is directed f irs t to one point and then to another, analysis 
dissects a public order, distinguishing and separating its various aspects 
from each other. Political institutions can be distinguished from poli-
tical organizations, for example, and can be said to operate in a diff-
erent manner. However, the elucidation of these philosophic distinctions 
does not mean that a public order is held together by discrete and iso-
lated components, like individual building blocks which, when arranged in 
a particular way, go to make up a house. A public order is a unity; a 
roughly coherent society which is lived in as a whole. I t exists to the 
extent that i t is manifested in the activities of men. It is a practice, 
therefore, in which distinctions can be discerned between various aspects, 
but which cannot be broken down like a chemical compound into separate 
elements. I t is not necessary to ponder whether the chicken of public 
order came before the egg of political activity, or whether political 
l i fe precedes authority. In practice, public order is inseparable from 
all aspects of political activity. Neither political activity nor pub-
l i c order could appear isolated from the other. Nor can i t be claimed 
that any one aspect of politics is prior to any other. All are depen-
dent on each other for the preservation of the society within which 
they each make their appearance. No one aspect can be said to be the 
foundation on which al l others rest. Distinct from one another, i t is 
only through the interaction of the various aspects that a public order 
is sustained through political activity, and political activity by pub-
l i c order. 
As a practice which does not begin at one moment in time and which 
cannot be said to be held together by any one key element, a public order 
has a kind of internal momentum that carries i t through time. Men are 
brought into a social order through a process of apprenticeship. This 
process is not one of critical examination of the order but of attempts 
to attain mastery of the idiom. It is not a self-conscious endeavour 
but is largely an unconscious achievement where imitation and uncriti-
cal emulation play a primary role. For most men the social world which 
they come to inhabit is one which is largely accepted as inevitable. 
I t is a world which they accept unquestioningly as a gift from the past 
and within which they adjust, trying to make themselves at. home as best 
they can. Change, of course, is inevitable. But equally inevitable is 
the fact that men will view the demands of the present in terms of the 
order which they have received from the past. Since we have no choice 
but to begin from where we are now, political activity concerns itself 
with the preservation and modification of the character of the public 
order within which we find ourselves. 
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While political activity is not the only way in which this order 
may both be maintained and modified, i t is a primary way. Those factors 
which are crucial in the preservation of public order are also crucial 
in the authorization of changes that enable the public order to meet 
the demands of the present. The diverse and interrelated aspects 
which make up political activity perform the dual role of sustaining 
the currency of a public order while modifications are brought about 
within i t . In doing so, political activity sustains through time the 
public order within which we fashion for ourselves a human identity, 
acknowledging the identity of others at the same time that we receive 
their acknowledgement in return. In the Western European tradition 
citizens are at one and the^ same time both together' and' "apart. Coll-
ectively they are subject to law; individually they are free to act 
within the order imposed by law. Perhaps the most significant mani-
festation of th^ir freedom is the freedom to modify the order to which 
they are subject - a freedom inconceivable were they to reject the 
discipline i t has imposed. 
200 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ACTON, H. B . , ' T r a d i t i o n and Some Other Forms o f O r d e r ' , Proceedings 
o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n Soc ie t y , 1952-53, N.S. V o T T T n T : 
ACHEBE, Chinua, No Longer a t Ease, (New York: Fawcett World L i b r a r y , 
1970y: 
ADCOCK, F. E . , Roman P o l i t i c a l Ideais and P r a c t i c e , (Ann Arbor ; Univ. 
o f Michigan Press , 19"6Fri 
AHMAD, Eqbad, 'Revo lu t i ona ry W a r f a r e ' , i n Marvin E. Gett leman, e d . , 
Vietnam: H i s t o r y , Documents, Opinions on a Major World 
C r i s i s , (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett P u b l i c a t i o n s , I n c . , 
ALLEN, J . W., P o l i t i c a l Thought i n the 16th Century. (London: 
Methuen & C o . , L t d . , 1967). 
ANSHEN, Ruth Nanda, e d . , Freedom: I t s Meaning, (London: George A l l e n 
& Unwin L t d . . 1942). 
ARDREY, Rober t , A f r i c a n Genesis, (New York: Atheneum P u b l i s h e r s , 
i96iy: 
ARENDT. Hannah, ' A u t h o r i t y i n the Twent ieth C e n t u r y ' , Review o f 
P o l i t i c s , 18: 403-17 (October, 1956) . 
ARENDT, Hannah, Between Past and Fu tu re , (New York: Mer id ian Books, 
The World Pub l i sh ing Co. , 1968). 
ARENDT, Hannah, Cr ises o f the Repub l ic , (London: Penguin Books, 
ARENDT, Hannah, The Human C o n d i t i o n , (Chicago: The Univ. o f Chicago 
Press, 1958). 
ARENDT, Hannah, 'On Ly ing i n P o l i t i c s : Re f lec t ions on the Pentagon 
P a p e r s ' , The New York Review, 18th November, 1971. 
ARENDT, Hannah, On R e v o l u t i o n , (London: Faber & Faber, 1963). 
ARENDT, Hannah, On V io lence , (London: A l l e n Lane The Penguin Press, 
i97oy: 
ARENDT, Hannah, 'What Was A u t h o r i t y ? ' i n Carl J . F r i e d r i c h , e d . , 
A u t h o r i t y , Nomos I , (Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1958). 
ARTZ, F reder i ck B . , From the Renaissance to Romanticism: Trends i n 
S ty les i n A r t . L i t e r a t u r e and l ^us i c , TS'DU-rSSO, (London: 
. The U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Press, 1962). 
BAKKE, E. Wr igh t , 'The Concept o f Socia l O r g a n i z a t i o n ' , i n Mason 
H a i r e , e d . , Modern Organ izat ion Theory. (New York: John 
Wi ley & Sons, I n c . , ]%?Y', 
201 
BARNARD, F. M. , ed. and t r a n s . , J . G. Herder on Socia l and P o l i t i -
ca l C u l t u r e , (Cambridge: The Cambridge Un i ve r s i t y Press, 
BECKER, E rnes t , The B i r t h and Death o f Meaning, (London: C o l l i e r -
Ma cniTTTarTrTtaTTlW)": 
BENTHAM, Jeremy, 'The Book o f F a l l a c i e s ' , The Works o f Jeremy 
Bentham, v o l . I I , John Bowring, e d . , (London: S impkin , 
Marsha l l & Co . , 1843). 
BERLIN, S i r I . , Four Essays on L i b e r t y , (Oxford : The Oxford Univer-
s i t y P ress , l^Wf. 
BERLIN, S i r I . , Two Concepts o f L i b e r t y , (Oxford : The Clarendon 
Press , 1958). 
BERMAN, Harold J . and GREINER, W i l l i am R., The Nature and Funct ions 
o f Law, (B rook l yn : The Foundation Press, I n c . , 1966). 
BERMAN, M a r s h a l l , The P o l i t i c s o f A u t h e n t i c i t y , (London: George 
A l l e n l Unwin, L t d . , 1970)'; 
BETTELHEIM, Bruno, 'V i o l ence : A Neglected Mode o f Behav iou r ' , i n 
Shalom Endelman, e d . . Violence i n the S t r e e t s , (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 19687^: 
BLAU. Peter M. and SCOTT, W. R ichard , Formal Organ iza t ions : A 
Comparative Approach, (London: Routledge & Kegan Pau l , 
1963). 
BODIN, Jean, S ix Books o f the Commonwealth. M. J . Tooley, ed. and 
t r a n s . , (Ox fo rd : .Bas i l B l a c k w e l l , 1967). . 
BURKE, Edmund, Se lec ted Works, 3 v o l s . , E. J . Payne , .ed . , (Oxford : 
Clarendon Press , 1921-26). 
BURKE, Edmund, Re f l ec t i ons on the Revolut ion i n France, (London: 
Penguin Books, 1969). 
CAMUS, A l b e r t , The Ou ts i de r , S t u a r t G i l b e r t , t r a n s . , (London: 
Penguin Books., 1971). 
CAMUS, A l b e r t , The Rebe l , Anthony Bower, t r a n s . , (London: Penguin 
Books, 1971). 
CANETTI, E l i a s , Crowds and Power, Carol S tewar t , t r a n s . , (New York: 
The VTl<ing Press , 1963). 
CAPLOW, Theodore, P r i n c i p l e s o f O rgan i za t i on , (New York: John Wiley 
& SonsTlnc , 1959). 
CARROLL, Lewis, Through the Looking Glass, (New York: Clarkson N. 
P o t t e r , I n c . , muy. " 
CASSIRER, E r n s t , The Logic o f the Humani t ies, (London: Yale Univ. 
PressTIWy: 
202 -
CLARK, Kenneth B . , 'The Wonder i s That There Have Been so Few R i o t s ' , 
i n Shalom Endelman, e d . , Violence i n the S t r e e t s , 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, \9W). 
CLEAVER, E l d r i d g e , Soul on I c e . (New York: Del l Pub l i sh ing C o . , 1968). 
COLEMAN, Samuel, ' I s There Reason i n T r a d i t i o n ? ' i n Preston King and 
B. C. Parekh, e d s . . P o l i t i c s and Exper ience, (Cambridge: 
The Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968). 
The Complete Report o f Mayor LaGuardia 's Commission on the Harlem 
•Riot o f March 19, 1935, (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 
CONNERY, Robert H . , e d . . Urban R i o t s : Violence and Soc ia l Change, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1969). 
CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONIST PARTY, 'A Be t te r Tomorrow'. Par ty Mani-
f e s t o , 1970. 
CRICK, Bernard . The Reform o f Pa r l i amen t , (London: Weidenfeld & 
N icho l son , 1964). 
CRITCHLEY, T. A . . The Conquest o f V io lence: Order and L i b e r t y i n 
B r i t a i n , (London: Constable & Co. . L t d . . 1970). 
CROZIER. M i c h e l , The Bureaucra t i c Phenomenon. (Chicago: Univ. o f 
Chicago Press, 1964). 
DERBY, Dan, 'House D i v i d e d ' , Far Eastern Economic Review, v o l . 
L X X I I I , no. 36 (4"~September. 197^) . 7 -8 . 
DEUTSCH. Kar l W.. '.The Nerves o f Government: Models o f P o l i t i c a l 
Communication and C o n t r o l , (London: C o l l i e r - M a c m i l l a n , 
j m r . 
DION, P h i l i p , 'Back to Square One ' , Far Eastern Economic Review, 
v o l . L X X I I I , no. 33 (14 August , 1971), 19-20. 
DOSTOYEVSKY, Fyodor. The D e v i l s . David Magarschack, t r a n s . , (London: 
Penguin Books, 1969). 
DRAKE, S t . C l a i r , 'Urban Vio lence and' Social Movements', i n Robert 
H. Connery, e d . . Urban R i o t s : Violence and Socia l 
Change. (New York: Vintage Books, 1969). 
EARL, Donald, The Moral and P o l i t i c a l T r a d i t i o n o f Rome, (London: 
Thames & Hudson, 1970). 
ECKSTEIN, Har ry , e d . , I n t e r n a l War, (London: C o l l i e r - M a c m i l l a n , 
L t d . , 19647:: 
ELLSBERG, D a n i e l , Papers on the War, (New York: Simon & Schuster , 
1972). 
ENDELMAN, Shalom, e d . . V io lence i n the S t r e e t s , (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 19687: 
203 -
FANON, Franz, The Wretched o f the E a r t h , Constance F a r r i n g t o n , 
t r a n s . , (New York: Grove Press, I n c . , 1965). 
FELDMAN, Arno ld S . , "V io lence and V o l i t i l i t y : The L i ke l i hood o f 
R e v o l u t i o n ' , i n Harry Ecks te in , e d . , I n t e r n a l War, 
(London: C o l l i e r - M a c m i l l a n , L t d . , ]96'^. 
FRIEDRICH, Carl J . , e d . , A u t h o r i t y , Nomos I , (Cambridge, Mass.: • 
The Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1958). 
FRIEDRICH, Carl J . , ' A u t h o r i t y , Reason and D i s c r e t i o n ' , i n Carl J . 
F r i e d r i c h , e d . . A u t h o r i t y , Nomos I , (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press* 1958). 
FRIEDRICH, Carl J . , Community, Nomos I I , (New York: The L ibe ra l 
A r t s Press , 1959). 
FRIEDRICH, Carl J . , e d . , L i b e r t y , Nomos IV, (New York: Ather ton 
Press , 1962). • 
FRIEDRICH, Car l J . , The Phi losophy o f Law i n H i s t o r i c a l Perspec t i ve , 
2nd e d . , (London: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1963). 
FRIEDRICH, Carl J . , e d . , R e v o l u t i o n , Nomos V I I I , (New York: A ther ton 
Press , 1966) . 
FRIEDRICH, Carl J . , T r a d i t i o n and A u t h o r i t y , (London: The Pa l l Mal l 
Press , '[WZj: 
GERTH, H. H. and MILLS, C. W r i g h t , t r a n s , and e d s . , From Max_Weber: 
Essays i n Soc io logy , (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 
L t d . , 1%7) . 
GETTLEMAN, Marvin E . , e d . , Vietnam: H i s t o r y , Documents and Op in ions , 
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1966). 
GOTTSCHALK, Louis R., Jean-Paul Marat: A Study i n Rad ica l ism, 
(London: The U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Press , 1967). 
GRAY, J . Glenn, The W a r r i o r s , (New York : Harper Torchback, 1959). 
GURR, Ted Rober t , Why Men Rebel , (P r ince ton : Pr ince ton Un i ve r s i t y 
P ress , "WTi j y : 
HALBERSTRAM, Dav id , The Best and the B r i g h t e s t , (New York: Random 
House, I'^TTT. 
HAN SUYIN, The Cr ipp led T ree , (London: Panther Books, L t d . , 1972). 
HART, H. L. A . , The Concept o f Law, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press , 
. 19617:: 
HEGEL, G. W. F . , The Phenomenology o f Mind, J . B. B a i l l i e , t r a n s . , -
(New York: Harper & Row, T W J . 
HEGEL, G. W. F . , The Phi losophy o f H i s t o r y , J . S i b ree , t r a n s . , 
(New York : Dover P u T h c a t i o n s . I n c . , 1956). 
HERSEY, John, The A l g i e r s Motel I n c i d e n t , (London: Hamish Hami l ton , 19^ 57:^  
HITLER, A d o l f , Me i n Kampf, (London: Hurs t & B l a c k e t t , L t d . , 1942). 
HOBBES, Thomas, Behemouth i n Co l lec ted Works, v o l . IV , S i r Wm. 
Moleswor th , e d . , "( london: John Bohn, 1843). 
HOBBES, Thomas, Lev ia than , Michael Oakeshott , e d . , (New York: C o l l i e r 
Books, 1962). 
HOBSBAWM, E. J . , P r i m i t i v e Rebels: Studies i n Archaic Forms o f Socia l 
Movement's i n the 19th and 20th Cen tu r i es , (Manchester; 
Manchester Univ. Press , 1959). 
HODGES, H. A . , Wi lhe lm Pi 1 they : An I n t r o d u c t i o n , (London: Kegan Pau l , 
T rench , Trubner & Co. , L t d . , 1944). 
HOFSTADTER, R i cha rd , The American P o l i t i c a l T r a d i t i o n , (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1948y: 
HOOK, S idney, e d . . Law and Ph i losophy, New York Un i ve r s i t y I n s t i t u t e 
o f Phi losophy Proceedings, 1964, (New York: The New York 
U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1964). 
JACOBSON, Norman, 'Knowledge, T r a d i t i o n and A u t h o r i t y ' , i n Carl J . 
F r i e d r i c h , e d . , A u t h o r i t y , Nomos I , (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1958). 
JOHNSON, Chalmers, Revo lu t ionary Change, (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown & 
Co. , I96B7:: 
de JOUVENAL, B e r t r a n d , Sovere ign ty : An I nqu i r y i n t o the P o l i t i c a l 
Good, J . F. Hun t ing ton , t r a n s . , (Cambridge: The Univer-
s i t y Press , 1957). 
KANN, Robert A . , The M u l t i n a t i o n a l Empire: Nat iona l ism and Nat iona l 
Reform i n the Hapsburg Monarchy, 1849-1919, 2 voTsl 
"(New York: The Columbia Un i ve rs i t y Press, 1950). 
KERR, W i l f r e d B . , The Reign o f T e r r o r , 1793-94, (Toronto : The 
U n i v e r s i t y o f Toronto P ress , 1927). 
• KINVITZ, M i l t o n R., ' C i v i l Disobedience and the Duty o f Fa i r P l a y ' , 
i n Sidney Hook, e d . . Law and Phi losophy. Proceedings o f . 
the New York U n i v e r s i t y i n s t i t u t e o f Phi losophy, (New 
York: The New York U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1964). 
KUHN, Thomas. The S t r u c t u r e o f S c i e n t i f i c Revo lu t ions , 2nd e d . , 
(Chicago: The U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Press, 1970). 
'Labour 's Programme f o r B r i t a i n ' , Annual Conference, 1973, (London: 
The Labour P a r t y , 1973). 
LABOUR RESEARCH DEPARTMENT. 'The Two C l a s s e s ' , 1935. 
205 
LADD, John, ' M o r a l i t y and P h i l o s o p h y ' , i n Sidney Hook, e d . , Law and 
Ph i losophy, Proceedings o f the New York U n i v e r s i t y 
I n s t i t u t e o f Ph i losophy , (New York: The New York Univer-
s i t y Press, 1964). 
LASKI, Haro ld J . , L i b e r t y i n the Modern S t a t e , (London: George 
A l l e n & Unwin, L t d . , 194B7: 
LASLETT, Pe te r . Ph i losophy, P o l i t i c s and Soc ie ty . 1st s e r i e s . 
(Oxford : Basi1 B l a c k w e l l . 1963). 
LEFEBVRE. Georges, The French R e v o l u t i o n , from i t s Or ig ins to 1793, 
(LondonTkout ledge & Kegan Pau l , 1962). 
LENIN, V. I . , What i s t o be Done?, (London: Panther Books, 1970). 
LEIF , Harold L . , 'Contemporary Forms o f V i o l e n c e ' , i n Shalom Endel-
man, e d . . V io lence i n the S t r e e t s , (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 19687: : 
LERNER, D a n i e l , The Passing o f T r a d i t i o n a l S o c i e t y , (London: 
C o l l i e r - M a c m i l l a n , L t d . . 1958). 
LIPSET, S. M., 'Democracy and the Soc ia l System' , i n Harry Ecks te i n , 
e d . , I n t e r n a l War, (London: C o l l i e r - M a c m i l l a n , L t d . , 
1964)": 
LOCKE, John, Two T rea t i ses o f Government, Peter L a s l e t t , e d . , 
(London: The New Engl ish L i b r a r y , L t d . , 1963). 
LORENZ, Konrad, On Aggress ion , M a r j o r i e K. W i l son , t r a n s . , (New York: 
Harcou r t , Brace, Jovanov ich , I n c . , 1966). 
MALCOLM X, The Autobiography o f Malcolm X, (New York: Grove Press, 
I n c . , 1965). 
MAO TSE-TUNG, Quotat ions from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, (Peking: Foreign 
Language Press , 1966). 
MAREUSE, H e r b e r t , An Essay on L i b e r a t i o n , (London: The Penguin Press, 
1969) . 
MAREUSE, He rbe r t , One-Dimensional Man-,' (London: Sphere Books, L t d . , 
1970) . 
MARX, K a r l , Ear ly W r i t i n g s . T. B. Bottomore, t r a n s , and e d . , (London: 
McGraw-HiTTBook Co . , 1964). 
MARX. Kar l and ENGLES, F r i e d r i c h , The Manifesto o f the Communist 
P a r t y , (Pek ing : Fore ign Languages Press, 1968). 
McALISTER, John T . , J r . , Vietnam: The Or ig ins o f Revo lu t i on , (London: 
A l l e n Lane, The Penguin Press , 1969). 
MILIBAND, Ralph, Popular Thought i n the French Revo lu t i on , 1789-1794, 
unpubl ished Ph.D. Thesis presented to U n i v e r s i t y o f 
London, 1956. 
MILNE, A. J . M., Freedom and R i g h t s , (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, 
Ltd. ,~W6F]T~^ 
MONTESQUIEU, Charles de . The Pers ian L e t t e r s , C. J . B e t t s , t r a n s . , 
(London: The "Penguin Press, 19 /3 ) . 
MOORE, B a r r i n g t o n , The Soc ia l Or ig ins o f D i c t a t o r s h i p and Democracy, 
( B o s t o n " t h e Beacon Press, 196 / ) . 
MOORE, B a r r i n g t o n , 'Thoughts on Vio lence and Democracy', i n Robert 
H. Connery, e d . , Urban R i o t s : V io lence and Socia l Change, 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1^7^ 
MURRIf, J . A . , e t a i , e d s . . The Oxford Engl ish D i c t i o n a r y , (Oxford : 
The Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press , l5T?]r 
NEUSTADT, Richard E . , P r e s i d e n t i a l Power, (New York: The New Amer-
ican L i b r a r y , 1964). 
NIEBURG, H. L . , P o l i t i c a l V io l ence , (New York: S t . M a r t i n ' s Press, 
19697^  
NIETZSCHE, F r i e d r i c h . Thus Spoke Za ra thus t ra . R. J . H o l l i n g d a l e , 
t r a n s . , (London: Penguin Books, 1971). 
'The No-No World o f T h i e u ' , Far Eastern Economic Review, v o l . L X X I I I , 
no. 39 (25 September, 1971) , 5-7. 
OAKESHOTT, M ichae l , 'Ra t i ona l i sm i n P o l i t i e s ' , Rat iona l ism i n P o l i -
t i c s , (London: Methuen & Co . , L t d . , 1967). 
ORWELL, George, ' P o l i t i c s and the Eng l ish Language', Selected 
Essays, (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1961). 
Par l iamentary Debates (Hansard) , 5th s e r i e s , v o l . 826 (Session 1971-
7 ? ) : 
PICKLES, Dorothy, The F i f t h French Republ ic : I n s t i t u t i o n s and P o l i -
t i c s , (London: Methuen & Co. , L t d . , 1962). ~ ~ 
PLATO, Gorg ias . Wal ter Hami l t on , t r a n s . , (London: Penguin Books, 
1971). 
PLATO, Repub l i c , F. M. Co rn fo rd . t r a n s . , (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press , 1961). 
POLANYI, M ichae l , Personal Knowledge, (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul,lTO7; 
POSTGATE, R. W., e d . , Revo lu t ion from 1789 to 1906, (London: Grant 
R ichards , L t d . . l^STTj: 
QUINTON. Anthony, e d . , P o l i t i c a l Ph i losophy, (Oxford : Oxford Univ. 
Press, 19677^ 
RAYMOND, E l l s w o r t h , The Sov ie t S t a t e , (London: C o l l i e r - M a c m i l l a n , 
L t d . , ]9'SSY. 
207 
'Report o f the Committee o f P r i vy Counsel lors appointed to cons ider 
" au tho r i zed procedures f o r the i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f persons 
suspected o f t e r r o r i s m ' , Cmnd. 4901 , (London: HMSO, 
The Report o f Mayor LaGuardia 's Commission on the Harlem R io t o f 
March 19, 1935, (New York: The Arno Press and the New 
York Times, 1935). 
Report o f the Nat iona l Adv isory Commission on C i v i l D i so rde rs , 
' (New York: Bantam Books, 1968). ~ 
ROCKSTROH, Dennis, 'Phantoms' V i c t o r y ' , Far Eastern Economic Review, 
v o l . L X X I I I , , no. 42 (16 October , 1971). 8 . , 
ROSE, R i cha rd , Governing:Without Consensus; An I r i s h / P e r s p e c t i v e , 
(London: Faber & Faber L t d . , 1971) . ' 
RUDE, George, The Crowd i n H i s t o r y : A Study o f Popular Disturbances 
i n France and England, 1730-1848, (London: John Wi ley 
& Sons, 1964)" ' 
SANTAYANA, George, Dominations and Powers^ (New:York: Charles 
S c r i b n e r s ' Sons, 1951). 
SARTRE, Jean-Pau l , L i t e r a r y and Ph i l osoph i ca l Essays, (London: 
C o l l i e r - M a c m i l I a n . 1966). 
SARTRE. Jean-Pau l . Nausea. Robert B a l d i c k , ^ t r a n s . , (London: Penguin 
Books. IWBj: 
SCHIFFRIN, Harold Z . , Sun Yat-sen and the Or i g i ns o f the Chinese 
R e v o l u t i o n , (Los Angeles: The' U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a 
Press , 1968). 
SHILS, Edward, ' T r a d i t i o n and L i b e r t y : Antinomy and In te rdependence ' , 
E t h i c s , v o l . L X V I I I , no. 3 , A p r i l , 1958, 153-165. 
SHILS, Edward A . , ' I n t e l l e c t u a l s , T r a d i t i o n and the T r a d i t i o n of 
I n t e l l e c t u a l s : Some P re l im ina ry C o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' , Daedalus, 
v o l . 1 0 1 , no. 2 ( S p r i n g , 1972). 
SIMPSON, J . Pa lg rane. P ic tu res from Revo lu t ionary P a r i s , 2 v o l s . , 
(London: W i l l i am Blackwood & Sons, 1849). 
SNOW, Edgar, Red S ta r Over China, (New York : Grove Press , I n c . , 1961). 
SOLZHENITSYN, A lexander , The F i r s t C i r c l e . Michael Guybon, t r a n s . , 
(London: Fontana Books, 1968). 
SOREL, Georges, Re f l ec t i ons on V io lence , T. D. Hulme and J . Roth , 
t r a n s . , (London: C o l l i e r - M a c m i l I a n , 1961). 
STARNER, Frances, 'Winner Takes A l l ' , Far Eastern Economic Review, 
v o l . L X X I I I , no. 41 (9 October . l ^ V l ) , 7-8~ 
STARNER, Frances, 'Bunker 's Boy ' , Far Eastern Economic Review, v o l . 
LXXKKK, no, 40 (2 OctoberTlWl), 8-IT: 
: f o r Idei 
The Cambj 
(WELL, Mi 
B. L ipp i 
rd Univer 
French R 
ina L ib ra 
: and Jac 
* Kegan P 
id., T. 0 
lersity o 
; ippraisal 
r k : J . B 
lice. War i 
I'd Univeri 
i n i z a t i o n 
|;ott Pars( 
1164). 
liSlett, ec 
s e r i e s , ( 
i Penguin 
iin: Robert 
;Ruth Nand 
jiorge A l l e 
: , P o l i t i c 
i 's i ty Pres 
The Del l 
-C , T h e K u ^ ^ o f the Chinese Revo lu t i on . 
(London: George ATTen & Unwin, Lt3rnW87: —: 
WRIGHT, R ichard , Nat ive Son, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 
